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Abstract  
This research contributes to the growing subfield of ideational political 
economy, by developing a theory of narrative in economic policymaking.  
Economic policymakers operate under conditions of perpetual uncertainty, 
but must achieve and project certitude in order to support confidence, and as 
a basis for policy. This dilemma is principally resolved through the construction 
of economic narratives: causal stories that mobilise a set of economic ideas in 
order to define the economy, its relationship to policy, and its expected future 
trajectory. Such narratives should be understood as social constructions, not 
as projections of, or diversions from, the material facts. However they are 
vulnerable to events that fall outside their account of the economy, a 
vulnerability which tends to increase with time. 
Constructivist political economy has historically been oriented more to the 
explanation of change than continuity. The resilience of neoliberal policy 
frameworks through the crisis of 2008 has therefore posed challenges for a 
subfield that has tended to treat ideas and discourse as a source of creative 
political agency, and a counterweight to the conservatism of interests and 
institutions.  
The thesis presents a case study of the New Labour government of the UK 
(1997-2010) in which ideas and narrative are shown to be largely change-
resistant, generating political, and to some extent policy, continuity through 
crisis. The case study disaggregates two properties of economic policy 
narratives: internal validity, which is concerned with consistency and 
coherence, and external validity, which relates to the perceived external 
conditions. By tracing the evolution of the two validities across the lifetime of 
an economic narrative, we see that rhetorics which begin as the expression of 
political agency evolve, over time, into structural conditions that impose 
powerful cognitive and ideological constraints on their narrators. A theory of 
the life-cycle of economic policy narratives is proposed, comprised of four 
evolutionary phases: construction, reinforcement, crisis and fragmentation. 
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A note on referencing 
 
The thesis makes reference to a large volume of primary sources in the form 
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decided to index these materials separately from the main bibliography, with 
in-text citations using a set of reference codes rather than the (author, date) 
format otherwise used. A full index of speeches cited in the text is duly 
provided after the bibliography. 
Reference codes are designed to indicate the nature of the speech, and the 
year in which it was delivered: for example, the 2008 Budget statement 
becomes (BUD08). The identity of the speaker is generally made clear in the 
surrounding text.  
The two exceptions to this rule are: speeches that appear as secondary 
citations from other texts, and speeches by actors other than the New Labour 
government. These are cited (author, date) and appear in the bibliography in 
the usual way. 
Parliamentary proceedings are referenced in accordance with the advice in 
Leston-Bandeira, C. & Thompson, L. 2013. Referencing Parliamentary Material: 
A Guide for Lecturers and Students’, which is produced by the UK Parliament 
Outreach Service and recommended by the Political Studies Association. For 
example, House of Commons proceedings are listed by parliamentary session 
and Hansard column number: HC Deb. 2005-06: 441 col.1494. 
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1. Introduction 
Materialist and constructivist approaches to economic 
policy narratives 
 
This project is about the politics of economic policy: specifically, about the 
business of translating economic ideas, and economic events, into a viable 
political narrative. It will propose that economic policy narratives are not only 
descriptive but constitutive of that politics, being designed to turn uncertainty 
into certainty and so provide a basis for policy action. Yet economic rhetoric is 
relatively under-analysed in political economy, being more often treated as a 
mask for underlying interests, or as secondary part of government activity 
compared with the serious (and measurable) business of making policy and 
winning elections. In particular, we currently lack a fully-realised theoretical 
framework for understanding how language acts to establish the validity of a 
particular narrative of the economy, and what happens to that validity when 
the narrative is confronted with events it cannot easily assimilate. 
In the last several years, it has become impossible to ignore the fact 
there is often a disjunction between what politicians say, and what seems to 
be happening in the world. Political science has had no choice but to confront 
this problem: the rise of a new “post-truth” politics in which hard facts are 
apparently subordinate to partisan impact and the validation of common 
knowledge. This poses serious questions for a discipline founded on the idea 
of an at-least minimally rational voter and a mostly logical political process. 
Political science has always been, to some extent, a normative account of how 
democracies are supposed to work; the post-truth age raises the uneasy 
prospect of a world in which politics is irretrievably irrational and unmoored 
from reality. The gap between what politicians say, and what is apparently 
going on, has therefore become the focus of a great deal of attention, 
sharpening the problem of how best to theorise the role and operation of 
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language in politics.  
This research approaches the question via a case study from a different 
era: the ostensibly depoliticised, technocratic, “great moderation” of the 
1990s and early 2000s. During that time, the language of economic policy 
seemed to be doing no more than reflecting a global economy in which 
stability and prosperity reigned. The 2008 financial crisis not only disrupted 
that economy but undermined a generation of political and intellectual 
certainties, paving the way for a new period of critical reflection on what this 
apparently neutral economic language had been doing, and how political 
accounts of the economy should be scrutinised. The political consequences of 
the crisis have not, however, played out as might have been predicted. This 
research project began with an impulse to expose the contingency of the great 
moderation’s account of itself; it has evolved into a broader treatment of the 
role of economic ideas, and language, in driving both political change and, to a 
surprising degree, political continuity after a crisis. 
This introductory chapter sets up the parameters of the research with 
reflections on some key themes. First, it posits the existence of a perennial 
tension in economic policymaking, between the uncertainty inherent in 
economics and the certainty required of politics. This tension, it is suggested, 
is resolved by the use of rhetoric to construct narratives, making language a 
core component of economic policymaking, but one which is not well 
theorised. Second, it broadly outlines the two main epistemological 
frameworks in which political science has tended to approach economic policy 
as its object: on the one hand, rational materialism, and on the other hand, 
social constructivism. Each implies a distinct set of assumptions about the role, 
and importance, of language in economic policy. Third, I suggest that the case 
of the New Labour Government of the United Kingdom exposes the limitations 
of both conceptual frameworks in respect of language and economic policy. 
The politics of Britain’s economic crisis in 2008-10 does not fit well with either 
rationalist assumptions about economic actors, or constructivist theories of 
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ideationally-driven change. As such, it is suggested that there is a need to 
further develop our theories of the role of discourse, and ideas, in economic 
policy. 
The chapter will suggest that while both materialist and constructivist 
explanatory frameworks struggle to explain the ideational and discursive 
dynamics of economic policy, a broadly constructivist political economy offers 
the greatest potential to do so. Working within a constructivist paradigm, the 
thesis that follows then has two aims. The specific empirical objective is to 
delve into the ideational workings of a particular case: the New Labour 
government of the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010. It is suggested 
that an analysis of Labour’s narrative can shed new light on the ideas at work 
in an important political project, and particularly on the latter years of that 
government, including its response to the 2008-09 financial crisis, which has 
attracted less attention from scholars of New Labour so far. The broader 
objective, however, is theory-building: to see what the New Labour case can 
reveal about the role of narrative in political economy. Ultimately, the 
research asks what Labour’s attempts to renew their rhetoric in the face of 
crisis can tell us about the operation of economic ideas across a political and 
economic cycle, and about the relationship between political constructions 
and economic events. 
The uncertainty dilemma 
Let us take as a starting point two assumptions about the politics of the 
economy. First, that the nature of the economic conditions is irretrievably 
uncertain; that doubt and contestation are permanent conditions despite, or 
perhaps in keeping with, the sophistication of the economics profession, as 
t’Hart and Tindall have noted: 
“Despite its modelling prowess and the unrelenting certitude 
conveyed by some of its best-known practitioners, the field of 
economics is anything but an exact science… expert 
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disagreement is the norm and is, in fact, an additional source 
of uncertainty rather than a mechanism for helping 
policymakers cope with it.” (2009: 6) 
 
In assuming perpetual uncertainty I am making a straightforward empirical 
claim – that economic uncertainty is everywhere to be found – and leave aside, 
for now, the ontological question of whether economic conditions are 
fundamentally knowable. As a starting point it is enough to note that 
economies are generally complex and opaque, difficult to interpret and even 
harder to predict. Even where we have good information about certain 
dimensions of the economy – employment rates, GDP growth, inflation – the 
implications of those things are perpetually open to debate. And if the 
interpretation of a single economic indicator or trend may be debatable, the 
sum of those individual parts is even more unclear; acquiring data on a set of 
trends is not the same as having an objective view of “the economy” as a 
singular object. As such I take economic uncertainty to be the common 
denominator of economic policymaking. 
Second, we may assume that economic uncertainty, no matter how 
inevitable, is politically unviable and must be replaced with a working measure 
of certainty. Mark Blyth has argued that faced with Knightian uncertainty, 
“human agents create the stability that they take for granted” (2006: 497); we 
are continually in the business of constructing solid ground on which we can 
stand. The pressure to achieve certainty is particularly acute in economic 
policy, since while some policy areas can be de-emphasised at different times, 
the economy is rarely in that category. Saying nothing about the economy can 
look too much like knowing nothing, to the extent that silence is not often a 
viable option for governments. T’Hart and Tindall note the dilemma this 
creates, since “policymakers can seldom afford to wait until they really know 
what’s going on before communicating about it publicly” (2009: 4). Indeed, 
the imperative to pronounce on the state of the economy may increase in 
proportion to uncertainty about it, since in times of crisis the government 
 14 
becomes a particularly important source of economic expertise and 
reassurance. Governments, by virtue of their special responsibility for the 
economy, have the job of conjuring solid political terrain out of profound 
economic uncertainty, and they must perform this trick year after year. 
The problem on which this thesis will focus is thus a problem that routinely 
confronts those in power: how can economic uncertainty be transformed into 
political certainty, and what are the challenges attending that process? It is 
suggested that a key tool by which governments cope with economic 
uncertainty is the construction of narratives about the economy; that is, by 
conceiving and mobilising overarching stories that aim to define and master 
the economic conditions, and so provide a basis for policy action. Narrative, in 
a world of uncertain economics, becomes a key source of politically actionable 
certitude. 
Based on that proposition, I will argue there is a clear need to understand 
how economic narratives are constructed, how they achieve their political and 
economic credibility and, in particular, how they cope with change and crisis. 
What, precisely, is the relationship between political constructions of the 
economy, and material economic events? How should we understand and 
theorise governments’ economic discourses? When do they change, and when 
do they hold steady? What combination of material fact and interpretive 
action adds up to a valid economic narrative and how should the theorist 
proceed to answer that question? If we are to understand the implications of 
the uncertainty dilemma – to understand how governments reconcile 
economic uncertainty with political responsibility – two broad responses are 
available, which can be broadly characterised as materialist and constructivist. 
Either approach implies a particular understanding of the intellectual 
processes by which economic conditions are politically mastered and, hence, 
quite different understandings of the importance and role of economic 
narratives and rhetoric. 
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Rational materialism and economic policy 
The materialist response is that the cure for uncertainty is knowledge: we 
master the economy by getting better at forecasting, refining our economic 
models, gathering good data and interrogating it systematically (e.g. Reinhart 
& Rogoff, 2009). Governments should, in theory, be better placed to do this 
than most, given their stock of in-house expertise, privileged access to data, 
and ability to draw on wider sources of expert advice. In a rational materialist 
world, the politics of economic policy should favour those who are most 
skilled at understanding the economy and responding to it. Economic policy 
narratives, then, should succeed when and because they correspond with the 
facts, deriving their validity from their grip on the economic fundamentals, 
and losing validity when the gap between the rhetoric and the reality becomes 
too large. The test of a good economic narrative comes down to its accuracy, 
so that the success of a political story should depend on whether it is 
materially correct and true. Voters being assumed to be rational creatures, 
they are expected to discern the true state of the economy and judge their 
own interests accordingly; while rhetoric might obfuscate those interests for a 
time, on the whole the public is expected to reject inaccurate narratives 
sooner or later. 
 
Expressed in the abstract like this, the materialist view might appear 
exaggeratedly apolitical. Yet the assumptions underlying rational materialism 
are quite pervasive both in academia and in wider commentary on politics. 
Mainstream economics has, of course, been subject to extensive criticism for 
its sometimes crude assumption that rational maximisation is the keystone of 
social action, and that the micro-rationality of individuals can be aggregated to 
the level of groups and societies (Green & Shapiro, 1994; Kahneman, 2012). In 
particular, the empirical evidence for the all-knowing rational agent has been 
shown to be extremely thin. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to rehearse 
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the arguments for and against rational choice theory, but it is important to 
note that many of those criticisms have duly been taken on board; the 
growing field of behavioural economics, for example, seeks to more accurately 
reflect some of the systematic irrationalities driving human choices, aiming to 
improve economists’ empirical grip on the real world, and with it their 
prospects of influencing policy. What behavioural economics retains, however, 
is a materialist ontology in which there is a measurable, and mostly 
predictable, distance between economic interests and actors’ choices.  
 
The important feature of rational materialism, for the purposes of this 
research, is its narrow view of the role of discourse and ideas. So long as 
rational materialist assumptions are in play, ideas about the economy are 
essentially reduced to an error function, describing a measure of the 
misperception of actors’ true interests (Blyth, 1997). Political language about 
the economy is then revealing only insofar as it identifies systematic 
irrationalities and makes them available for measurement. Such assumptions 
are not confined to the academy; they also dominate large parts of the 
discipline of political science and, especially, international political economy 
(see McNamara, 2009), which imports from economics the archetype of the 
rational agent and, in doing so, reduces much political behavior to the 
maximisfraation of economic utility, leaving ideas and language beside the 
point. Moreover, materialist assumptions are everywhere to be found in 
popular commentary on politics. The famous Clinton campaign slogan “it’s the 
economy, stupid” made a mantra of the idea that where the economy goes, 
the politics must follow; that Governments’ ideas and reputations must be 
expected to prosper when the economy is doing well, and falter when times 
are hard. Economic rhetoric can then effect, at most, only a marginal or 
temporary difference compared with the economic fundamentals.  
 
Rational materialism performs an important role in the theoretical 
architecture of classical economics; however, as the Clinton slogan shows, it 
facilitates only a very thin account of real-world politics. In regards to the New 
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Labour years, it is quickly apparent that a rational-materialist reading is an 
unsatisfactory, and certainly an incomplete, conceptualisation of both that 
period in British politics and of the role of economic ideas and discourse more 
generally. It is now commonplace to deride Gordon Brown’s “stability and 
prudence” rhetoric as either dishonest or fatally misguided; Labour’s much-
vaunted stability narrative was seriously damaged by the financial crisis of 
2008-09, and swiftly gave way to a new coalition government and a new 
narrative of austerity. Yet it is worth recalling how politically successful 
Labour’s stability talk was, and for how long. Until roughly 2007, the New 
Labour government could claim a good degree of success in rebuilding the 
party’s economic credibility, to the extent that in the 2005 general election 
campaign the economic record, and Brown’s reputation as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, were seen as key campaign assets (Scammell & Harrop 2005). It 
now looks extraordinary that in 2007 Brown was still declaring that “we will 
never return to the old boom and bust” (BUD07), but at the time it embodied 
a tried and tested economic policy narrative that had survived a decade in 
government. 
A materialist position leaves room for two possible explanations of that 
political success (Table 1.1). One possibility is that Labour’s stability narrative 
was broadly correct for the first ten years, accurately describing a period of 
steady and continuous economic growth, low unemployment and low inflation. 
The financial crisis, in that account, is an exogenous change in the economic 
conditions that did not invalidate the narrative but overtook it, necessitating 
new rhetoric for new times. A second scenario assumes that the stability 
narrative was always factually dubious, but that it nonetheless succeeded for a 
time in obscuring the presence of underlying economic fault lines and earning 
the government undeserved credit. The financial crisis then served to expose 
the true state of the economy, and with it the falsity of the rhetoric. I suggest, 
however, that the very difficulty in choosing between those two accounts 
exposes the inadequacy of a materialist explanation. Whether one decides 
that Labour’s narrative was overtaken by events, or exposed as false by them, 
is still open to interpretive judgment. Indeed, such judgments still appear to 
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break down according to party affiliation, with Labour spokespeople generally 
maintaining that the crisis was unforeseeable and separate from the stability 
years, while their political opponents argue Labour’s narrative had misread or 
misrepresented the true risks to Britain’s prosperity. 
 
Table 1.1: Two materialist accounts of Labour’s stability narrative 
 
 Before the crisis After the crisis 
A) Stability narrative 
was correct  
Rhetoric succeeds 
because it reflects 
reality 
Rhetoric overtaken by 
events 
B) Stability narrative 
was wrong  
Rhetoric succeeds by 
obscuring reality 
Rhetoric exposed by 
events 
 
Ultimately, both materialist explanations share a common assumption: 
that there is a measurable distance between the narrative and the events it 
described, such that the gap between rhetoric and reality may be objectively 
assessed. As a consequence, the only question that need be asked about 
rhetoric is how accurate it is; the only available verdicts on political narratives 
of the economy are either that they are descriptive of reality, or that they 
misrepresent it. Political language, in the materialist view, is either redundant 
because it tells us nothing that a sound reading of the fundamentals would not 
reveal, or it is a red herring, because it leads us to believe things that are not 
true. I suggest that when we are asked to choose between accounts that 
locate the politics of economics in a critical divergence between rhetoric and 
reality, we are essentially looking for a way to measure the reality and discard 
the rhetoric. The irony is that the very process of doing so requires us to 
interpret the economy under conditions of uncertainty.  
 
In the New Labour case, an objective measure of the rhetoric-reality 
gap is extremely difficult to determine. Even in hindsight, with all the new data 
provided by the unspooling of a financial crisis, we appear unable to decisively 
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reject either of the two explanations for the previous success of New Labour’s 
stability talk. The fact of our continued uncertainty about the nature of the 
pre-crisis economy suggests that there is more to economic policy rhetoric 
than a sliding scale of correctness. Was it a period of growth that stopped 
because of a global downturn? Or a period of on-paper growth that turned out 
to be illusory? A political post-mortem on New Labour’s economic record and 
the causes of the crisis continues to require the mobilisation of ideas about 
the economy in order to select between, and politically activate, competing 
narratives of our recent economic and political past. So while material events 
may be discernible, and material indicators available, the larger picture – 
Britain’s economic crisis as an agreed story – cannot be assembled by simply 
summing those parts together, but must be arrived at through discourse and 
debate. Economic uncertainty persists.  
 
Economic narratives as social constructions 
The alternative to materialist readings is a constructivist political economy 
that has focused on reasserting the primacy of economic ideas over material 
conditions, and which points out that the “truth content” of economic ideas 
may be irrelevant to their political force (Blyth, 2003: vii).  In a constructivist 
framework, the economic conditions are substantially in the eye of the 
beholder, not objective and exogenous to politics but “constituted by social 
processes” (McNamara, 2002: 61) and thus inseparable from political action. 
The politics of economic policy are assumed to originate not in “the economy” 
as observable landscape, but out of the ideational construction of the 
economy by political agents, as Hay and Rosamond have argued:  
 
“It is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which 
they find themselves rather than the context itself which 
informs the way in which actors behave. This is no less true of 
policy-makers and governments.” (Hay & Rosamond, 2002: 
148) 
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A constructivist understanding of economics as based on ideas rather than a 
material context implies a different understanding of how political agents 
react to uncertainty. Rather than the cure for uncertainty being fact, economic 
uncertainty is assumed to be the trigger for processes of construction that 
draw on, but are not bounded by, ideas about the material economy. A 
constructivist framework thus implies a far more central role for economic 
language, and for the ideas it mobilises. Viewed as constructions, economic 
narratives are neither a description nor a misdescription of the fundamentals 
behind political behaviour, but the medium in which the economics become 
politically meaningful in the first place. Indeed, the politics in the political 
economy derive precisely from these processes of social construction, since 
“the material world always has to be interpreted, and the ability to determine 
which stories are told about that world is a source of power” (McNamara, 
2015: 47). 
 
Social psychologist Serge Moscovici 1  (2008) has argued that social 
construction (or “representation”, in his terms) is fundamental to humans’ 
ability to absorb new information and circumstances, especially in relation to 
subjects that are technical or abstract. He suggests the need to generate 
collective understandings is particularly a feature of the modern world, which 
is too complex for us to form our own conclusions about most of it. Instead, 
we rely on ideas and experts that have been certified as credible by the 
community: 
“Increasingly, it is through the intermediary of other people 
that we are familiarized with theories and phenomena, and 
we cannot verify them on the basis of individual experience. 
The bloated mass of indirect knowledge and indirect realities 
                                                        
1 Not to be confused with his son, European Commissioner and former 
French minister of Finance Pierre Moscovici, who is not a known social 
constructivist. 
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extends far beyond the shrivelled mass of direct knowledge 
and direct realities, and it is spreading in every direction. 
Under these conditions, we think and see by 
proxy.“ (Moscovici 2008: xxvii) 
 
It is difficult to think of an area in which that idea is more apt than economics. 
Much of what we hear about the economy, and economic policy, is abstracted 
from our daily lives. We may think the fiscal deficit is important, but it cannot 
be seen or touched and, if asked, most people probably couldn’t say how big it 
is. Even when economic events touch us directly – when we become 
unemployed, or our mortgage interest goes up – the causes of those events 
are unclear and require interpretation. Politicians, and especially governments, 
then become an important source of pre-certified ideas about the state of the 
economy. A constructivist view of economic policy therefore requires that 
narrative, and rhetoric, are placed at the centre of the analysis, with 
government narratives perhaps most central of all. 
 Constructivist political economy has important advantages, making 
possible a fuller conception of the role of narrative and rhetoric than is 
available using rational materialist assumptions. It opens up the political as 
well as the economic dimension of political economy, and allows us to ask 
more searching questions of rhetoric than simply whether it is correct, 
exploring instead the kind of correctness the narrative is trying to assert, and 
what the political implications of that attempt might be. However, 
constructivist political economy also runs up against some difficulties in 
explaining the dynamics of the New Labour case, and especially the Labour 
government’s apparent inability to reframe its economic story in the face of 
the financial crisis. In a constructivist world, ideas and discourse introduce a 
theoretically bottomless flexibility to politics, allowing actors to perpetually 
redefine the world and build new coalitions of interests around new narratives. 
As such, the empirical literature in ideational political economy had until 
recently been oriented to the explanation of change, not continuity (see Blyth, 
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1997; Schmidt, 2010). If institutions were the source of continuity in politics, 
ideas and discourse were assumed to be the grit in the oyster; the building 
block of political creativity and innovation with which political actors, whether 
social movements or elite norm entrepreneurs, could conceive and instigate 
change.  
Furthermore, constructivist political economy, in conjunction with 
historical institutionalism, had developed a punctuated equilibrium view of 
change in which crises should create the main window of opportunity for ideas 
and discourse. The 2008 financial crisis, and the political contortions that it 
triggered around the developed economies, should have been one of those 
moments in which the workings of economic ideas in politics is best revealed, 
since it was well established in the comparative political economy literature 
that moments of crisis are the key opportunity for ideational and discursive 
change (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2003). For example, t’Hart and Tindall emphasise 
that moments of crisis are opportunities for discursive contests that produce 
more rapid change than would normally be possible: “When a particular ‘crisis 
narrative’ takes hold, it can be an important force for non-incremental 
changes in policy fields that are normally stabilized by the forces of path 
dependence, inheritance and veto-playing.” (2009: 23). Mark Blyth has 
cautioned against treating ideas as an all-purpose deus ex machina, arriving 
from the ether to disrupt otherwise stable institutions (Blyth, 1997). However, 
Blyth himself allows ideas their greatest power in the aftermath of a 
disruption of the status quo:  
“[I do not] say that only ideas matter, nor that institutional 
change is purely an ideational affair; they do not and it is not. 
But economic ideas certainly do matter in periods when 
existing institutional frameworks and the distributions they 
make possible fail and uncertainty prevails.” (Blyth, 2003: 11) 
 
Constructivist political economy, and its part in the ideational turn 
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within political science, had thus given rise to two broad expectations. First, 
that since politics is based on processes of ideational and discursive 
construction, ideas and discourse will be most important when they operate in 
the service of change rather than continuity. Second, that if crises are the 
moments at which the creative potential of ideas is most likely to emerge, we 
should have seen it in the 2010s; discursive change was supposed to follow 
institutional shock. It was therefore a problem for constructivist political 
economy that the largest exogenous shock in a generation – the global 
financial crisis – did not seem to have opened the ideational field as much as 
one might have expected. The orthodoxies of neoliberal economic policy, 
particularly its embrace of finance capitalism, should have been seriously 
weakened by the crisis of 2008-onwards. As Schmidt and Thatcher put it: 
“assertions about allocation through ‘efficient markets’ as 
opposed to the ‘inefficient state’ faced the reality of 
disastrous private-market decisison and state bailouts of 
large companies, including large financial institutions who 
had been the beacons of private markets… Such gaps 
between the rhetoric and a different reality might have been 
expected to weaken neoliberalism; however, their continued 
reappearance suggests the opposite.” (2013: 29) 
 
Far from instigating a reckoning for neoliberal economic policy, the crisis 
proved “not paradigm challenging but rather paradigm-reinforcing” across the 
advanced economies (Hay & Smith 2013: 402). From Britain’s austerity 
budgets to Federal Reserve’s continuing entanglement with Wall Street 
(Jacobs & King 2016) to the Eurozone’s self-inflicted pain, neoliberalism 
appears to have survived the crisis with its grip on the levers of policy as tight 
as ever. Ideational political economy, having hitherto been mostly change-
oriented, was forced to confront the failure of its predictions and come up 
with ways of theorising ideational continuity, and to ask whether it could be 
understood as something distinct from stable interests or institutional inertia 
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(Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). 
The New Labour government of the UK offers a prime example of this 
puzzle. Following Labour’s election defeat in 2010, Gordon Brown used his 
hastily-written book Beyond the Crash to acknowledge that the old ideas had 
proven useless in explaining what had gone wrong in 2008-09: 
“With the major industrial economies hurtling toward a 
depression, we were facing a perfect storm. Economic 
orthodoxy was proving irrelevant; the market seemed intent 
not on self-correction, but on self-destruction.” (Brown, 2010a: 
xix) 
 
Yet in the opening pages of the same book Gordon Brown reaffirmed his faith 
in the goodness of free markets:  
“I am proud that whatever my faults, I have maintained a 
resolutely antiprotectionist, pro-free trade, pro-market, and 
pro-globalisation stance throughout my time as Chancellor, as 
Prime Minister, and since.” (ibid: 26, footnote, emphasis 
added) 
 
Brown was not alone in exhibiting this kind of cognitive dissonance. 
Policymakers in the UK and other developed nations, despite much talk about 
the dramatic scale of the crisis in the years following the crash, did not seem 
to be rejecting the old policy paradigm nor even seriously questioning it. The 
New Labour case is best seen as a subset of a wider puzzle, in which despite 
massive shocks to existing narratives, ideational change did not emerge.  
After the banking crisis of 2008-09, despite taking quite decisive policy 
action Labour floundered presentationally, struggling to adapt a new narrative 
to fit the changed conditions. The policy response to the crisis was, in fact, 
quite decisive, including government action to recapitalise British banks, and a 
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leading role for the UK in coordinating policy at the international level. 
Brown’s proactiveness won praise from international observers and policy 
elites (Freedland 2009); nonetheless, the domestic politics remained 
unfavourable, with Labour apparantly unable to articulate a convincing story 
about why the crisis had occurred, and what the future would look like. The 
question is why the rhetoric – ostensibly the most flexible part of a 
government’s activity – should be so difficult to turn around, even in the face 
of extreme provocation. There is no doubt that the arrival of the credit crunch 
dealt a serious blow to Labour’s “no return to boom and bust” narrative, but if 
the policy could adapt, why not the story? If economic narratives are social 
constructions, why not simply construct a new one to fit? Just as materialist 
political economy struggled to explain the political success of Labour’s stability 
talk before the financial crisis, constructivist political economy also has some 
difficulty explaining the stubbornness of that narrative after the crash.   
Economic construction between crises 
The risk for constructivist political economy is therefore that the “strange non-
death” of the old ideas (Crouch, 2011) simply brings us back around to 
material explanations. If ideational and narrative change was not a major 
feature of this crisis, perhaps ideas and social construction are not the causal 
force constructivists had believed. It might be argued that economic policy 
change is less a matter of ideational contestation after crisis, and more a 
straightforward regrouping of interest politics, or a simple case of institutional 
inertia, in which case a combination of rational choice and historical 
institutionalism is sufficient to explain things. To the extent that neoliberalism 
has been rebooted rather than rejected since 2008, this might be taken to 
reveal the primary importance of economic elites and their grip on key 
institutions: on the one hand, powerful interest groups maintaining their 
position by sponsoring the politics of austerity and retrenchment (Mirowski, 
2013) and, on the other hand, the institutional stickiness of an intellectual 
framework that has put a generation of economists in tenured positions (Blyth, 
2013b). In that case, there can be little to say about ideas and narrative except 
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that they provide useful tools for groups that wish to make narrow interests 
appear encompassing. The non-death of neoliberal ideas is only puzzling if you 
start with constructivist assumptions about the malleability of political 
thought; if you begin instead with institutional status-quo bias or interest-
group politics, the puzzle arguably disappears. Ideas and discourse are once 
again epiphenomenal to the operation of more familiar causal forces. 
This thesis will propose that ideas and discourse actually did matter a 
great deal in the story of Britain’s financial crisis and its aftermath, but that 
understanding how they mattered requires a more nuanced theory of the 
ways in which ideas operate across a political cycle. In particular, it requires a 
much better theory of the extent to which continuity, and the periods in 
between crises, are also subject to processes of narrative construction. The 
role of discourse in shaping economic policy programmes is most well 
acknowledged in respect of economic crisis, since at times when policy 
paradigms are destabilised by crisis, the process of redefining the economy in 
speech becomes highly visible:  
“Who gets to interpret the crisis, to speak what it is, and to 
specify what models can legitimately be brought to bear to 
tame it is worth attending to… Such practices are the exercise 
of power.” (Abdelal et al 2011: 234) 
 
However, this was only ever half the story. If we are persuaded that language 
acts to politically construct periods of crisis, it surely makes sense to ask what 
role economic rhetoric plays at other points in the cycle. The construction of 
economic stability in the period between crises is equally important as the 
construction of paradigmatic change, but remains undertheorised by 
constructivists. In particular, this shortcoming arises because the politics of 
stability and the politics of crisis cannot be adequately understood in isolation 
from one another. Focusing on narrative – on politics as a story, told in a 
particular order – has the potential to correct this weakness because it 
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imposes an awareness of sequence that can otherwise go missing in political 
economy. Responses to crisis are not hatched in a laboratory; they occur in 
the presence of prior narratives and may be conditioned, or indeed 
constrained, by the political stories that have gone before. As such we need an 
ideational political economy that does not treat ideational change and 
continuity as separate and free-standing phenomena, but which engages with 
processes of construction across the boom-bust cycle.  
In that spirit, this research explores the proposition that in the New 
Labour case, ideas and rhetoric that began in the service of political change 
later became ossified, to the extent that Labour were eventually trapped by 
their own discourse; wedded to an imaginary of the economy that was 
increasingly difficult to sustain but which nonetheless imposed real 
boundaries on the government’s ability to think, or speak, a different 
economic story. Keynes’ much-quoted (and possibly apocryphal) bon mot on 
evidence-based policy – “when the facts change, I change my mind” –  is often 
held up as an example for policymakers to follow. But New Labour’s struggle 
to renew their rhetoric after the 2008 crisis appears illustrative of a different 
Keynesian observation: that “the difficulty lies not in the new ideas, but in 
escaping from the old ones” (Keynes 1973: xxiii). This research deploys the 
tools of ideational political economy to look more closely at why, exactly, that 
should be so.  
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2.  Theory and literature 
Making sense of ideas and discourse in economic policy 
 
In political science, causal theories are commonly grouped under three 
headings, each emphasising one of three contenders for the epistemological 
bottom line: interests, institutions and ideas. Of those three, theories of ideas 
are still arguably the least established; ideational theory is less a unified school 
than an umbrella term for a group of approaches, many of which are still 
relatively new (Abdelal et al, 2010, Béland & Cox, 2011). What ideational 
scholars share is dissatisfaction with conventional social science approaches 
that assume mostly fixed material interests or institutional structures. In its 
broadest form, ideational social science has argued simply that ideas matter 
and that without them, models of social action will always be underspecified 
(Schmidt 2010, 2011; Schmidt & Radaelli 2004,). Others have taken a more 
overtly constructivist position that asserts that ideas not only matter, but are 
fundamental to the operation of the social world, and should therefore be the 
starting point for theory (Beland & Cox 2011; Blyth 2003, 2011; Hay 2011). 
Most, though not all, ideational theorists tend towards constructivism, arguing 
that the material context must always be apprehended via processes of social 
construction, and that material objects are therefore less important or less 
interesting than the ideas people hold about them, and the politics in which 
those ideas are mobilised.  
This research contributes to the growing literature in ideational 
political economy, being prompted by a conviction that what looks, at first 
glance, like rational interests or institutional inertia in economic policymaking 
might actually be better explained by reference to ideas and discourse. The 
introductory chapter suggested that ideas and narrative are fundamental to 
the politics of the economy, and that a constructivist epistemology offers the 
best means of theorising their significance. This chapter develops that 
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argument in more detail, beginning with a set of broadly constructivist 
assumptions about the nature of economic policy. The first is that economies 
are not amenable to simple observation, but require us to apply ideas in order 
to understand them. Economic ideas are not exogenous accounts of the 
political economy as object; rather the ideas should be understood as 
endogenous to the economic sphere, which cannot be understood except by 
grasping what and how political actors think about it. Put another way: it is 
never simply “the economy, stupid”, but rather the representation of the 
economy by political actors that determines the politics of economic policy. 
Second, I suggest that the primary means by which we arrive at those 
representations of the economy is through discourse, and the construction of 
narratives. The language of economic policy should therefore be seen as not 
only descriptive, but constitutive, of the politics. Both these points will be 
expanded on throughout the theoretical literature review that follows. 
However, the aim of this project is not simply to swell the ranks of the 
ideational school by attesting that I too have concluded “ideas and discourse 
matter”. Rather, the aim is to build on the existing literature by showing how 
they have mattered in the politics of Britain’s financial crisis and, in doing so, 
to generate some new propositions about the mechanisms at work in the life 
cycle of economic policy narratives. Being more specific, the project explores 
whether, contrary to what theory in this area commonly predicts, ideas and 
discourse have as much to do with the construction of stability and continuity 
as they do with crisis and change. It will propose that ideational theory needs 
to develop the tools not only to explain continuity or change as separate 
phenomena, but to understand the interactions between these two states, 
since addressing theories of ideas to only one side of the coin dooms them to 
failure in explaining real-world cases. To that end, this research explores the 
proposition that ideas, and the narratives in which they are mobilised, first 
empower political actors but later constrain them, and that over time 
governments may find themselves caught in narrative traps of their own 
making. Those narrative traps should be understood not as rationally self-
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reinforcing examples of path dependency, but rather as cognitive and 
ideological commitments whose causal power substantially derives from their 
internalisation by their original narrators. 
The New Labour case appears to show that a narrative calibrated to 
provide a platform for policy action in one sort of context, can be overtaken by 
events that pose serious challenges to its validity but, despite this, continue to 
impose constraints on actors’ ability to think, or speak, about alternatives. If 
correct, this would suggest that both ideas and the discourses in which they 
are mobilized have causal force in politics, but not in the ways that are usually 
assumed. Rather than being primarily the vehicle for political agency and 
endogenous change, it is proposed that economic narratives, rather than the 
institutions they inhabit, or the material interests of narrators, may become a 
key source of political continuity, because over time they come to embody 
ideational commitments in which change is difficult and slow. They do so not 
because ideas are always agents of continuity, but because ideas, once 
mobilised as political narratives, go through a life cycle in which change is less 
and less available as time goes on. 
This chapter reviews the existing theoretical literature on three fronts. 
First it will develop the argument, introduced in the previous chapter, that a 
key function of ideas in the political economy is the construction of narratives 
as an antidote to economic uncertainty. Existing scholarship provides a rich 
vein of evidence on the processes by which rhetoric and economics interact, 
demonstrating not only that narrative-making is an important social process 
but that it has particular relevance to economic policy as a field. Second, the 
chapter compares that understanding of the role of narrative with the 
theoretical literature on ideas and discourse, particularly discursive 
institutionalism and constructivist political economy, and discusses their 
historic preoccupation with explaining political change rather than continuity. 
Third, the chapter reviews post-crisis developments in ideational theory 
around the puzzle of ideational non-change after 2008. It concludes by 
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suggesting that understanding the role of narrative in economic policy means 
developing a more sophisticated theory of the ways in which ideas play into 
the politics of both crisis and stability, and that this can best be done by 
tracing the operation of real narratives across periods that encompass both 
conditions.  
The politics of economic policy: narrative as the antidote to uncertainty 
The previous chapter introduced the idea of an uncertainty dilemma for 
economic policymakers, who are called on to project economic certitude while 
themselves operating under conditions of perpetual uncertainty. It was 
suggested that a key means by which governments respond to that dilemma is 
by the production and dissemination of narratives, which conjure a degree of 
certainty and so provide a basis for policy action. How exactly is that 
achieved? 
First, narratives are “tools people rely on to stabilise their assumptions 
about political dilemmas and come to conclusions about what to do.” (Boswell, 
2013: 2). In the context of economic policy, they provide a means by which 
technical information about the economy can be made intelligible. Faced with 
complex trends, incomplete data or competing theoretical claims, 
policymakers must arrive at an understanding of the economic conditions 
which, even if not 100 percent certain, is stable enough to serve as a basis for 
policy decisions (t’Hart & Tindall, 2009).  This functional understanding of 
narrative will be familiar to policymakers themselves, who are cognizant of the 
need to ‘tell a story’ out of the data (Smart, 1999), and who recognize that 
since perfect certainty is not generally available, a good narrative of the 
economy can fill in the gaps. Anthropologist Douglas Holmes has termed this 
process the “economy of words”, in which language is the means by which 
mixed or uncertain signals on the economy are boiled down to a coherent 
story, and “the shifting and fugitive dynamics of global markets” can be 
rendered intelligible (Holmes, 2009: 384-5).  
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One does not need to be a constructivist to accept that economic 
trends require some interpretation, if only because the available information 
tends to be complex and incomplete (if the data spoke for itself, economists 
would go out of business). However, it is useful to extend that argument in a 
constructivist direction, in two respects. Firstly, one can argue that if economic 
data need interpretation, then it is likely that more than one interpretation 
will be possible, and that actors will need to select between competing 
accounts of the same events or trends. While economic indices such as 
employment, or price inflation, may have an existence independent of our 
narratives, deciding which of them matter, and how much, in order to 
combine them into a whole that we can label ‘the economy’ is clearly an 
interpretive exercise in which ideas have the potential to be causally 
important. Constructivists have further argued that even defining the 
economy as a singular object is an interpretive process, and one that has only 
evolved in the last several decades (Brown, 1994). For example, Earle et al 
(2017: 15) have shown that “the economy” first appeared in British party 
manifestos in the 1950s, rapidly increasing in prominence with every election 
cycle since. Obviously economic questions were important in politics before 
that point, but the identification of “the economy” as an object to be managed 
was a mid-twentieth century idea, suggesting that in economic policy, even 
the most unremarkable rhetorical constructions are socially and historically 
contingent. In short: neither the existence nor the shape of the economy is a 
straightforward projection of the material world; they are fields of uncertainty 
that require interpretation. This statement is less controversial than it used to 
be: one side-effect of the 2008 crisis was that even sections of the economics 
profession became suddenly interested in the constructedness of their object, 
with Nobel laureates Akerlof and Shiller remarking that “lest there be 
statistical doubt that the credit crunch is just one more story, every economist 
has his or her favourite statistical indicator of it” (2009: 87). Even so, it bears 
repeating that economics, both as an academic discipline and as a policy field, 
is in many ways inherently interpretive, making narrative an essential part of 
its professional toolkit. 
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Second, while one need not be a constructivist to talk about ‘telling a 
story’ out of economic data, that insight can usefully be expanded by 
recognising that what those stories do goes beyond assembling a descriptive 
account of the economy: narratives exist to persuade an audience of a certain 
kind of reality. Deborah Stone (1989) has laid bare the ways in which political 
narratives are not just stories, but causal stories, carrying explicit or implicit 
messages about why things happen, who should receive the credit or blame 
for them happening, and thus where the responsibility for further action 
belongs. By constructing causal stories about social questions actors not only 
describe the world but also define the scope for political action to change it. In 
particular, Stone argues that such stories “have both an empirical and a moral 
dimension” (1989: 283); they adjudicate questions of cause and, by extension, 
blame, when they arbitrate whether a problem is thought to have originated 
in the realm of  “accident, fate or nature” (1989: 299) or in the realm of 
human behaviuor, control and intent. The distinction has important 
consequences for the kind, and degree, of government action that may 
legitimately be brought to bear on a problem; whether, for example, financial 
market failures of the kind seen in 2008 were the product of active human 
malfeasance, or the passive physics of markets, has important implications for 
future policy. Narratives of the economy thus construct the world not just to 
create order out of uncertainty, but to make that new certainty politically 
actionable. Causal stories act to shape and delimit policy agendas. 
The proposition that narrative acts to reduce uncertainty and enable 
political action could apply to any number of policy areas. However there are 
also special characteristics of economic policy that make the ideational 
construction of narratives particularly relevant here.  The first arises from the 
nature of economics as an academic discipline, and its particular blind spot for 
narrative and rhetoric. The assertion of narrative truth is an assertion that the 
narrator possesses authoritative knowledge, and a common strategy for 
invoking such authority is to present the ideas within the narrative as objective 
and unarguable. As Stone puts it: “political actors use narrative story lines and 
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symbolic devices to manipulate so-called issue characteristics, all the while 
making it seem as though they are simply describing facts” (Stone, 1989: 282). 
Economics being a particularly quantitative, positivistic branch of the social 
sciences, it is especially prone to adopt that stance, presenting its readings of 
the economy as technical and objective: that is, as apolitical. Both economic 
policymakers and their academic counterparts are, therefore, particularly 
likely to arrive at apparently neutral causal stories that validate their authority 
as experts, and they are likely to be uncomfortable with the notion that what 
they are doing is rhetorical rather than just technical. 
Both economists and economic policymakers tend to share an 
instrumental view of narrative, accepting that a certain amount of 
interpretation (or inference, in the statistician’s lexicon) is necessary to get the 
job done, but nonetheless seeing themselves as primarily in the business of 
facts not interpretivism. As Akerlof and Shiller put it: 
“It is generally considered unprofessional for economists to 
base their analyses on stories. On the contrary, we are 
supposed to stick with quantitative facts and theory – a theory 
that is based on optimization, especially optimization of 
economic variables…” (2009: 54)    
 
Deirdre McCloskey (1998) characterises the field of economics as operating on 
the implicit belief that political language is generally the enemy of good 
science because, in rational materialist terms, rhetoric provides “veils over bad 
arguments” (1998: 13). Instead, she suggests, “rhetorical devices… are also the 
form and substance of good arguments” (1998:13), in which case the presence 
of rhetorical or narrative language should not be automatically mistrusted, any 
more than the presence of complex statistics should automatically imply 
validity. Moreover, she suggests it is futile to imagine that rhetoric could 
somehow be stripped out of economics leaving only the science behind, 
because even the dispassionate, rationalist voice characteristic of professional 
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economists is, in McCloskey’s view, an ethos position, established through the 
a particular kind of discourse in which scientific detachment is a powerful 
rhetorical tactic. Unfortunately, that very rhetoric leaves economists 
vulnerable to error, because: 
“science does not protect us from all nonsense, only some. 
Science is human speech, too. If we do not realize that science 
uses metaphors and tells stories… we are going to do worse 
than make fools of ourselves. (1998: 173) 
 
That is, it is not the presence of rhetoric that is economists’ weak spot, but 
their denial of its existence. 
 McCloskey’s target is the academy, but her critique is equally relevant 
to economic policymaking, which combines economists’ scientific aspirations 
with politicians’ need for certainty. As such economic policymaking might be 
considered particularly vulnerable to hubris and overconfidence in its 
predictions - not because it relies on constructed narratives to marshal its 
analyses, but because it is generally uncomfortable with admitting that fact, 
leaving it without the tools to identify and critically assess what its narratives 
of the economy are doing. There are of course strategic reasons why 
politicians might wish to tap into the economist’s professional persona to 
depoliticise certain policy choices, as has been suggested in relation to the 
flagship New Labour policy of central bank independence (McNamara, 2002). 
Economic language plays into identity politics: a politician who speaks in 
economics is unlikely to appear exciting, but they may project other qualities, 
such as expertise or seriousness. Gordon Brown was, for a time, so successful 
in cultivating his image as the dour but responsible steward of the economy 
that “Not Flash, Just Gordon” became a Labour party promotional slogan. 
Those political imperatives should not, however, distract theorists from 
critically interrogating economic policymaking’s scientific self-image. The trap 
for political science is that it takes the drily rationalist language of economic 
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policy at face value by studying it mainly in rationalist terms.  
A constructivist theory of economic policy narratives would offer a 
corrective to the tendency to assume that because mainstream economics, 
and economic policy, speak the language of rational interests that is the key to 
their explication. Constructivist approaches have emphasised that economic 
narratives go beyond the technical, offering “both a “scientific” and a 
“normative” account of the existing economy and polity” (Blyth, 2003: 11). 
Theories of rhetoric also provide useful heuristics for thinking about economic 
language, since what looks like pure logos (logical argument) may also rely on 
ethos (qualities of the speaker) and pathos (emotive appeals) to get its point 
across. (Bauer & Glaveanu, 2011). The language of economics might appear to 
be the very opposite of political rhetoric, being dry, academic, and often 
“aggressively dull” (Galbraith, 1991:2), but those very qualities may in fact be 
contributing to its effectiveness in the construction of economic narratives. 
Economic policy also has a distinctive relationship to ideas and 
narrative because of the endogeneity of economic policy discourses to the 
economies they seek to influence. In some policy areas, effecting change 
requires direct government action via legislative or fiscal policy: for example in 
education, exam results are not likely to differ from one year to the next 
because the education minister makes a speech about them.  In economic 
policy, however, political discourse can have immediate material 
consequences, because economic performance is affected by sentiment and 
expectations, which are themselves affected by political speech (Wood et al, 
2005). Narratives, then, are not the end of a process of analysing the economy 
as a static object, but are part of a feedback loop in which policymakers both 
react to, and seek to shape, the economy. Narrative operates on both sides of 
this loop, facilitating analysis of economic events but also materially altering 
them because what policymakers say, as much as what they do, influences 
economic sentiment and thus economic behaviour. Policymakers are aware of 
this potential impact and will be acutely conscious of the potential for their 
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words to either fuel economic confidence or damage it (Holmes, 2009). 
Narratives matter in economic policy because the have the potential to move 
markets, at which point “the stories no longer merely explain the facts; they 
are the facts.” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009: 54). 
If narratives are about creating certainty as a platform for policy, then 
clearly the ability to construct a convincing narrative confers significant 
political power on the narrator. Much recent literature in political economy 
has turned the spotlight on the interpretive contest to define the global 
financial crisis, on the basis that “who gets to interpret [a] crisis, to speak what 
it is, and to specify what models can legitimately be brought to bear to tame it 
is worth attending to… Such practices are the exercise of power” (Abdelal et al 
2011: 234). Deciding whether, for example, the advanced economies should 
be considered to have experienced a crisis of debt, or a crisis of growth, is an 
interpretive battle in which the same data is mined for evidence to support 
utterly different policy prescriptions (Hay, 2013, Blyth, 2013a). 
However, not all narratives are born equal: politicians, and especially 
governments, are an especially important source of stories about the state of 
the economy. Akerlof and Shiller argued during the crisis that governments’ 
accounts of the world are powerful because: 
“the human mind is built to think in terms of narratives, of 
sequences of events with an internal logic and dynamic that 
appear as a unified whole… The same is true for confidence in 
a nation, a company or an institution. Great leaders are first 
and foremost creators of stories” (2009: 51).  
This is not to say that political narrators have it all their own way; 
governments must work extremely hard to ensure their narrative is accepted, 
with varying degrees of success. They do however occupy a privileged position, 
since both the symbolic status of leadership, and the institutional resources at 
their disposal, ensure that a government’s view on the economy is guaranteed 
an audience and usually afforded a degree of credibility. This research focuses 
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particularly on developing a constructivist theory of government narratives, 
since these provide a window on the workings of discourse and ideas at the 
very centre of the political economy.  
It is important to note that asserting the importance of government 
narratives in constructing the economy is not the same as saying that the 
economy is only a construction. Vivien Schmidt has noted that the language of 
discourse and narrative can be off-putting for many political scientists, for 
whom it “conjures up exaggerated visions of ‘post-structuralists’ or post-
modernists who, they (often unfairly) assume, consider words without deeds” 
(2010: 15). To be clear: the economy is not just a figment of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer’s imagination; for example, the global financial crisis had 
material consequences that would be belittled if one were to assume they 
could simply be re-imagined away, by politicians or anyone else. The point is 
not that there is no such thing as the material economy – it is that the 
economy can never be politically meaningful except via a process of 
construction, since “for things to be intelligible they must exist as part of a 
wider framework of meaning, that is, of a discourse” (Panizza & Miorelli, 2013: 
303). One set of material conditions can give rise to many kinds of politics; this, 
of course, is where ideas and discourse come in. 
Change and continuity: are ideas revolutionary, or conservative? 
We have seen that ideas, and the narratives they support, are fundamental to 
the politics of the economy. Whether those politics tend toward change or 
continuity is a separate question, and for the most part the theoretical 
literature on ideas and discourse has tended to suggest the former: that ideas 
are the wellspring of political agency, and provide resources for political actors 
wishing to effect various kinds of change. The emphasis on change in the 
ideational literature, while valid in many ways, has also proved a weakness, 
since it fails to capture a large part of what economic policy narratives do in 
practice. As discussed in the previous chapter, this shortcoming was made 
particularly visible in the wake of the 2008 crisis, which should have provided 
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perfect conditions for ideationally-driven change, but which was characterised 
instead by the surprising resilience of the old paradigm. This chapter takes a 
closer look at this gap in the theoretical literature, suggesting that while ideas 
certainly have the potential to be revolutionary, since the purpose of 
economic narrative is to reduce uncertainty then it is equally likely that the 
ideas which become politically significant will be those that enable political 
agents to stabilise the world, and to promote continuity rather than 
transformation.  
Early scholarship in the ideational school tended to emphasise the 
relationship between ideas and change, not least because other branches of 
political science appeared to have the continuity side well covered. In 
institutionalist political science, ideas only begun to enter the analysis 
relatively recently, since the initial focus of that subfield had been on the 
capacity of institutions to structure social behaviour, and to establish the 
‘rules of the game’ in a given institutional context (North, 1990). Scholars of 
institutions developed different views on the raw materials underlying 
institutions: material interests (rational choice institutionalism), established 
organisational forms and the legacy of past decisions (historical 
institutionalism) or conventions and cultural norms (sociological 
institutionalism – see Hall & Taylor, 1996 for a definitive review). All three 
branches of institutionalism, however, saw institutions as self-reinforcing, 
characterised by feedback loops and processes of increasing returns that 
would tend to constrain the ability of even the most powerful individuals or 
interests to bring about change. The great advantage of such theories was 
their ability to conceive of the state as actor, and government as something 
more than the sum of plural interest groups, thus helping to explain why 
apparently similar problems might give rise to very different political 
outcomes in different national contexts. The downside, of course, was a 
tendency to emphasise stability over change, and to reify institutions as 
seemingly unalterable bastions of the status quo. 
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According to Vivien Schmidt (2010), institutionalists therefore turned 
to ideas as a means of understanding how, in a world full of institutions, 
change is still possible. Bringing ideas, and the discourses in which they 
circulate, into the analysis achieved two things. First, by paying attention to 
the content of ideas it becomes possible to explore what agents think about 
institutions, and how they invest meaning in them, reinstating a sense that 
individuals have independent agency, with the ability to reflect on institutions 
and even reject them. Ideas thus reinstate the possibility of change, even if 
institutional continuity is the more common state of affairs. Secondly, a focus 
on the exchange of ideas as discourse begins to expose the mechanisms 
underlying institutional change.  Rather than change having to come from an 
exogenous event, a focus on discourse allows us to theorise institutional 
change from within. Schmidt argued that the turn to ideas cut across all three 
branches of new institutionalism, and that it should rightly be considered a 
fourth, “discursive” institutionalism (DI), which is “concerned with both the 
substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in 
institutional context” (Schmidt, 2010: 1).   
For Schmidt, DI gave us a useful new tool to work with, but it still fell to 
the analyst to demonstrate “‘when discourse matters’, that is, when it exerts a 
causal influence on policy change by serving to reconceptualise interests, 
reshape institutions and reframe culture, and when it does not” (Schmidt & 
Radaelli, 2004: 201). In other words, ideas and discourse were considered to 
matter when they effect or instigate change. Discourse’s claim to significance 
was based on the premise that “how ideas are generated among policy actors 
and diffused to the public by political actors through discourse is key to 
explaining institutional change (and continuity)” (2011: 55). As a result, 
Schmidt seemed initially to confine the usefulness of DI to explaining change, 
leaving stability to the other institutionalisms, making discursive 
institutionalism a complement to the other three rather than a fully realised 
alternative. While she would allude, parenthetically, to a role for discourse in 
constructing continuity, this line of inquiry had not, until recently, been 
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developed any further.  
If discursive institutionalism originally approached ideas as a 
counterweight to institutions, other discursive schools tended to be equally 
change-oriented, looking to ideas as a source of a priori political agency. 
Critical discourse theory (CDT), with roots in post-structuralist and post-
Marxist thinking, conceives of discourses as important sites of resistance to 
power and hegemony (Howarth et al, 2000; Norval, 1996). Critical discourse 
analysis often aims to reveal the contingency of taken-for-granted ideas and 
social structures, creating the space in which they can be challenged and 
overturned. Once again, the theoretical emphasis is on the potential for ideas 
to effect transformations in politics, while the empirical focus is generally 
outside the political mainstream, on discourses of protest and resistance. For 
CDT the radical potential of ideas is, ultimately, the point; a connection 
between discourse and social change is baked into the theory.  
Constructivist and ideational political economy sit somewhere in 
between institutionalism’s focus on established structures and rules, and 
critical discourse theory’s interest in language, power and resistance. Much of 
the ideational turn in political economy can be traced to Peter Hall’s seminal 
1993 article ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, which was 
concerned with the ways in which policy models change, and thus with the 
operation of idea and discourse within the institutions of government. Hall’s 
definition of a policy paradigm brought these elements into novel 
combination: 
“Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas 
and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and 
the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but 
also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing… This framework is embedded in the very 
terminology through which policymakers communicate about 
their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it 
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is taken for granted” (1993: 279).  
As with Stone’s causal stories, Hall’s policy paradigms assemble a set of ideas 
that both define and solve a policy problem; successful paradigms, like 
successful causal stories, succeed when they assume sufficient authority as to 
shut out alternatives, ultimately becoming institutionalized in the policy and 
practices of government. Out of that framework, Hall develops a theory of 
ideational change that distinguishes between changes in the settings and 
instruments of policy – first- and second-order change, which is part of 
“normal policymaking” – and paradigmatic change at the level of overarching 
policy goals. That is, he places special emphasis on change at this third order, 
which is where the big ideas live. Change at this level will be radical and 
therefore rare, requiring an “accumulation of anomalies” so great as to fatally 
undermine the authority of the old paradigm and allow a new one to come 
through. So while ideas could be hugely powerful once embedded in 
policymaking, disembedding them usually required “developments that are 
not fully comprehensible, even as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm” 
(1993: 280).  
Hall’s insights did a huge amount to open up the ideational turn in 
political science, providing new conceptual tools with which to theorise ideas 
in operation, rather studying them than as abstracted ideologies or discourses. 
His emphasis on change in response to paradigm failure would prove 
particularly influential. The constructivist-ideational literature that followed 
duly tended to locate moments of change within a punctuated equilibrium 
framework, in which relatively stable paradigms experience periodic bouts of 
rupture and reinvention, usually in response to an exogenous event of some 
kind. Ideas were thought to be most powerful during crises, which provide the 
window of opportunity in which ideas may flourish (Blyth, 2003; Matthijs, 
2011; t’Hart & Tindall, 2009). The revolutionary power of ideas was, in other 
words, subject to boundary conditions, the most important of which was 
thought to be the weakening or breakdown of a previously dominant 
paradigm. Mark Blyth summarised this position, arguing that: 
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“ideas permeate all aspects of materiality and determine 
agents’ orientations to social objects. But none of this means 
that institutions are “up for grabs” all the time. As such, the 
ability to determine the dominant narration of “the way the 
economic world works” is powerful only to the extent that 
ideas can reach across consumption categories in moments of 
uncertainty and transform supposedly given interests.” (2003: 
271) 
 
Similarly, Sheri Berman (2013) has described a two-stage process in which 
challenges to existing ideas creates the ‘demand’ for new ideas, allowing new 
political movements to provide the ‘supply’ by bringing new narratives to bear 
on existing questions. Ultimately, there has always been a tension at the heart 
of the punctuated equlibrium model between, on the one hand, its awareness 
of the constructedness of the social world and, on the other hand, its 
recognition of the embeddedness of many of those constructions. 
Ideationally-oriented work was continually called on to differentiate itself 
from historical institutionalism, which as Hall himself noted, had always been 
“attentive to the relationship between institutions and ideas or beliefs” (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996: 942). This was most commonly resolved by allowing institutions 
to embody stability, and ideas to introduce the possibility of change under the 
right conditions.  It required only the right kind of shock or ‘moment of 
uncertainty’ to give ideas their window of opportunity over policy and, by 
extension, to reveal the power of ideational theory. 
Crisis: the strange non-death of a paradigm 
The 2008 financial crisis provided some vindication for constructivists, 
as the politics battles around the causes and remedies of the global crash 
made it suddenly uncontroversial to suggest that economics, and economic 
crises are, to a large degree, socially constructed (e.g. Hay, 2013). In other 
ways however, the crisis confounded ideational political economy’s best 
theories. An exogenous shock like the meltdown of the global financial system 
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was exactly the sort of event that was expected to destabilise old ideas and 
usher in new ones; in Hall’s terms, the paradigm-threatening anomalies were 
piling up fast. Attention therefore turned to why, since 2008, new economic 
ideas were much less forthcoming than expected. Rather than a paradigmatic 
ideational shift being triggered by the crisis, there appeared to have been a 
brief period of policy experimentation in 2008-09, which was then rapidly 
reversed in favour of a return to the pre-crisis paradigm and policy toolkit 
(Blyth, 2013a, Farrell & Quiggin, 2012, Hay 2013). The 2008 crisis had, it 
seemed, contradicted the predictions of constructivist and ideational political 
economy, which were confronted with the fact that this very large 
punctuation had not upset the equilibrium of the old ideas, or at least not for 
long. 
This new puzzle soon generated its own literature. In 2010, John 
Quiggin’s Zombie Economics set up the question, asking why policymakers 
were still venerating discredited neoliberal doctrines such as efficient 
privatization, trickle-down economics and self-correcting markets. Colin 
Crouch (2011) dubbed this phenomenon the “strange non-death of 
neoliberalism”, since neoliberal ideas appeared to be not only surviving their 
great crisis but perhaps profiting by it. In 2013, Schmidt and Thatcher’s edited 
volume on “resilient liberalism” sought to bring a variety of theoretical 
weapons to bear on explaining neoliberalism’s extraordinary ability to make 
the best of a crisis, asking simply why ‘the illusions have survived the bonfire’ 
(Callinicos, 2010, quoted in Schmidt & Thatcher, 2013: 14). Schmidt and 
Thatcher’s introduction to the volume did not seek to resolve the question, 
but it identified five possible lines of inquiry. Three of these were broadly 
ideational explanations, the first being that neoliberal ideas were, in their 
substance, sufficiently elastic as to be able to absorb even a global financial 
crisis without sustaining fatal damage. Second, that the implementation gap 
between what neoliberalism had promised, and what it had actually delivered 
by 2008, left room for the argument that policy simply had not gone far 
enough. In this scenario, neoliberalism might actually have been strengthened 
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by its empirical failures, which had left its proponents free to keep arguing for 
perpetual revolution. Third, Schmidt and Thatcher suggested that neoliberal 
policymaking was able to skate around its apparent failures because its 
philosophy retained enough internal coherence to sound convincing. That is, 
discursive elegance might be trumping material validity in the battle of ideas 
around the crisis. A good example of this might be the resonance of the 
analogy, popular with proponents of austerity, between government debt and 
household budgets, which sounded so much like common sense that no 
amount of expert debunking was able to dent its political power in the post-
crisis years (Blyth, 2013a).  
Each of these three ideational explanations is intriguing, but each 
leaves open the question of why political actors were, in those years, still so 
committed to, and keen to promote, neoliberal ideas; why they were still 
motivated to make the best of neoliberalism’s malleability, its incomplete 
implementation or its internal coherence. Why had so few policymakers been 
affected by the crisis? Why no neoliberal crisis of faith? Schmidt and Thatcher 
therefore left open the usual two alternatives to ideational explanations: 
interests and institutions. For all the adaptability of neoliberal ideas, there 
remained the possibility, in their analysis, that neoliberalism had survived its 
crisis thanks to a combination of active support from the winners in the 
neoliberal political economy, and the passive effects of institutions that 
retained pre-crisis ideas in their organisational DNA.  
The surrounding literature is similarly divided on the causes of 
neoliberalism’s resilience. Some emphasise the brute politics of interests, 
including the power of large corporations to continue sponsoring a policy suite 
that had always been more self-interested than philosophically pure. In this 
vein, Crouch (2011) lays much of the blame for neoliberalism’s non-death at 
the door of large corporations, who have been well served by a policy model 
that preached free markets but actually delivered oligopolistic advantage to 
large incumbents. While that account clearly has some validity, it does not 
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explain why the big firms were able to protect their advantage after 2008, 
when their ability to lobby their interest should have been at its weakest. 
Mirowski (2013) offers a partial answer to that challenge, suggesting that the 
interest groups that sponsor neoliberal ideas underwent no more than a 
tactical retreat after the crisis, regrouping behind the scenes and continuing to 
dominate the ideational field through their established networks of political 
influence. Mirowski is surely right that “a burst of bad news does not generally 
bring a dogma crashing down of its own accord. It takes a whole lot more than 
that” (2013: 34). However his account of a “neoliberal thought collective” 
outmanoevering leftwingers shades towards conspiracy theory, presuming an 
extraordinary degree of coordination by neoliberals. It is also strongly oriented 
to the US context in which lobbying and campaign finance combine with 
multiple veto points to put politics up for sale. It is far weaker as an 
explanation of ideational continuity in the UK, where neoliberalism’s non-
death occurred under the auspices of a centre-left government with near-total 
executive power, and a less pervasive lobbying industry (Hopkin & Alexander 
Shaw, 2016). Ultimately, such interest-based accounts rely on pointing to the 
reasons neoliberalism suited certain actors all along, providing much thinner 
evidence that those actors continued to exert influence on policy during and 
after the crash. 
John Quiggin’s explanation puts more emphasis on institutions, and 
specifically on the “internal dynamics of the economics profession” (2010: 31). 
In Quiggin’s analysis, the intellectual architecture of the pre-crisis period was 
not reoriented afterwards, because: 
“the Great Moderation vanished in 2008 and 2009… [but] the 
academic industry built to analyze it did not. Research projects 
based on explaining, measuring, and projecting the Great 
Moderation were not abandoned.” (2010: 31) 
That is, the path-dependencies involved in academic research programmes 
helped to immunise economists against disproof, even as the world 
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spectacularly diverged from their standard models. Mark Blyth has also 
questioned the lack of a paradigm shift in economics, “despite the 
demonstrable disconfirmation of 30 years of theory” (2013b: 206), ultimately 
suggesting that academic economists have been shielded from the failure of 
their theories by tenured positions and the inelasticity of demand for their 
courses from undergraduates looking for an entry route to still-lucrative 
financial sector jobs. The old ideas, however dubious, remained institutionally 
secure, and in the absence of a competitor paradigm waiting in the wings with 
comparable institutional heft, neoliberalism survived because “it is politics, 
not economics… authority, not facts, that matter for both paradigm 
maintenance and change” (2013b: 210).  
This argument is something of a departure from Blyth’s earlier work, 
which put heavier emphasis on the independent power of ideas (e.g. Blyth 
1997), suggesting that the 2008 crisis had led him some way back towards 
institutional explanations as a means of accounting for ideational continuity. 
So where does all this leave ideational theory? It might be argued that the 
crisis, and the new focus on ideational non-change, rightly nudged ideational 
political economy back toward institutions for a more grounded theory of 
ideas and power, including institutional power. Even if one remains committed 
to explaining crisis and non-change within a constructivist-ideational 
framework, it is worth acknowledging that not all constructions are equal; that 
institutions matter too, and that perhaps the transformative potential of ideas 
had been overemphasised. In this spirit, Farrell and Quiggin (2012) called for a 
focus on “the interplay of power and ideas”, looking particularly to the expert 
networks in which ideational consensus is created or destroyed. They suggest 
that in the post-crisis period there was enough dissensus among networks of 
economic experts as to snuff out the brief turn to neo-Keynesianism in 2008-
09. Politicians were effectively able to go shopping for experts that would 
support their preferred policy options, facilitating a neoliberal fightback 
through the selective use of expert evidence (the controversial Reinhart & 
Rogoff paper on expansionary fiscal contraction in 2010 springs to mind). Once 
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again, however, this begs the question of why politicians, including leftwing 
ones in Britain, were so keen to find for ways to re-validate the old paradigm 
and so anxious to see policy to revert to its pre-crisis settings. 
Some others have attempted to address the puzzle in a way that 
retains a primary causal role for ideas and language. Such explanations tend to 
incorporate a cognitive or social psychological dimension, as a means of 
explaining not just why ideas matter in politics, but how those ideas support 
particular political choices over others. For example, Hindmoor and McConnell 
(2013) note the tendency of politicians to read new evidence through old 
conceptual frames, introducing a kind of confirmation bias into policymaking 
that make it more likely new ideas will be repelled than absorbed. Wesley 
Widmaier (2016a, 2016b) goes still further in this direction, combining insights 
from cognitive psychology with discursive and historical institutionalism to 
suggest that rhetorical leadership by politicians can become first path 
dependent, and eventually pathological, in its unwillingness to bend over time. 
Widmaier’s analysis, like this research, finds a gap in the political science 
literature between institutions and ideas, noting that while historical 
institutionalism is good at identifying sequential dynamics and path 
dependencies it tends to fall back on flawed materialist assumptions that 
“obscure endogenous inefficiencies” (2016b: 729) by presuming that 
institutions are the embodiment of rational equilibria in a given context. 
Discursive institutionalism jettisons the rational materialism, but in doing so 
often “abstract[s] away from the sequential analysis of order development in 
time” (2016b: 728). Widmaier’s solution is a hybrid theory of rhetoric “in 
political time” that makes it possible to ask whether political ideas may be 
endogenously inefficient (i.e. wrong) while still behaving like stable, self-
reinforcing institutions.  
However, having developed an ostensibly discursive theory of ideas in 
political time, Widmaier seems to fall back on more straightforward interest-
constructions in explaining the politics of real-world cases. In the case of the 
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great moderation in the UK and US, Widmaier finds that:  
“Clinton and Blair recognized the importance of new financial 
sources of demand and growth, and so acquiesced to the 
epistemic power over ideas of central bankers and professional 
economists as a means to sustain asset price appreciation” 
(2016a: 346).  
 
This sounds less like a theory of ideas over time than a fairly straightforward 
story about venal politicians knowingly pumping up a doomed asset bubble for 
short term gain, in which case ideas have very little to do with it; pure political 
self-interest is doing the causal work. Ideas, in this account, belong to 
epistemic communities; politicians are not themselves keepers of ideas but 
strategic consumers of them, in which case politics is still the domain of 
rational self-interest. This seems to me an insufficient conceptualisation of the 
New Labour case, since it leaves alone the most vexing part of the New Labour 
puzzle: how had an ostensibly centre-left government talked itself into this 
corner? Did Labour truly realise the great moderation was a chimera, but forge 
ahead out of pure electoral expediency? Making an all-in political bet on a 
known asset bubble seems the very opposite of a rational choice, unless one is 
concerned only with the very short term. And anyway, if New Labour truly 
were short-term utility-maximisers, would not the crisis have prompted the 
swift and total abandonment of the failed ideas? The great puzzle of New 
Labour’s resilient neoliberalism is that even a leftwing party with a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to rethink the relationship between state and market 
was largely unable to do so. 
The strongest part of Widmaier’s account is that in which he traces the 
evolution of great moderation ideas from their construction, through 
consolidation and into crisis. In this last phase in particular, Widmaier argues 
there is “structural power in ideas” (2016a: 346), which is to say that over time, 
established intellectual positions come to constrain actors whose belief in 
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their validity has gone well beyond rationality into received wisdom, 
confirmation bias and hubris. This overconfidence, according to Widmaier, 
breeds both political jeopardy and real-world economic risk, because 
excessive faith in the great moderation paradigm had led policymakers to 
compound their own errors over time. This framework clearly illustrates the 
value of bringing the temporal dimension into play, because it shows that the 
causal force of ideas is not a static phenomenon; it alters over time as once-
novel ideas congeal into orthodoxy. 
Widmaier’s theory of increasing dysfunction in political ideas draws on 
Grube (2016), who particularly identifies rhetoric as the mechanism of 
ideational path dependence. Grube, like Widmaier, connects institutionalist 
theories of path dependency with discursive and rhetorical theory in political 
science, arguing convincingly that “actors effectively become trapped in gilded 
rhetorical cages of their own making, wherein the very success of their earlier 
rhetoric paradoxically prevents them from easily adopting new rhetorical 
formulations even when circumstances may require it” (2016: 531). This 
notion of “sticky words” is an important departure from the typical 
assumptions of rhetorical and discursive theory, which tend to emphasise the 
power of words to effect change by embodying the agency of social actors. To 
suggest that the words may be acting upon their speakers is a theoretical 
reversal that opens up a very different conception of what political language 
does: in Grube’s own terms, it offers “a corrective to the conceptual starting 
point that communicative behavior is itself unrestrained” (2016: 533).  
The kind of path dependency that is being specified is, however, 
critically important. Grube draws on Pierson (2000) and Mahoney (2000) to 
outline a theory of path dependency based on increasing returns for 
consistency, versus compound costs of exit to a different rhetorical path. That 
is, he invokes a theory of path-dependency that goes beyond asserting the 
importance of sequence to an assumption about self-reinforcing payoffs. 
Grube goes on to hypothesise a set of factors which might increase the 
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stickiness of political rhetoric, from the degree of public salience attached to 
an issue, to the frequency with which the rhetoric has been repeated and the 
extent to which a piece of rhetoric hedged its bets by making itself contingent 
on events in some way. By connecting institutionalist insights with rhetoric in 
this way one can, Grube argues, arrive at “a dynamic conceptualisation of path 
dependency that recognizes the key part that individual agents play in 
discursively erecting the very boundaries that end up restraining them.” 
(2016: 532).  
Underlying that heuristic, however, is an assumption that rhetorical 
traps are mainly a problem for politicians who, having seen that events have 
moved against their earlier rhetoric, would like to jettison that language but 
are prevented from doing so by public opprobrium. Grube argues that the 
presence of one or more of these factors makes it more likely that rhetorical 
path-dependency will bite, at which point “there are costs associated with exit 
from one rhetorical path to another, [whereas] increasing returns flow to 
those leaders who are able to be consistent in their rhetoric” (2016: 541). That 
is, the forces of path-dependency are applied externally: the political penalty 
for a u-turn is the major barrier to rhetorical change, leaving politicians 
trapped by language they themselves would prefer to revise. And here once 
again, the New Labour case raises some awkward questions. New Labour’s 
economic policymaking certainly displayed many of the tendencies that Grube 
predicts would create rhetorical path dependency:  high levels of repetition, 
lack of ambiguity and, being economic policy, a high level of political salience. 
Labour’s crisis response, however, does not fit the picture of a government 
trying to find ways to conduct a u-turn without being penalised for it. Rather, 
they did everything to avoid a reversal, cleaving to old ideas and old rhetoric 
long past the point most politicians would have abandoned them. If Labour 
found themselves in a rhetorical trap it seemed to have been in large part self-
imposed.   
The notion of rhetorical path-dependency is an important and 
 52 
promising departure for discursive institutionalism. But once again, it may be 
helpful to move towards a more fully constructivist theory of how politicians 
think, and how rhetoric connects to ideas. If we understand path dependency 
in terms of increasing returns versus costs of exit, we are retaining materialist 
assumptions in which political actors accurately assess their interests and 
adapt their thinking to fit, subject to certain external constraints (which in 
Grube’s formulation include their own past rhetoric). I suggest there is more 
mileage in a constructivist conception of path dependency, in which past 
rhetorics do not only impose external constraints but internal ones, layering 
up cognitive and perceptual barriers to change that may be even more 
powerful constraints than the fear of a public u-turn.  
The next chapter sets up the research design for this project with these 
considerations in mind, aiming to further develop this new literature by pulling 
several strands together. Firstly, this research is intended to contribute to 
wider attempts, particularly in ideational political economy, to explain the 
puzzling resilience of the neoliberal policy paradigm despite an apparently 
perfect crisis. Secondly, it aims to build on recent developments discursive 
political economy, where ideational and rhetorical theories have been 
combined with key concepts from institutionalism, on the one hand, and social 
psychology on the other, to generate new conceptual hybrids.  
I will show that New Labour case can be seen as a sub-set of the wider 
puzzle of neoliberalism’s non-death, and one which remains stubbornly 
difficult to explain. Labour’s pre-crisis rhetoric was indeed a good candidate 
for path-dependency. But Gordon Brown’s rhetorical non-change in the crisis 
years was so dogged as to stretch the definition of increasing-returns path 
dependence to breaking point. The idea that rhetorical continuity, rather than 
change, still attracted sufficient positive returns as to outweigh the ideational 
challenge posed by a global financial crisis is quite some claim. In Brown’s case, 
there was very little payoff for his rhetorical consistency, which led him to be 
viewed as increasingly out of touch. His non-change must, therefore, be 
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explained either by a different kind of path-dependency, or by something else 
altogether. The next chapter sets out an alternative hypothesis that has 
elements in common with both Widmaier’s phases of ideational development 
and Grube’s rhetorical traps, but which roots the analysis in constructivist 
assumptions about the purpose, and hence the evolution (or non-evolution), 
of economic ideas across the lifetime of a political project. 
Do zombie narratives matter anyway? 
One might argue that if some governments are unable to change their ideas, 
or their narratives, it does not matter a great deal. Just as markets are 
supposed to deal with bad investors by ensuring they lose money and leave 
the game, democratic politics should be self-clearing. Politicians who remain 
attached to failed paradigms will probably lose office, and if Gordon Brown 
preferred to go down with the rhetorical ship than alter his core story, one 
might argue that is a matter of personality rather than politics. Why then 
should we focus our explanations on him and the stubbornness of New 
Labour’s pre-crisis ideas? 
 I suggest that the New Labour case is worth understanding better for 
both empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, it is worth asking why the 
crisis of 2008-09, and the brief window of opportunity it created for neo-
Keynesian ideas,  could not be more effectively seized. And theoretically, the 
case has the potential to tell us something new about how ideas and narrative 
evolve over the life of a political project, and how the same set of ideas may 
go from being change agents to conservatives. We have seen that historically, 
ideational scholars have generally been more interested in the birth of new 
paradigms, and the conditions under which new ideas achieve a breakthrough. 
But if we are interested in political ideas, this introduces a kind of survivorship 
bias into our accounts, focusing only on the ideas that win, at the moments of 
their greatest effectiveness as change agents. This also puts the emphasis on 
the upswell of new ideas rather than the processes of their stabilisation or 
decay. In Sheri Berman’s (2011) terms, these are supply-side explanations of 
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how ideas come to fill a vacuum, rather than demand-side explanations of the 
ways in which old ideas may or may not vacate the political arena. I suggest 
we need to do more to understand the full life cycle of political ideas, and 
especially the processes by which ideas, in their attempts to stabilise the 
politics of economic policy through narrative, may themselves become key 
sources of constraint, fragility and risk. The fact is that New Labour’s stability 
narrative, though seriously damaged by the economic crisis, remained 
politically embedded long past the point any rational materialist would have 
abandoned it, and perhaps longer than even the institutional literature would 
lead us to expect. The question is: why? The next chapter will outline a 
framework for answering that question. 
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3.  Research design: 
Operationalising the study of ideas and narrative 
 
The first challenge for any study of ideas is to arrive at a research design that 
makes it possible to draw credible conclusions about what, precisely, ideas 
have done in specific cases. This means converting the large and often subtle 
edifice of ideational theory into a manageable project that somehow 
preserves constructivist assumptions while achieving some traction on real-
world events. Craig Parsons has called for a “second generation agenda” that 
takes ideational political science “beyond the literature’s initial focus on the 
notion that ‘ideas matter,’ to explorations of how they matter” (Parsons, 
2015: 1). This thesis aims to contribute to that new empirical literature, using 
a focus on narrative to better demonstrate the causal significance of ideas in 
economic policy, and to develop new theory about the mechanisms by which 
the political power of ideas is made manifest. 
Until recently, the available literature on ideas in politics provided few 
pointers on how empirical work could, or should, be done. Many of the core 
texts in the subfield were centrally concerned with confronting rationalist and 
institutionalist skepticism about ideas being important at all, and so operated 
mostly at the level of theory (Abdelal et al, 2010; Beland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 
1997; Schmidt, 2010). Empirical studies of ideas often left their 
methodological choices implicit (e.g. Epstein, 2010), providing few usable 
models for others to adopt beyond a vaguely specified “interpretive, 
historically oriented approach” (Widmaier 2010: 162). Conventional 
handbooks on political science methods, based on linear causation and 
inference from controlled comparison (most famously in King et al, 1996) 
proffered more problems than solutions for empirical projects concerned with 
the “muddle of ideas” (Beland & Cox, 2011: 13), but the ideational school had 
yet to develop clear alternative methodologies better fitted to its research 
agenda.  
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That has now begun to change, and several recent papers have offered 
explicit advice on how to produce valid empirical studies of ideas. Alan Jacobs’ 
(2014) chapter on process tracing in ideational research takes the techniques 
of historical case study research and considers their application to ideational 
objects, emphasising “expansive empirical scope” that places policy outcomes 
in their broader context, careful attention to the limitations of data on ideas 
(discussed further below) and creative use of theory to tightly specify the 
causal claims being presented. Craig Parsons further argues that for ideas to 
be considered “distinctively and demonstrably” significant, they must be 
shown to have led policymakers in “non-obvious” directions that are not 
simply reducible to the material constraints they faced at the time (2015: 7,11).  
The design of this project takes Parsons’ and Jacobs’ advice and applies it to 
the particular task of explaining the role of narrative in economic policy.  
 This chapter sets out the research design for the empirical work that 
follows, and so provides a bridge between theory and empirics. First, the 
chapter considers case selection and the anticipated value of the New Labour 
study in theory-development. Second, the central research question is defined, 
and a proposed explanation based on ideas and narrative is put forward. A 
range of alternative explanations are outlined, and the evidentiary 
requirements for arbitrating between them are discussed. Third, definitions 
are provided for key concepts including discourse, narrative and rhetoric, and 
the relationships between them are clarified. Fourth, a distinction is drawn 
between two properties of narratives: internal and external validity, which 
together provide the analytical framework that the empirical chapters will go 
on to apply. Finally, the chapter anticipates potential weaknesses in the 
research design and data, and explains how these will be mitigated.  
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Case selection: New Labour as a pathway case for ideational continuity 
through crisis 
If the main theoretical preoccupation of this research is the role of ideas and 
narrative, its empirical focal point is the puzzling absence of ideational change 
in response to the 2008 financial crisis. Those two concerns are intertwined: it 
is precisely because a large material event did not substantially disrupt the 
neoliberal policy consensus that theories of ideas are so interesting, because 
the material conditions would appear to have been ripe for ideational change, 
yet it did not emerge. As argued in the previous chapter, existing theories of 
ideas, being more concerned with change than continuity, have struggled to 
explain why this particular dog did not bark. Untangling what impact ideas and 
narrative had during the financial crisis, if any, is thus an important task in 
both understanding what has happened in a particular case and refining our 
broader theories of the politics of boom and bust. 
The empirical core of the project is a case study of the New Labour 
government of the United Kingdom, 1997-2010. The primary research design 
in this project is therefore not cross-case comparison but a set of detailed 
within-case comparisons that examine the evolution of the New Labour 
economic narrative. How is the choice of this single case to be justified? Single 
case studies are viewed with disfavour by much of the literature on social 
science research methods; they are often judged to carry a high risk of 
selection on the dependent variable, to provide too few degrees of separation 
to allow for causal inference, and to be incapable of supporting 
generalisations, limiting their audience to those scholars with a specific 
interest in the particular case. Regarding causation, however, John Gerring 
(2004) has argued that single cases may in fact provide significant inferential 
leverage when they are used as a source of information about within-case 
variance of key conditions. For example, single cases may allow for 
observations about covariance over time, which could potentially support 
causal inferences, making it possible to say what factors caused the outcome 
of interest in that particular case. 
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 Establishing causal relationships in a single case does not, however, 
guarantee that the finding has any general significance. Political science has 
been deeply skeptical of the value of single case studies, preferring to leave 
deep readings of single cases to historians and cultural anthropologists with (it 
is presumed) fewer aspirations to generalisable theory.   George and Bennett’s 
(2004) typology of case study designs allows for a continuum of research 
objectives from the detailed “idiographic” investigation of a single case for its 
intrinsic interest, to comparative theory-testing models, but the implication is 
still that theory-testing work is more interesting and probably more 
worthwhile. George and Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of 
events” (2004: 17), suggesting a preference for case studies that speak to 
some phenomenon larger than themselves. Similarly, Gerring has defined the 
single case study as  “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004: 342), making 
generalisation a fundamental aim of the case study method, in which case 
single case research designs may be problematic.  
This research project does have an interest in developing generalisable 
insights, albeit cautiously. The purpose of the New Labour case study is not 
simply to understand what happened to Gordon Brown, or to fashion a 
political biography of a particular administration, though those could be valid 
research objectives. Rather, the intention is to use the New Labour case to 
illuminate the broader question of how economic policy is impacted by 
narrative and, by extension, how economic ideas work in politics. Such theory-
building ambition rests on the proposition that the New Labour case study fits 
the criteria for a crucial case study and, especially, Gerring’s model of the 
“pathway case”, in which a single case may “elucidate causal mechanisms” 
(2007: 238) with broader applicability. 
The New Labour government is a good candidate for a pathway case 
on political ideas because it was a plausibly likely case for policy and ideational 
change after the financial crisis. If ever the pro-market, pro-finance 
Washington consensus were vulnerable it was in the period 2008-10, when 
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the near-implosion of the global banking system blew apart the notion that 
unimpeded markets would deliver steady and continuous growth. The so-
called “great moderation” that had underpinned Labour’s pre-crash 
prospectus was suddenly and unmistakably finished, upending the argument 
that financial services were at the cutting edge of British economic success. 
The party in power in the United Kingdom was not the one traditionally allied 
to the City of London but a centre-left party with its major funding from the 
trade union movement and its core vote outside the financial capital and its 
commuter belt in the south east of England. The centrality of the banking 
sector to the British economic model left the UK particularly exposed to the 
crisis, potentially creating the conditions for significant political as well as 
economic upheaval. According to theory, crises should provide ideal 
opportunities for ideational change, and if that change were to occur 
anywhere, it might surely have occurred in Britain, yet did not. The empirical 
case study will attempt to discover why not; whether ideas can be considered 
causally important in such circumstances and, if so, what ideational 
mechanisms may have been at work in preserving the status quo.  
 
Question and hypotheses 
The research question for this project is open-ended: what was the causal 
impact of narrative on New Labour’s response to the economic crisis, if any? 
Theory would predict that narrative, as a form of discourse, introduces a 
degree of political flexibility not present in institutions or materially given 
interests. However, I propose that narrative may either empower or constrain 
governments at different points in the political and economic cycle, and that in 
the case of New Labour, rhetoric which began as empowering of policy later 
became its primary constraint. New Labour, it is suggested, did not cleave to 
their pre-crisis positions out of material necessity or institutional inertia, but 
because they continued to hold the same ideas that had motivated their pre-
crisis policy, even after the material context was radically altered. This 
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explanation might be considered an inversion of Lindblom’s (1982) notion of 
the market as prison – for New Labour it is suggested that the narrative 
became the prison. It is an ideational explanation for policy outcomes, but an 
ideational explanation of a specific kind: that ideas which had been publicly 
mobilised in a government’s narrative took on a causal significance over and 
above the agency of the people who expressed them, to the extent that it 
became a constraint on the government’s thinking and policy around the crisis.  
Narrative has the potential to constrain its creators on two dimensions: 
because there may be a political penalty for a perceived u-turn, and because 
the constructive effort involved in putting forward a narrative involves a 
degree of cognitive or ideological commitment to the ideas being espoused 
which makes it painful to abandon them later. The first of these problems 
cannot really be considered an ideational phenomenon. If politicians stick with 
an established narrative that they no longer believe in purely because they 
fear being accused of inconsistency, then they are indeed trapped by narrative 
but for largely pragmatic reasons (e.g. Grube, 2016). When policy change does 
not occur because a government refuses to be caught in a “u-turn” or “flip-
flop” then primary causal force must be deemed to come from electoral 
interests rather than ideas (or at least, not the government’s ideas). However, 
the second kind of narrative trap is deeply ideational. Sticking to an 
established narrative even when the world has changed may indicate the 
operation of political ideas at their most powerful, constraining policy choices 
and blocking change by defining the “parameters of the possible” (Abdelal et 
al, 2010: 238). If ideas and narrative are in the driving seat, there will be 
evidence of politicians attempting to bend circumstances to fit their ideas, 
rather than the reverse. This narrative rigidity is posited as having been the 
key dynamic in the later years of the New Labour case. 
For the causal impact of narrative to be demonstrated, it must of 
course be weighed against other possibilities. Alternative explanations for 
New Labour’s policy continuity fall broadly into two groups: institutional, and 
interest-based (see figure 3.1, below, for a summary). On the institutional side, 
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it might plausibly be argued that any turn to the left by the New Labour 
government would have been frustrated by the conservatism of the British 
establishment, most prominently the Treasury and the Bank of England. 
International institutions might also have had a part to play in constraining 
policy change: a broad neoliberalism remained the default setting of the 
European Union and most of the G7 during the period, making a unilateral 
British policy reversal more difficult.  Institutions may also present a more 
straightforward obstacle for policy reversals, because big organisations are ill-
equipped to change direction in a hurry, and may lack the capacity for rapid 
policy innovation, being geared to existing priorities. It might be that New 
Labour could have effected change after the crisis given more time, but that a 
general election in 2010 left them too little road on which to turn around the 
institutional caravan.  
 Alternatively, interest-based explanations might point to the continued 
presence after the crisis of structurally powerful interests opposed to a 
leftward shift in British economic policy. Fear of a negative reaction in the 
bond markets or a downgrading of Britain’s credit rating might have prevented 
New Labour from attempting a turn to the left, crisis or no crisis. The threat of 
capital flight if policy were to become unfavourable to the City of London 
could plausibly have been as present after the banking crisis as before, and 
could arguably have been sharpened by it. In such an account, Labour’s policy 
stasis would then not be particularly puzzling, since there could little reason to 
expect policy change while financial interests remained the same. Similarly, an 
explanation based on electoral interests might suggest that Labour faced the 
same constraints after the crisis as before it, in that their electoral chances still 
depended on winning over swing voters in middle class constituencies whose 
preferences had not changed and might even have been sharpened with the 
onset of recession. Each of these counter-arguments will need to be carefully 
weighed in the empirical account. 
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Table 3.1: Competing explanations of New Labour non-change after crisis 
Ideas Narrative as prison: New Labour trapped by prior 
rhetorical commitments and ideational inertia 
 
Institutions The Treasury as prison: British policymaking establishment 
wedded to market liberal paradigm and opposed to 
leftwing change 
 
Prison break pending: institutional inertia means that 
policy change takes too long 
 
Interests Market as prison: powerful financial interests still opposed 
to leftwing policy; crisis did not change those material 
barriers 
 
Basildon constituency as prison: New Labour continued to 
be captured by the preferences of middle class swing 
voters  
 
 The above framework borrows the familiar “three ‘I’s” configuration 
from as a means of clearly delineating the preferred explanation from 
conceivable alternatives. Such a framework is, of course, a simplification, and 
risks exaggerating the independence of the three causal worlds from one 
another. Setting ideas, institutions and interests against one another risks 
implying that the researcher must discount two of them altogether in order to 
support claims about the third. Such an undertaking would of course be 
spurious, and sets an unreachable bar for empirical research that is as likely to 
yield false negatives as genuine insight (Jacobs, 2014). To be clear: this project 
does not proceed on the basis that ideas, institutions and interests are free-
standing variables whose relative weight can be precisely calculated and 
whose causal importance is mutually exclusive. Rather, the three ‘I’s are 
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assumed to be distinguishable groups of causal pressures that are each likely 
to exist in some combination at any given time. For the causal importance of 
ideas to be proven it is not necessary that institutions, for example, be 
irrelevant. It should, however, be possible to discern particular moments at 
which one of the three is particularly decisive. A satisfactory explanation of 
political outcomes must attempt to sort out one cause from another, and to 
assess their relative weight, without forcing complex causes into artificially 
tight boxes.  
Craig Parsons has turned to cultural sociology for the suggestion that 
“we must show that ideas ‘exercise an influence of their own but not 
completely by themselves’” (Biernacki, 1995, cited in Parsons, 2015: 3), 
allowing for the possibility that ideas may be causally significant without being 
detachable from other features of the political context. The case study that 
follows will sift the empirical evidence with a view to establishing how the 
relative impact of different causes may have waxed and waned over time. 
Explanatory traction is likely to come most strongly from moments when one 
potential causal pressure holds steady and another varies (when, for example, 
material conditions alter but ideas do not), but such variance is assumed to 
illustrate the balance of causal power at a particular moment rather than 
always and everywhere. To the extent that broader theoretical claims about 
the politics of ideas emerge out of the empirics, these will be carefully 
specified. 
 
Key concepts: narrative, discourse, rhetoric  
The project takes narrative as its conceptual keystone, but it is, of course, just 
one of many available frames for the analysis of political language and ideas. 
This section considers the concept of narrative in closer detail, and especially 
by reference to two alternatives: rhetoric and discourse.  
Figure 3.2 below illustrates the distinction between these three frames, 
for the purposes of this project. At the top level, discourse is taken to indicate 
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very large public conversations with fuzzy boundaries. The term discourse 
tends to imply dialogue, rather than monologue; it may be taken to imply 
intersubjectivity (as in postmodern kinds of discourse analysis) and certainly 
implies a large and various population of speakers. “A discourse” may also 
mean a whole worldview (e.g. Daddow, 2011) or a complete political lexicon in 
which a common language encapsulates a group’s shared assumptions about 
the world. The common thread is that discourses are bigger than any single 
speaker or group, and freighted with implicit political assumptions. They are 
also notoriously difficult to study empirically. 
 Rhetoric is another term often used interchangeably with narrative in 
popular commentary on politics, but again I take it to mean something quite 
specific. Rhetoric is the micro-foundation of political speech; it relates to 
individual “acts of political persuasion” (Beech & Lee, 2008: 5). Studying 
rhetoric generally means close reading of individual speeches and may make 
use of literary theory to unpick the linguistic devices at work (e.g. McCloskey, 
1998; Roe, 1994) or draw on classical rhetorical theory that lays bare the ways 
in which ethos, pathos and logos enable a single speaker to move his or her 
audience (Bauer & Glaveanu, 2011). Finlayson (2007 has exhorted a new 
school of rhetorical political analysis (RPA) in which the focus is on speech as 
action, emphasising the extent to which rhetoric exists not just to explain or 
describe but to persuade and to provoke action in an audience (see also 
Finlayson & Martin, 2008). What these approaches have in common, however, 
is that rhetoric appears at the opposite end of the linguistic scale to discourse, 
being fine-grained, individualised and relatively amenable to empirical scrutiny.  
I locate narrative at the middle level, conceptualising it as something 
larger than rhetoric but less expansive than a discourse. It belongs to fewer 
people than a discourse, and will be more one-sided: a narrative is less a 
conversation than a set of assertions made by a particular group of actors. The 
picture is complicated by the fact that much of the political science literature 
on discourse (Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism, for example) is addressing 
something closer to this middle level, steering clear of the grander 
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conceptions of discourse found in poststructuralist branches of the social 
sciences (see Schmidt, 2010: 15). There is therefore some overlap between my 
conception of narrative and some of the political science literature on 
discourse. There is also a difference between this conception of narrative and 
the way it is often invoked in rhetorical analysis, making it important to clearly 
define what the term means in this project. 
Figure 3.2: Three levels of political language 
 
In popular commentary on politics the term ‘narrative’ has become “an 
important part of the contemporary political lexicon” (Boswell, 2012: 1) and 
needs little explanation. Commentators may refer to “a narrative” in the 
singular to denote a political story that achieves a basic degree of coherence: 
for example, governments may be criticised for their failure to advance a 
narrative of their politics  that articulates a clear story about what they are 
doing and why (e.g. Toynbee & Walker, 2010). Alternatively, the term may be 
used to label a loose confederation of political arguments around a given 
policy agenda, articulated by a range of actors. This usage is often adopted by 
those who would wish to see such arguments challenged: for example, critics 
of austerity politics may refer to “the austerity narrative” to expose its 
contingency and invite counter-arguments to come forward.  In both popular 
commentary and political science, however, writers display a tendency to rely 
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on the reader’s familiarity with common usage and do not provide their own 
definitions. 
 Some academic definitions of narrative are available. Akerloff & 
Schiller concentrate on the idea of coherence, defining narratives as 
“sequences of events with an internal logic and dynamic that appear as a 
unified whole” (2009: 51). Others have focused on the instrumental value of 
narratives as “sense-making mechanisms” (Boswell, 2012: 2) that are 
particularly useful in conditions of uncertainty because they “underwrite and 
stabilize the assumptions for policymaking in policymaking in situations that 
persist with many unknowns” (Roe, 1994: 34). Some authors emphasise the 
social character of this sense-making, seeing it as “a collaborative process of 
corporate knowledge-making… [toward] communally constructed 
representations of knowledge about past, present, and future developments 
in the… economy” (Smart, 1999: 250). McNamara (2015) casts narration as a 
“technology of cultural construction”, through which elites seek to legitimate 
political systems or projects by drawing on recognisable myths and tropes, 
often in relation to the past. Narrative in this conceptualisation becomes a 
means by which contemporary institutions do their own historiography (see 
also Hobsbawm & Ranger (2002) on the cultural power of invented traditions). 
Others see narrative as a projection of human psychology and the “story-
based patterns of human thinking” (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009: 52) or, more 
pejoratively, “our predilection for compact stories over raw truths” (Taleb, 
2008: 63).  
It is noticeable that many of these definitions contain implicit or 
explicit value judgments about whether a narrative is a good thing. Similarly, 
the term “rhetoric” is often used to denominate either the highest form of 
public oratory or the basest kind of spin and obfuscation. Either conception 
can be an obstacle to considering what rhetorical language does in 
policymaking. Studying rhetoric mostly as great oratory places the primary 
focus on extraordinarily persuasive one-off interventions by great leaders, and 
thus disqualifies the majority of political language. On the other hand, 
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dismissing rhetoric as mere spin assumes a cynical politics concerned with 
covering up its true (and presumably materially-given) purposes, and thus 
gives us little traction on what political ideas might be at work. The concepts 
of discourse and rhetoric may be invoked approvingly as a healthy public 
dialogue to be facilitated (Finlayson, 2007) or as the linguistic carapace of 
power structures that should be exposed and dismantled (Norval, 1996;  
Howarth et al, 2000). Each implies a distinctive research agenda with a 
strongly normative component. 
I prefer to leave aside such value judgments in favour of a more open-
ended definition that serves as a prompt to empirical observation. For the 
purposes of this research, a narrative is defined as a political account of a set 
of conditions, their origins and, in particular, their relationship to policy. This 
definition of narrative draws particularly on Deborah Stone’s concept of the 
“causal story” (Stone, 1989), connecting an account of a problem with 
arguments for or against its resolution in policy. This definition is also 
congruent with Finlayson’s argument that “narrative is a fundamental way in 
which we grasp the meaning and the ordering of the events we experience 
and in particular of how we understand human actions and their effects (2007: 
557). It differs, however, from Finlayson’s rhetorical approach in important 
ways. In RPA narrative is listed alongside rhetorical techniques such as 
metaphor, commonplaces and so on, thereby presenting it chiefly as a 
mechanism by which political speech can be made more persuasive. This 
essentially reduces narrative to a sub-set of rhetoric in which the focus is 
language with an internal structure that tells a story in some kind of sequence. 
This research takes a different view, treating a narrative as an observable 
object (i.e. a complete causal story) rather than a technique out of which 
rhetorical objects are constructed. 
 Policy narratives, in this view, are not static representations of an 
object but are an attempt to persuasively connect external conditions to the 
possibilities and justifications for policy action (or inaction). Since this project 
is primarily interested in economic narratives, it looks to accounts of the 
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economic conditions that comprise an interpretation of the present situation, 
including an account of how the economy came to be as it is; a diagnosis of 
what policy should be applied and a claim about what will happen as a result. 
This definition reflects the theoretical assumptions set out in chapter two: that 
narratives respond to uncertainty about the economic conditions and, by 
distilling a working understanding of those conditions, provide the platform on 
which policy can be built. I focus particularly on the economic narratives of 
governments, in which a relatively small number of key narrators are 
responsible for the narrative work that conceives and facilitates the 
government’s policy agenda. 
This does, however, pose the question of how narratives and narrators 
relate to one another. Once again, seeing narrative as the middle ground 
between rhetoric and discourse is important. A discourse is generally 
theorised as having a life of its own, being too large and mutable to be owned 
by any one discussant. Theorising discourse often means theorising the ways 
in which language becomes invested with structural power, shaping the world 
in which agents must make their way. A piece of rhetoric, on the other hand, 
represents the agency of a single speaker, and can be approached using 
theories of intentionality, purposive speech and strategic political action, as 
well as psychological framings that prioritise the personality and cognition of 
the speaker. Crudely put, discourses are broadly structural, while rhetoric is 
linked to individual agency. 
As the middle tier of political speech, narrative sits at the intersection 
of structure and agency. My theoretical claims for narrative rest on this 
tension, in many respects: I have posited that ideas which are, at first, 
empowering of policy (because agents deliberately mobilise their ideas to 
reduce uncertainty and set up their policy agenda) may later come to 
constrain the very same agents and prevent further policy change. That is, the 
relationship between narrative and narrator, structure and agent, is not a 
steady state. The construction of a new narrative is a process in which the 
agency of narrators is centrally important. It does not follow, however, that 
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such agency is a permanent facility, and my proposed theory of narrative 
suggests that older narratives behave much more like structures, moving out 
of the control of their original narrators to the extent that “politicians can 
become prisoners of their metaphors” (Stronach et al, 2014: 322). The 
empirical work that follows will be an opportunity to explore this contention in 
greater depth, but the working assumption is that there may not be a static 
relationship between narrative and narrator, and as such it is not likely that 
the causal impact of narrative will be found stable over time. 
 
Internal versus external narrative validity2 
Having established our definition of narrative it is necessary to operationalise 
it for the empirical study. This means devising a method by which narrative 
evolution may be systematically observed and, in particular, by which 
inferences may be drawn about when and why any changes occur. Framing an 
empirical study of a narrative can be difficult because it risks either being only 
descriptive of its content, or an exercise in contrasting what was said with 
external conditions (rhetoric versus reality framings). On one hand, purely 
discursive analyses risk becoming an insular exercise in close description, 
concerned mainly with the internal properties of a given text. This is clearly 
problematic in relation to the language of economic policy which, as argued in 
the last chapter, is inseparable from its object, the economy itself. Events 
clearly matter too. But neither is it satisfactory to simply pit a narrative against 
its material context and ignore its internal logics, given our assumption that 
economic events must be constructed in language in order to be politically 
meaningful. The fact is that economic policy narratives are both stories in their 
own right, and stories in context, and we need to find ways to interrogate 
both dimensions.  
The solution proposed here is to give due space to the dual properties of 
                                                        
2 A version of this section was originally developed in Alexander, 2012. 
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narrative – both the internal shape of a narrative and its relationship to 
external events – but, crucially, to keep the two things conceptually distinct 
from one another. Schmidt and Radaelli pointed up this possibility when 
considering the reasons why certain political discourses are unsuccessful: 
“What makes a discourse and/or a policy programme 
ultimately fail? External events that undermine the 
applicability and relevance of the policy programme? Internal 
contradictions in the discourse itself?” (2004: 202) 
 
This distinction is useful for the purposes of operationalising a narrative 
analysis because it allows us to disaggregate the two kinds of validity to which 
political narratives must aspire. First, economic narratives aim to achieve 
internal validity: that is, to be coherent in their own terms. Second, narratives 
seek to achieve a degree of external validity: to fit the facts, however 
perceived. Both kinds of validity are necessary if a narrative is to do its job of 
convincingly combating economic uncertainty, but the two can be separately 
observed and their covariance should not be presumed. It is suggested that a 
full analysis of economic narratives should assess how the two validities 
interact, when they converge and diverge and, especially, what governments 
do when faced with validity problems on one or both fronts. 
To expand the definitions more fully: the external validity of a political 
narrative is its consistency with external conditions; the extent to which a 
narrative fits – or is perceived to fit – the facts. It will be immediately evident 
that any attempt to design an objective test of external validity would be 
highly sensitive to the indicators that are included in the calculation. For 
example: a given narrative might score very well on its consistency with trend 
growth in the economy, while having little to say about debt, so the 
composition of the measure for external validity would heavily condition the 
results. The standard response to such dilemmas would be to construct a 
sophisticated basket of indicators that aims to capture all relevant measures 
of economic performance. Government narratives would then be scored on 
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each of these indicators, such that those with the broadest grip on the 
economic conditions would likely score highest for external validity. However 
if we assume a world of uncertainty, as described above, then different kinds 
of external validity may serve political purposes at different times, making the 
definition and measurement of external validity an endlessly moving target.  
The fundamental problem with arriving at an objective measure for 
external validity is that it is what Kathleen McNamara has called a “perceptual 
variable”; validity exists in the eye of the beholder. As such, establishing the 
external validity of an economic policy narrative is not only achieved by fact-
checking; it must be “constituted by social processes” (McNamara, 2002: 61). 
External validity ultimately relies on distilling a common verdict out of trends 
that are open to a number of different interpretations. It involves not just the 
weighing of data but an ongoing process of agenda-setting and interpretation. 
Governments claim a high degree of authority to speak about the economy, 
giving their narratives a certain advantage in establishing external validity. But 
they are also subject to very high levels of scrutiny and are open to 
accusations of partiality and politicisation of evidence that can undercut their 
authority. The extent to which they succeed in asserting an externally valid 
account of the economy will therefore depend strongly on their ability to 
agenda-set by specifying the indicators on which economic performance 
should be judged, as well as depending more straightforwardly on whether 
data for those indicators is consistent with the narrative’s predictions. 
If the economic context is always contested, even amongst the experts, 
then “fit with the facts” will be as much a matter of assertion as proof. 
Evidence of external validity therefore tends to be negative, rather than 
positive; it cannot be absolutely proven to be present, but it can plausibly be 
falsified in certain circumstances. The construction of external validity goes 
awry when one of two things happens: either a gap opens up between the 
narrative and the data on one of the indicators that the narrative itself 
prioritises, or voices from outside are able to assert that the narrative is 
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prioritising the wrong things. That being the case, instead of seeking an 
objective measure of external validity, it may be more useful to focus on the 
presence or absence of external validity challenges: moments at which the 
existing narrative is subject to exogenous pressure from events the narrative 
itself deems important, or from rival interpretations of which events matter. 
The empirical study that follows will make use of the notion of external 
validity challenges in order to pinpoint moments at which the narrative is 
under most pressure to change. Observing whether the outcome of such 
moments is change or continuity will be fundamental to understanding the 
relationship between economic narratives and economic events. 
The internal validity of a narrative, on the other hand, relates to its 
coherence within itself. It requires an internally consistent set of messages 
that, taken together, make a persuasive case for a particular economic story. 
Signs of internal validity would include consistency over time, mutually 
reinforcing themes and well-developed links between problem analysis and 
policy solutions. Poor internal validity would be evidenced by contradictory 
claims, disunity between government spokespeople, frequent changes of 
direction and the absence of clear headline messages. The crucial point is that 
these conditions for internal validity could, in theory, be satisfied even if the 
narrative bore very little relation to the external context. Internal validity is 
about how well a narrative functions as a story, not how realistic that story 
might be. Unlike external validity, internal validity can be quite readily 
observed in the language of a narrative itself, and need not be inferred from a 
contrast with other data. Operationalising this concept therefore requires a 
systematic approach to content analysis of speech material, in order to trace 
key language over time and take observations about its coherence and 
consistency. (Chapter M1 sets out the content analysis methodology in full, 
based on the research goals explained in this chapter.) 
The aim, in separating out the two kinds of validity, is to make it 
possible to see how different imperatives may drive economic narratives at 
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different moments. The two categories are not very surprising on their own; it 
is intuitively obvious that governments will ideally want to be both factually 
right and rhetorically coherent. Where the distinction becomes most valuable 
is in tracing the dynamics of validity over time. That is, rather than taking a 
static materialist view that asks how large the gap is between the rhetoric and 
the reality at a given point – or a purely discursive view that takes the ‘story’ 
out of its context – we should ask how and when the two kinds of validity wax 
and wane over the life of a political project.  
 
Data, and other problems 
In calling for more work in the rhetorical tradition, Alan Finlayson advises that 
“if we wish systematically to investigate political rhetoric as a way of 
understanding and explaining political actions and events the first step must 
be to specify a corpus of argument for analysis” (2007: 554). In this regard, 
focusing on government narratives has an important practical benefit, in that 
they are, by definition, publicly available. Speeches, statements, parliamentary 
transcripts and media interviews enable the researcher quickly to amass a 
wealth of data on a government’s economic story, and indeed the sheer scale 
of verbiage produced by modern governments makes sifting rather than 
accumulating data the primary challenge. In the case of New Labour’s 
economic policy, good data exists from across the period of government, most 
importantly via the “newsroom and speeches” section of the archived 
Treasury website, preserved online by the National Archives since 2010. The 
empirical chapters in Part II will briefly set out the methodology applied to the 
case study, with a fuller discussion of methods in Part IV, including the 
sampling procedures that have been used to select speeches that 
operationalise the narrative as a manageable dataset.   
There is, however, a trickier dilemma for ideational researchers looking 
at narrative: whether one can use data on what people said to make valid 
inferences about what they thought. Most ideational work approaches its 
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object, ideas, through the intermediary of language, discerning what political 
actors think substantially, though not exclusively, through what they say. 
Finlayson & Martin argue that “the political speech is a snapshot of ideology in 
action” (2008: 449), and that in any case, there is no way to get at ideology 
without going through language because “ideas can only be accessed by 
studying the arguments made for or against them by political actors 
employing political rhetoric” (Finlayson & Martin, 2008, quoted in Grube, 
2016: 534). The obvious rejoinder is that we could choose to judge a 
politicians’ ideas by their actions, inferring ideas from what leaders do rather 
than what they say. The difficulty with such an approach is that it makes it 
impossible to distinguish between policies that are pragmatic and those that 
are ideologically motivated. We are also left with no way of getting at the 
moments of tension and dissonance that often accompany policy change or 
continuity. And ultimately, we cannot assert a causal relationship between 
ideas and certain policies because they would be assumed always to be in 
lockstep.  
But while governments’ actions are not a viable proxy for their ideas, 
nor is language an unproblematic window on ideology; there is an obvious risk 
in assuming that political speech is a reliable representation of political 
thinking. Alan Jacobs cautions that “error in the measurement of ideas can 
arise from the fact that the most readily interpretable manifestation of actors’ 
cognitive commitments – their own verbal expressions of their ideas – is often 
a systematically biased indicator” (Jacobs, 2014: 45). Indeed, politicians have 
the potential be the most unreliable of narrators, having every incentive and, 
in most cases, the requisite skill to use language strategically. The inferential 
leap from narrative, which corresponds directly to language, to ideas, which 
may not, requires exceptionally careful handling.  
Jacobs’ advice is that the strongest evidence of ideational 
commitments can be found in circumstances where material conditions 
observably change, but the expressed ideas do not (2014: 57). That is, if a 
politician continues to express the same position even when circumstances 
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are no longer so favourable to that interpretation, one may begin to infer that 
the ideas are sincerely held. The ‘three I’s’ research design outlined above is 
intended to look for just such evidence. In addition, the empirical analysis will 
aim to buttress its conclusions about the ideas behind key speeches by 
supplementing content analysis of speech data with interviews that probe the 
intentionality of speakers. By speaking to officials and advisers involved with 
the New Labour government it should be possible to stress-test emerging 
conclusions about the ideational underpinnings of the government’s narrative 
activity, and so to avoid heroic inferential leaps. This method is not watertight, 
since participants’ accounts of what the government believed may themselves 
be selective, strategic or simply biased. However, taken alongside content 
analysis of speeches, interviews should contribute to a fuller and more robust 
account of New Labour’s ideas up to and through the financial crisis. This 
mixed-methods approach should thereby provide a stronger foundation for 
testing the hypothesised impact of narrative on a government’s ability to 
speak, and think, new economic policy directions in the face of crisis.  
The research design for the New Labour case study can be seen as 
utilising familiar elements in somewhat novel combination. Discursive 
branches of political economy have often made use of case studies and 
qualitative-historical methods, but have less often used computerised content 
analysis. The research question prioritises the temporal dimension, asking not 
just what the narrative says but how it evolved. Content analysis provides a 
relatively structured means of arriving at conclusions about that narrative 
evolution, while the theoretical separation of internal and external validity 
should facilitate a new and relatively systematic assessment of what may be 
driving narrative change or continuity. Part II of the thesis now puts these 
frameworks into practice.  
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4. Constructing the great moderation  
Narratives of stability and prudence, 1997-2007 
The first of four empirical chapters on the New Labour case, this chapter 
presents an analysis of the New Labour government’s domestic economic 
narrative in the ten years preceding the financial crisis. It will show that 
Labour’s economic language in that period was characteristic of the ‘great 
moderation’ thinking of the time, according to which business cycle volatility 
had apparently been tamed by a new policy consensus for anti-inflationary 
monetary policy and fiscal restraint. Longitudinal analysis of Labour speeches 
shows that these ideas became increasingly entrenched through repetition, 
encountering a series of external challenges that might have provoked change, 
but through which the narrative only became more deeply embedded. 
Furthermore, the presentation of Labour’s economic narrative tended to 
become narrower and less sophisticated over time, as rhetorics that started 
life as multi-dimensional problem analyses become more tightly focused on 
single indicators that reflected well on the government’s policies. Periods of 
economic uncertainty did not tend to generate doubt or reflection, but rather 
provided a spur to ever-increasing certitude in policymakers, as the dynamics 
of narrative validity tightened their grip. 
 The analysis begins by mapping Labour’s domestic economic narrative 
as a pair of intertwined, but distinguishable themes: macroeconomic stability 
and fiscal prudence. Based on the theoretical framework set out in chapter 3, 
these themes are approached as causal stories with three core components. 
First, rhetoric in each theme presents an interpretation of the present 
situation, advancing a particular account of how the economy came to be as it 
is and diagnosing its particular problems. Second, following on from this 
problem analysis, each theme puts forward prescriptions for how policy 
should respond. Third, implicit or explicit in the policy prescriptions are 
predictions of their expected results: “if we do that, then this will follow”. This 
 78 
chapter begins by distilling the essential elements of Labour’s domestic 
narrative, identifying its keystone ideas and central claims, before tracing their 
evolution over time. 
 
Stability and prudence as causal stories 
New Labour’s economic policy was, at its root, based on a single promise: “in 
place of the boom and bust years, long term stability for Britain” (B5 CONF98). 
Macroeconomic stability was to be the defining theme of Labour’s economic 
story, developed first in opposition and then articulated at every opportunity 
in the early years of the New Labour government. Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown had diagnosed Britain’s economic weaknesses as originating in 
a lurching business cycle that prevented business confidence from flourishing. 
In particular, he saw economic volatility as being driven by inflationary 
tendencies, which ensured periods of growth inevitably ended in a wage-price 
spiral that hurt confidence and converted expansions into contractions: 
“At around this point in every recovery, when inflation, and 
interest rates have risen, a second wave of wage inflation has 
brought a recurrence of stop-go instability.” (PBR97) 
Going into further detail in 1998, Brown also pointed to capacity constraints in 
British industry as a brake on prosperity: 
“Every time the British economy started to grow, it quickly 
overheated and ran into inflationary pressures, and it did so 
because our economic base in Britain was too narrow and its 
capacity was too weak to sustain anything other than slow 
growth. That is why every past growth cycle has contained in 
Britain the seeds of its own destruction.” (CONF98) 
The way out of this bind was, apparently, to impose wage restraint during the 
good times, choking off inflation in the interests of stability: 
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“If the country's wage responsibility matches the 
Government's inflation resolve - and this is as relevant to the 
public sector as to the private sector - then Britain can have a 
low inflation environment for many years to come that will 
end the violence of stop-go economics in our country.” 
(CBI98) 
There was an important party-political dimension to this framing, which 
was intended to sever the association between Labour governments and the 
instability of the 1970s by addressing Labour’s historic inflation problem, while 
attributing boom and bust to both parties. In his early speeches, Brown would 
often refer to “Tory boom and bust” (CONF99) a deliberate subversion of the 
Conservatives’ traditional image as the party of economic competence. 
Labour’s stability rhetoric tended not to invoke the 1970s but the more recent 
experience of the early 1990s, when a Conservative government had presided 
over recession, falling house prices and spiking interest rates, culminating with 
Britain’s “Black Wednesday” exit from the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in 1992. The rhetoric of stability was not always partisan; 
elsewhere, Brown would acknowledge Britain’s “unenviable history, under 
both parties” of economic instability (PBR97). Nonetheless, the promise of a 
new era of stability was central to the New Labour project; if Brown could 
convince the public to trust Labour with Britain’s economy he would have 
overcome one of the most important barriers to the party’s electability, whilst 
appropriating territory in which the Tories were used to holding the advantage.  
The presence of such partisan motivations should not, however, be 
taken to imply that Labour’s enthusiasm for macroeconomic stability via 
inflation hawkishness was purely strategic. Rather, the macrostability 
narrative was the principal repository of New Labour’s economic thinking, 
expressing the most important components of their policy model. Within the 
macrostability theme, two key ideas are present. The first is that Britain’s 
principal economic ailment was inflation, such that inflation control had to be 
the overriding priority of monetary policy. While the government often 
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emphasised that its inflation target was symmetrical, taking “deflation as 
seriously as inflation” (BUD03), there was also a tendency to trumpet low 
inflation as an unequivocal good, as in 2003 when Brown’s budget statement 
heralded “the lowest inflation for thirty years” (ibid). As noted above, Labour’s 
stability narrative rooted its diagnosis of the problem in specific past episodes 
of high inflation. As such they were implicitly, and continually, emphasising 
the upside risk, and it was the risk of high rather than low or negative inflation 
that was the primary driver of their monetary policy. This ‘deflationary bias’ 
extended to the Bank of England, who tended to bring inflation in below, 
rather than above target (Angeriz & Arestis, 2007, cited in Kitson & Wilkinson 
2007: 810), suggesting that the new arrangements institutionalised not just 
the principle of inflation targeting, but an underlying preference for low 
inflation. This was a profoundly conservative stance for a Labour government 
to adopt, given its implications for wages. 
The second key idea was that governments were prone to stoke 
inflationary pressures for political purposes, choosing short-term advantage 
over long-term stability. The most important inflationary pressures were 
therefore understood to come from government, so that containing the threat 
of state interference becomes a necessary condition of monetary stability. If 
inflation was the threat, government was its most likely catalyst due to 
politicians’ preference for short-term growth, and their propensity to concede 
to public sector wage demands. Labour governments were considered doubly 
vulnerable to inflationary temptations, given their ties to the trade unions and 
their dependence on the voter constituencies who would benefit most from 
public spending. The solution was therefore to insulate the monetary policy 
authorities from government and mandate them to control inflation as a 
precondition to all other economic policy goals. 
Based on these foundational ideas, Labour adopted a policy of 
“constrained discretion” (Balls & O’Donnell 2002: 30-5; see also Lee, 2008: 21-
2) a form of self-binding less rigid than the fixed targets of monetarism but 
that would, in theory, compel the government to make decisions for the 
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economic long-term rather than the political present. This new institutional 
framework would restrict the government’s policy options in key areas and, 
where they retained discretionary powers, provide greater transparency about 
their intentions. In practice, this meant granting independence to the Bank of 
England; mandating the bank to single-mindedly focus on inflation-control; 
publishing the voting record of the Monetary Policy Committee and a new 
requirement that the government publicly state its monetary and fiscal 
principles and goals. By credibly committing the Bank of England to take the 
necessary action to hold down inflation (albeit a particular conception of what 
constituted the wrong sort of inflation; see Hay, 2009), monetary policy would, 
it was assumed, shape investors’ long-term expectations and deliver 
favourable conditions for inward investment. Over time, stable 
macroeconomics would create a long-termist investor class with confidence in 
the promise of future stability. In other words, Labour’s causal story posited 
that markets would respond to constrained monetary policy by delivering 
perpetual, if moderate, GDP growth. Make governments predictable, 
institutionalise inflation-hawkishness in the central bank, and the private 
sector would do the rest.  
These ideas were not unique to Labour: Bank of England independence, 
for example, was supported by a growing international consensus for central 
bank independence, with some thirty countries having adopted a form of CBI 
between 1990 and 1994 (McNamara, 2002: 49, Figure 1). However, Labour’s 
rhetoric can be seen as a British variant of the ‘great moderation’ thinking of 
the time, in which institutional and policy reforms in central banking were 
believed to have inoculated democracies against the government-stoked 
inflation crises of the past. The economic literature was beginning to present 
empirical evidence of a simultaneous reduction in output volatility and 
inflation volatility starting in the 1980s (Kim & Nelson, 1999; McConnell & 
Perez-Quiros, 2000), an outcome that would have been considered impossible 
under previously-standard assumptions about the trade-off between inflation 
and growth (see Bernanke, 2004). Explanations for this apparently happy 
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outcome varied (see Stock & Watson, 2003), but prominent amongst them 
was the belief that monetary policy had undergone a generational step-
change for the better. Central banks’ adoption of fixed inflation targets was 
supposed to produce better results through continuous fine-tuning, in place of 
the old tendency to lurch from under- to over-reaction to the inflation rate. In 
the early years of the 21st century, this inflation targeting was considered the 
apotheosis of good monetary policy, putting New Labour’s new monetary 
framework well within the international consensus.  
New Labour’s approach to monetary policy had been to voluntarily 
surrender control to an independent body in the interests of stability. On fiscal 
policy, by contrast, the government retained its full range of tax and spending 
powers and, after 18 years of Conservative rule, there was some considerable 
public expectation that spending on public services would now be more 
generous. This presented a dilemma for Labour, who had to reconcile their 
social agenda with their concern for economic credibility. The answer, once 
again, would be a form of constrained discretion. 
The causal story in the fiscal narrative began with the proposition that 
“responsible public finances are the cornerstone of stability” (CBI97), but that 
such responsibility had been too little in evidence. There was therefore an 
urgent need to “overcome instability and imprudence” (MH97) in fiscal policy. 
In this reading, government spending plans and, especially, public borrowing, 
had in the past been a source of risk and needed to be brought under control. 
The argument was recapped by Balls & O’Donnell in 2002: 
“Macroeconomic policy can be a stabilising force.  But the 
powerful influence of government borrowing an interest 
rates on the economy can be destabilising, if not managed 
effectively. The evidence suggests that fiscal and monetary 
policies over the last two full cycles had failed to provide the 
requisite stability.” (2002: 156). 
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The nature of past ‘irresponsibility’ was left fairly vague in Labour’s public 
rhetoric, but the clear implication was that fiscal policy had been politicised 
and short-termist. In an interview for this research, one longstanding Treasury 
official described in more detail how the economic forecasts underpinning the 
fiscal envelope had been open to manipulation by previous Chancellors: 
“Nigel Lawson always used to get the forecasts from the 
Treasury, cross out the growth number and put a bigger 
growth number in, cross out the inflation number and put a 
lower inflation number in. It’s his forecast, you know?” 
(Interview F) 
Labour’s prescription was a new Code for Fiscal Responsibility designed 
to increase the transparency of the government’s fiscal decision-making by 
giving the National Audit Office scrutiny powers over forecasting, and 
requiring the government to state its fiscal objectives from the outset. Out of 
those high-level objectives, Labour then put forward a pair of new, self-
imposed fiscal rules. The first specified that, over the economic cycle, public 
borrowing must be only for the purposes of capital investment (not current 
spending, consumed in-year). Simon Wren-Lewis has dubbed this “a cyclically-
adjusted balanced budget rule for government consumption” (2013: 28), since 
it hinged on a zero (or positive) average deficit over the measurement period. 
The second rule required that public sector net debt be held at ‘sustainable’ 
levels, defined by Labour as 40 per cent of GDP. The new fiscal framework was 
therefore geared particularly toward risk arising from public borrowing, which 
could expose governments to the wrath of the financial markets. It did not 
directly constrain tax and spending, but set the boundaries within which they 
could operate by imposing an effective ceiling on how much the government 
could borrow in both the short- and the medium-term.  
 The Code for Fiscal Responsibility was an attempt to publicly lay out 
the logic and boundaries of the fiscal process, and to commit future 
governments to the same transparency. It stopped short, however, of placing 
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the fiscal levers in the hands of independent experts, on the basis that 
“making decisions about taxation and public spending is part of the essence of 
a democratically elected Government, requiring economic and social 
judgements that only the Government can make.” (Balls & O’Donnell 2002: 
157). An interviewee reported that this distinction between fiscal and 
monetary policy was particularly important to then-Chief Economic Adviser Ed 
Balls: 
“[Some] wanted a fiscal policy committee to go along with 
the monetary policy committee right from the start. But Ed… 
said no that’s democratic choice.” (Interview F) 
In theory, then, the democratically elected government would retain full 
discretion over tax and spend, and while increased transparency would make 
it clearer when governments were loosening fiscal policy, it did not prevent 
them from doing so. The government therefore sought to fetter their own 
discretion through a set of political commitments, pledging to adhere to their 
Conservative predecessor’s spending plans for the first two years in office, 
despite the fact that these were extremely stringent: 
“Gordon Brown, in a sense, rubber-stamped Ken Clarke's 
plans, which Ken regarded as eye-wateringly tight and never 
intended to stick to.” (Interview B) 
They also promised there would be no increase in the basic or higher rates of 
income tax. With borrowing constrained, major tax increases off the table and 
spending plans fixed, the early signals from the Labour administration were as 
fiscally conservative as they were hawkish on monetary policy.  
Part of the explanation for this signalling was Labour’s belief that the 
perception of fiscal responsibility was as important as the actual shape of fiscal 
policy. The predicted outcome, according their narrative, was that the 
confidence created by the newly prudent fiscal framework would set the 
economy on a stable footing, eventually creating space for more expansive tax 
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and spending plans in the future. A rules-based system of constrained 
discretion was expected to be more reassuring to the markets than simple 
fiscal restraint, because it allowed economic actors to price in fiscal discipline 
without having to wait and see if it materialised: 
“If the policy framework lacks credibility, households and 
firms will continue to base their decisions on past 
experience… Through this open and transparent framework, 
the Government has been able to bridge the credibility gap 
that developed after years of poor fiscal management.” 
(2002: 157) 
Two ideas were implicit in this part of the narrative. The first, in line with 
the thinking on monetary policy, was that governments are unpredictable and 
short-termist, making them a source of risk and instability. While the rights of 
the democratically elected have an inalienable right to make fiscal policy, they 
still have to be made safe. This belief is illustrated by Balls and O’Donnell’s 
observation that fiscal rules did not even need to be perfectly specified, since 
it was the existence of rules, rather than their substance, that would underpin 
confidence: 
“Even if a fiscal rule is not ‘optimal’ in a perfect world, it may 
well be the best economic response in a situation where the 
unconstrained political process produces outcomes that are 
even less desirable.” (2002: 157) 
As in monetary policy, the ‘unconstrained political process’ was a thing to be 
feared, so that making policy predictable was at least as important as making 
it right. And, as in monetary policy, the threat posed by unpredictability of 
government was viewed asymmetrically: higher spending, like higher inflation, 
was the implied risk. The new frameworks therefore sought to institutionalise 
not just transparency about fiscal objectives, but a tendency towards fiscal 
restraint. 
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The second implicit assumption was that fiscal policy was “in a 
subordinate role to monetary policy” (Sawyer, 2007: 889) since the narrative 
made all spending plans secondary to, and conditional on, the achievement of 
macroeconomic stability. Elsewhere, Labour had committed to a 
thoroughgoing renewal of Britain’s public services, but in the economic 
narrative this was presented as a second-order goal on the basis that “without 
stability all plans for investment, employment and education founder” 
(BUD97). The Code for Fiscal Responsibility ensured that the primacy of 
monetary policy was built into the architecture, requiring that policy should 
“take account of risk and of the need to avoid, so far as possible, conflict with 
monetary policy” (Balls & O’Donnell 2002: 140). New Labour policy duly did 
so: the decision to stick to Conservative spending plans for two years was 
disappointing to the party base, but Brown argued that “it is only by being 
prudent and disciplined now, building a platform for long term stability, that 
we will be able to deliver the people's priorities - as we will - for health and 
education in the years ahead” (CONF97). The first two years would therefore 
be devoted to macroeconomic stabilisation and ‘prudent’ fiscal consolidation.   
This is not to say that Labour were out-and-out fiscal conservatives. 
Broadly speaking, fiscal policy underwent three distinct phases in Labour’s pre-
crisis decade: deficit reduction from 1997-2000, significant expansion from 
2001-2005, and a period of consolidation from 2005-07 (Budd, 2010: R38; 
Wren-Lewis, 2013: 26).  So while “prudence” began as Brown’s favoured 
shorthand for tight spending plans, it soon evolved into “prudence for a 
purpose”, a classic piece of third-way rhetoric that sought to resolve the 
tension between Labour’s economic and social objectives by framing both the 
initial freeze and the later spending as equally temperate. Initial fiscal restraint 
would, it was argued, be a means to achieving social progress, because once 
stability had been achieved it could provide the platform for greater largesse. 
The critical point, however is that the construction of the narrative established 
a clear pecking order: stability first and, when the markets could bear it, 
spending later.  
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Table 4.1: Stability and Prudence as causal stories 
Narrative theme 
 
Diagnosis Prescription Prediction 
Macroeconomic 
Stability 
Britain prone to ‘stop-go’, because 
periods of growth stimulated 
wage-price inflation spirals that 
undermined confidence. 
 
Government has incentives to 
exacerbate the inflation problem. 
 
Control inflation as the essential 
precondition for economic 
stability. 
 
Insulate monetary policy from 
government interference. 
Inflation stays low. No more boom 
and bust. Labour become the 
party of economic credibility. 
 
Fiscal Prudence Expansive spending plans frighten 
the market unless stability is 
locked in. 
 
 
Keep fiscal policy within ‘prudent’ 
and transparent limits by means 
of fiscal rules (‘constrained 
discretion’) 
 
 
Government can safely invest in 
public services without 
threatening stability. 
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The twin themes of stability and prudence spoke to the same basic 
concern: the necessity of creating the economic and political space in which 
other policy objectives might be safely pursued. They rested on the same 
fundamental ideas: inflation as the great evil, government as a source of risk 
and stability as primary. In the early days, the narrative displayed strong 
internal validity, with the two themes providing mutual reinforcement and a 
clear line from problem analysis, to prescription, to predicted outcomes. Table 
4.1 summarises the causal stories advanced in each narrative theme, as 
articulated in early rhetoric, distinguishing between their key components of 
problem-diagnosis, prescription and predicted outcomes. The question was 
whether those predictions would stand up to events.  
 
Internal and external validity in the pre-crisis years 
It is a key property of narratives that they project the expected outcome of the 
policies they prescribe and thereby specify the criteria on which they expect to 
be judged. While all economic narratives are political constructions, they are 
constructions with a particular view of the material indicators that matter, 
making it possible to set them against empirical data and draw conclusions 
about how far that data supports or contradicts them. If the evidence begins 
to point away from the causal story’s predictions the narrative is subject to a 
challenge to its external validity, precipitating a choice between remaining 
consistent and adapting to events – between preserving its internal or 
external narrative validity. Ideally, political actors like to be both correct and 
coherent, but when this is no longer possible a trade-off must be made. At 
such moments the political response can be particularly revealing. 
 The external validity claims in Labour’s macrostability rhetoric were 
twofold: first, that inflation would be held low and stable by the Bank’s 
independent control of monetary policy and, second, that the control of 
inflation would allow for stability and growth in the economy at large. The key 
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indicators for the stability theme were therefore the rate of inflation, and the 
rate of GDP growth. For the fiscal prudence narrative the key claims were, first, 
that fiscal policy would be constrained by the new fiscal rules and, second, 
that as a result the markets would be able to bear future spending on public 
services. As such the crucial EV tests for the prudence theme were whether 
the government met its fiscal rules, and what impact the fiscal position had on 
market sentiment, particularly once public spending began to rise.  
 I will suggest that these twin narratives faced a series of external 
validity challenges during the pre-crisis years: 
- in 1999-2000, due to a pessimistic growth forecast; 
- in 2003-05, when inflation threatened to rise, due partly to booming 
house prices; 
- also in roughly 2003-2005, when disappointing revenues threatened to 
undermine the government’s ability to meet its golden rule; and 
- in 2004-06 when weak growth presented a challenge to the 
government’s claims of success. 
Longitudinal analysis of the rhetoric, however, suggests that there was never 
any serious deviation from the core messages as laid down in 1997, much less 
any ideational change. Rather, the narrative showed an exponential tendency 
to stubbornness, with unfavourable economic data either being absorbed into 
the narrative or masked by measurement changes designed to leave the 
headline story intact. While Labour’s narrative did not change course in 
response to these EV challenges, it did display a tendency toward 
simplification. What started out as a multifaceted analysis of Britain’s 
economic weaknesses would evolve into a narrower focus on headline growth 
and inflation that, in the absence of any recession or inflationary spike, 
allowed the government to assert that its policy framework was a success. To 
that end, several elements of New Labour’s original problem analysis fell away 
over time or were reframed as supportive of the overall thesis.  
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1999-2001: pessimistic forecasts, strong growth 
At the beginning of the New Labour period, GDP growth appeared to 
present the immediate problem. Britain had been recovering from the 
recession of the early 1990s, but growth rate was actually falling over the first 
two years of Labour’s tenure, from 3.25% in 1997 to 2.25 in 1998 and a 
projected 1.25% in 1999. Concerns about a slowing world economy therefore 
led the Treasury to downgrade its 1999 growth forecast from 2% at the 1998 
PBR. During 1999-2000 quarterly GDP data became highly volatile, even 
allowing for seasonal swings, falling to just 0.2% in Q2-1999. The weak second 
quarter saw the UK economy within a whisker of negative growth, though it 
would rebound in Q3. Output at this time was thought to be below trend, 
though not by much; the 1999 budget made a virtue of this dip, suggesting 
that at least “this cycle is set to be much more moderate than those in recent 
decades” (HM Treasury, 1999a: para 1.6). Nonetheless, three years of slowing 
growth represented the first challenge to external validity of the government’s 
story. 
In the event, outturn growth for 1999 came in at 2%, almost flat against 
1998 and substantially better than the downgraded forecast (figure 4.2), 
allowing Gordon Brown to conclude that, thanks to the government’s policy 
framework, all was well. The clear message in Budget 2000 was that the 
prescription was working, and that “it is because the foundations on which we 
build are strong that the economy can meet our inflation target and achieve 
steady growth” (BUD00). The first external validity challenge to the narrative 
had passed, with the surprises in the data all on the upside, leaving the 
government apparently vindicated. UK growth remained fairly steady in wake 
of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, during which time the UK economy 
performed better than several of its G7 counterparts, further strengthening 
the government’s conviction that policy was on the right track. Paradoxically, 
the early wobbles in Britain’s growth performance actually became a source of 
 91 
confidence for the new government, who were developing a sense of 
important policy tests having been passed.  
The improved growth outlook was accompanied by better than expected 
fiscal outturns. The 1999 PBR and 2000 Budget reported apparently structural 
improvements in the fiscal position, with larger budget surpluses than 
projected and a smaller public borrowing requirement:  
“A year ago I estimated that this year's current surplus would 
be 2.5 billion pounds. I can report that we have not only 
balanced the current Budget but our current surplus this year 
is forecast to be 17 billion pounds… due to the performance 
of the economy and to prudent management, [public 
borrowing] is not in deficit by 3 billion but in surplus by 12 
billion pounds.” (BUD00) 
This highly favourable position enabled Brown to face both ways on public 
spending, simultaneously announcing he would “lock in fiscal tightening” for 
another two years while also offering discretionary measures worth 0.5% of 
GDP, rising to 1.6% over three years (Wren-Lewis 2013: 35). There was now so 
much room for manoeuvre in the public finances that it appeared possible to 
have all things at once. 
The improved fiscal position ensured the prudence narrative would 
come under no pressure during Labour’s first term. The official analysis in 
1999 was that the UK economy had been performing on trend in early 1997 
(HM Treasury, 1999b), conveniently lining up the start of a new economic 
cycle with the political cycle. The 2001 budget offered a “provisional judgment” 
that a complete economic cycle had begun in early 1997 and ended in mid-
1999, meaning that the first two years in office represented a “full, albeit short 
and shallow” economic cycle (Balls & O’Donnell 2002: 164). Labour’s golden 
rule required a balanced budget over the cycle, but policy in 1997-99 had gone 
beyond this by enacting a “large fiscal tightening” (HM Treasury 1999: 16), 
ensuring that they not only met the golden rule, but exceeded it with an 
 92 
average annual surplus of 0.75% of GDP (HM Treasury, 2000: para.C3).  From 
the presumed start of the new cycle in mid-1999, Labour would then be 
starting again at zero, but with the political credit for having imposed two 
years of prudence to reduce the debt accrued by their predecessors. 
Since the first external validity challenge had passed off without requiring any 
narrative adjustment, the internal validity of the narrative was unaffected and, 
indeed, reinforced. Existing rhetoric had provided an off-the-shelf framework 
for explaining better than forecast data in 2000, which was immediately 
interpreted as proof that the fiscal framework was delivering its expected 
results. That is, things were not just turning out well, they were turning out as 
they were supposed to in the causal story. This was reflected in the rhetoric 
both qualitatively and quantitatively; 2000 was the peak year for references to 
prudence and the fiscal rules (Fig. 4.8) which appear an average of nine times 
per speech. Qualitatively, it was also the year in which the tone of the rhetoric 
went from optimistic to triumphant, Brown declaring that “these extra 
resources are not at the expense of our prudence, they arise because of our 
prudence” (BUD00, emphasis added). This period thus appears to have been a 
critical juncture for Labour’s economic story, embedding a sense of confidence 
in the correctness of the government’s approach. 
This moment of narrative vindication coincided with a policy turning 
point in 1999-2000, when the commitment to Conservative spending plans 
expired and Brown could begin allocating money to Labour priorities. Until 
that point, Brown had been continuing to make use of ‘prudence’ as the 
justification for not doing very much with his fiscal levers. The frugality of the 
first two years would now provide the justification for new spending, with 
Brown arguing that “because we have been financially disciplined, extra 
resources are now available” (BUD00). Prudence having been established, the 
taps could now be turned on: 
“Today, two years on, by applying our fiscal rules we have 
reduced the inherited deficit by 32 billion pounds; budgeted
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Figure 4.2: Annual GDP growth rate, forecast at Budget and outturn, 1997-
20063 
 
Figure 4.3: Quarterly GDP growth (%) 1997 – 20074 
 
                                                        
3 Source: Author based on Budget documents. Forecast and outturn data as 
reported in the Budget is used because it represents the information 
available to the government at the time, allowing for inferences about their 
thinking. Budget growth forecasts are given as a range of 50 basis points. 
For simplicity this analysis takes the mid-point of the range. 
4 Source: Office for National Statistics, Quarter on quarter CVM SA, Series 
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well within our public spending ceilings; and brought debt 
down towards 40 per cent of GDP. As a result of this cautious 
and prudent approach, we remain on track to meet the fiscal 
rules while at the same time guaranteeing an extra 40 billion 
pounds for schools and hospitals.“ (MH99) 
Further spending increases were rolled out over the next several years, the 
most totemic of which was the 2002 announcement of a step-change in 
funding for the National Health Service. Despite this increased spending, at the 
time of the 2002 Budget, current spending was expected not only to balance 
over the economic cycle but to remain in surplus every year to 2007-08, 
beyond the expected end of the cycle in 2005-06. For the first five or six years 
of New Labour’s tenure, therefore, the fiscal narrative encountered almost no 
EV challenge whatsoever, as low borrowing costs, buoyant revenues and 
strong growth combined to support enormous investments in public services 
while not only meeting the fiscal rules but forecasting budget surpluses across 
the period.  
 
2003-05: a housing boom and inflation problems 
While New Labour’s first term had seen a brief wobble in the growth 
figures, data for inflation – the other key measure for the external validity of 
the stability narrative – had been extremely favourable from the start. 
Inflation had fallen steeply from its early-1990s peak by the time Labour took 
office, and was within the Bank of England’s target range by the time of 
Gordon Brown’s first budget. The rate of inflation remained close to target, 
and often on the low side, throughout the first term, while inflation 
forecasting also proved reliable (Fig 4.4), reinforcing the impression that the 
new monetary framework had done away with the scope for nasty shocks. The 
low and stable inflation of this early period therefore appeared to support 
both Labour’s narrative and the wider international perception that business 
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cycle volatility had been brought under control by a generational leap forward 
in policy design. By the end of the first term, Brown was in no doubt that the 
government could take the credit for this outcome, telling the Labour Party 
conference that “it is not by accident, but by our actions, that we now have 
the lowest inflation for over 30 years and around the lowest long term interest 
rates for 35 years” (CONF00). 
In the second parliamentary term however, some considerable sleight-of-
hand was required to ensure the inflation narrative stayed on the rails. At the 
2002 budget, outturn inflation for the previous year was higher than forecast, 
albeit by only 0.25 per cent. While Brown was careful to say that the Bank’s 
symmetrical target guarded against deflation as much as inflation, 
undershoots had generally been heralded as good news; an overshoot must, 
by implication, be a matter of concern. The next budget in 2003 reported that 
2002 inflation had come in on target, but slightly above its forecast (2.5% 
rather than 2.25%) and projected a further quarter-point rise in the coming 
year. While still well within the target range, these increases represented the 
first indication that inflation might rise again, at least raising the possibility of 
an external validity challenge to the narrative.  On one view, inflation was still 
well within bounds; however, Labour’s hyper-vigilance on inflationary 
pressures meant that even small increases could represent a threat to the 
narrative.  
While the headline increase was small, the reasons for it pointed to 
trouble, with the uptick in RPIX being substantially driven by booming house 
prices. House price inflation was by this time soaring, with double-digit growth 
in every year of Labour’s first term, rising to 25% growth in a single year in 
2002 (Fig. 4.6).  By early 2003 the Bank of England were warning that house 
price inflation was “unsustainably high” (2003: ii) and in late 2003 they 
implemented the first of a series of increases to the base interest rate, 
accompanied by heavy hints that house buyers should expect further rises in 
future (Bank of England, 2004b). On the face of it, this was the monetary  
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Figure 4.4: Inflation rate, forecast at Budget and outturn, 1997-20065 
 
Figure 4.5: Three measures of inflation, 1997-20076 
 
                                                        
5 Source: author based on Budget documents. In-year forecast is the 
Budget estimate for inflation in the current year (e.g. in 1998, the estimate 
for 1998 inflation as published in Budget 1998). Outturn is the figure as 
reported at the next budget (e.g. 1998 outturns reported in Budget 1999). 
The official measure of inflation changes from RPI to CPI between the 
forecast and outturn for 2003. 
6 Source: Office for National Statistics, series CZBH, CDKQ, D7G7, retrieved 
April 2016 
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Figure 4.6: House price growth, annual % change, 1997-20077 
 
framework functioning as designed, adjusting rates and managing 
expectations to prevent overheating in the economy. But Labour rhetoric 
shows an ambivalent attitude to house price inflation, which they alternately 
conceptualised as a threat to, or as proof of, Britain’s economic stability. 
The early narrative had taken a clear position that housing market 
inflation should be kept in check, with early rhetoric making an explicit 
connection between house price booms and instability. Brown promised in his 
first budget that because “volatility is damaging both to the housing market 
and to the economy as a whole… I will not allow house prices to get out of 
control” (BUD97). Some later speeches also referenced the idea of housing 
volatility as a source of risk, as in 2003 when Brown noted that “most stop-go 
problems that Britain has suffered in the last fifty years have been led or 
influenced by the more highly cyclical and often more volatile nature of our 
housing market.” (BUD03).  
                                                        
7 Source: Nationwide house price index, retrieved August 2016 
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Alongside this, however, sat a second strain of rhetoric that presented 
low inflation and low mortgage interest rates as equivalent goods. In this 
reading policy should not aim at house price moderation but at “entrenching a 
low inflation culture that prudently keeps interest rates and mortgage rates as 
low as possible“ (PBR00, emphasis added). Government rhetoric repeatedly 
celebrated the government’s success in driving down mortgage rates, Brown 
noting approvingly in 2004 that “mortgage rates have been lower than in any 
seven year period since the late 1960s” (PBR04). Brown even went so far as 
suggesting that the public’s preference for low mortgage interest would be a 
key mechanism for moderating inflation: 
“under the new system, unacceptably high wage rises… will 
not lead to higher inflation, but to higher interest rates, [so] it 
is in no one's interest if today's pay rise threatens to become 
tomorrow's mortgage and interest rate rises.” (CBI99) 
That is, Britain’s heavily leveraged housing market was now supposed to be a 
force for stability because in the presence of a credible threat from the Bank 
of England to raise rates, fear of higher interest rates would disincentivise 
inflationary wage bargaining. The clear potential for low interest rates to fuel a 
housing and consumption boom was not acknowledged. Colin Hay has argued 
that during this time, the Labour government displayed “increasingly 
differentiated” inflation preferences in which house price inflation was good 
but retail price inflation bad (2009: 462). Analysis of the rhetoric supports this 
analysis, but suggests that the inflation that most concerned Labour was, in 
fact, wage inflation. Stability, it seemed, meant avoiding a return to 1970s 
style wage-price inflation; it left plenty of room for a new kind of inflationary 
spiral based on housing. 
Budget documents show that over time, the notion of housing booms 
as a source of risk gradually gave way to the second logic of low interest rates 
as proof of stability. For example, the 1999 Pre-Budget Report noted that 
“housing market volatility might… pose a threat to wider economic stability” 
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but argued that the ratio of house prices to incomes (which was then 3.9) was 
not far from trend, and anyway “under the Government's new framework… a 
build up of similar pressures in 1997 was quickly alleviated through a timely 
policy response” (HM Treasury, 1999c: Box A4). By 2003 however, the ratio of 
house prices to incomes had increased to 5.8, suggesting the problem had not 
been contained. This did not seem to trouble the Budget analysis which 
reported, with some considerable understatement, that “strong house price 
inflation [had] helped sustain growth in consumer spending, offsetting the 
negative impact of declining equity values on total household wealth, while 
mortgage equity withdrawal added a further stimulus to consumption” (HM 
Treasury, 2003: para B25). In other words, the previous year’s 25% house price 
growth was keeping the British economy going through a period of uncertainty 
in world markets. The 2004 Budget regarded a housing market slowdown as a 
“downside risk” to consumer spending but one which the Treasury regarded 
as reassuringly distant and which “should not be overstated” (HM Treasury 
2004a: 26-7). By late-2004, the Treasury was offering a further 
reinterpretation of house price inflation as a form of savings activity by British 
households, who were accumulating asset wealth as an alternative to 
traditional savings. Viewed in that way, house price inflation could be 
welcomed as an indication that “saving behavior has been more robust in 
recent years than is often appreciated” (HM Treasury 2004b: 96). 
There was therefore a kind of cognitive dissonance emerging in the 
government’s inflation policy, which remained extremely concerned with 
headline inflation but was increasingly accommodating of inflation in house 
prices. Incrementally rising headline inflation, driven by rapid price inflation an 
overheating housing market, posed an external validity challenge to a 
narrative that depended on delivering low and stable inflation and growth in 
perpetuity. The government’s response to this challenge was to move the 
goalposts, announcing in June 2003 that it would change the inflation measure 
from RPIX to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Announced alongside the “five 
tests” assessment of Britain’s prospects for joining the European single 
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currency, the adoption of CPI as the official measure was ostensibly part of a 
move toward European harmonisation, bringing Britain’s national statistics in 
line with the international standard. However, considering that the five tests 
had pushed Euro membership off the agenda for the foreseeable future, it is 
far from obvious why in 2003 Britain was suddenly ready to adopt the EU’s 
official measure, especially given Gordon Brown’s proven willingness to resist 
European harmonisation in other areas. Framed as a Euro-convergence story, 
the change to CPI, and especially the timing of the change, makes little sense. 
Seen in the context of the government’s macrostability narrative, it appears 
rather more logical. 
 The change to CPI has often been interpreted as a calculated move to 
exclude house price inflation from the official measure at a time when house 
prices were booming (Hay, 2009; Besley & Sheedy, 2010). The previous 
measure, RPIX, had been exclusive of mortgage interest but had included ‘a 
measure of owner-occupied housing costs’ (see Bank of England 2004a: iii) 
whereas CPI excludes mortgage costs, which are difficult to harmonise across 
Europe’s very different housing markets. The timing of the change was also 
significant: Differences in the ways the two indices are calculated ensure that 
CPI tends to return a lower inflation rate than RPI; at the time of the 
announcement it was running 160 basis points lower than RPIX. Alongside the 
change of index Brown simultaneously cut the Bank’s target by 50 basis points 
to 2%, but the change of index still created significant new headroom in the 
target.  Besides this short-term advantage, the new measure effectively 
guaranteed a far greater likelihood that economic performance would 
continue to be interpretable as on-track. RPIX inflation would have been 
higher than CPI; RPI would have been both higher and more volatile (fig 4.5). 
Taking CPI as the official measure of inflation thus offered the best fit with the 
government’s ‘low and stable’ inflation narrative, while making the change in 
2003 rebooted the inflation data at the first signs since 1998 that it might be 
creeping upwards and at a time when booming house prices meant the gap 
between indices was unusually wide. The RPIX index nudged 3% in 2002-03, 
 101 
but the CPI measure stayed flat and well below target, apparently reinforcing 
the message that the government’s macrostability policies were working well 
despite their failure to effectively rein in housing inflation. 
 Despite the fact that this “covert re-politicisation of monetary policy” 
(Hay, 2009: 474) had weakened the Bank’s incentive to do anything about 
housing inflation, through 2004 the MPC enacted a series of increases in the 
base rate. The housing market cooled dramatically over the course of 2005, 
prompting Brown to welcome this “necessary slowing in house prices” (PBR05), 
but at no point did house prices actually fall. The gap between average 
earnings and house prices continued to widen in 2005, median house prices 
reaching seven times incomes in 2006. Despite this, the government chose to 
interpret the 2005 slowdown as sufficient on the basis that it had been 
achieved without negative GDP growth, whereas “in any other decade, a 
house price bubble would have pushed Britain from boom to bust”  (CONF05). 
Once again, the lesson drawn was that the key to success had been the 
groundwork laid in 1997, and that no further policy action was warranted 
besides letting that system work. Brown told the CBI in 2005 that “our 
resolution has again been tested by the need to moderate the housing market” 
(CBI05) but that by sticking the course, inflationary pressures had been 
contained without any lurch into recession. In 2005 average house prices were 
almost 7 times average earnings in England,8 but in the 2005 Pre-Budget 
statement the government was back to celebrating “the lowest mortgage 
rates for 40 years” (PBR05). After 2005, as house prices once again accelerated 
away from earnings, there was no further talk about housing market risk. 
Monetary tightening had damped prices without causing a recession, so all 
was well and low mortgage rates were still a good thing: 
“mortgage rates which averaged 11½ per cent between 1979 
and 1997, have since then averaged just half that at 6 per 
                                                        
8 Source: Office for National Statistics, ratio of median house price to 
median annual earnings 
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cent. As I have said before Mr Deputy Speaker: No return to 
boom and bust.” (BUD06). 
At no point in the pre-crisis decade had house prices fallen back, and even the 
2005 cooling was a plateau, not a correction. By mid-2007 annual house price 
growth was back to 10%, but the stability narrative had dropped any interest 
in housing market volatility. As long as the two main indicators remained 
favourable – just – that was good enough. 
 The interplay of political interests and economic ideas is particularly 
interesting in this episode. The Treasury’s reframing of house price inflation as 
evidence of, rather than a threat to, stable economic growth could be 
interpreted as pure interest politics: specifically, Gordon Brown’s interest in 
keeping a housing-based boom going for political reasons (e.g. Hay, 2009, 
Widmaier, 2016a). Excluding housing from the inflation measure effectively 
weakened the Bank’s mandate to do anything about the house price bubble, a 
move apparently in direct contradiction to the government’s rationale for 
independent monetary policy because it privileged short-termist pandering to 
homeowners over central bankers’ concern for long-term economic stability. 
The change of inflation measure might therefore be seen as proof that the 
high-minded ideas in the macrostability narrative were less than sincere.  
However, another reading is also plausible. The government’s 
separation of wage inflation, which was bad, from house price inflation, which 
was fine, actually maps neatly onto certain of the underlying ideas in New 
Labour’s political economy, which located risk in the public sector and 
opportunity in the private market. Under that ideational framework, if 
households were capitalising on low interest rates to make leveraged 
investments in an appreciating asset class they could be congratulated on 
their willingness to embrace financial capitalism, provided they didn’t also 
agitate for a payrise. A non-housing inflation measure could be seen to reflect 
the core of the original causal story by focusing on bad inflation, rather than 
repudiating the story overall. Labour were not only choosing to ride a housing 
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boom, but were attempting to find ways to feel good about doing so, by 
rationalising that boom as emblematic of progress towards a modern, flexible 
economy. They then made the necessary narrative and policy adjustments to 
allow them to interpret events as compatible with the original story, deciding 
that that so long as stability was the watchword of monetary policy, whatever 
that policy produced must count as stable. The change of inflation measure 
enabled the government to interpret the economy as validating the 
predictions of their policy framework, showing that growth (even rocketing 
asset growth) and stability were compatible goals. In this instance, a change of 
policy did not only preserve the boom; it also preserved the narrative. Political 
interests were on the side of housing inflation; but in important respects, so 
were New Labour’s ideas, allowing them to assimilate what might have been 
an external validity problem into their overarching narrative. 
 
2005: meeting the fiscal rules ‘over the cycle’ 
As we have seen, the government’s ability to meet its fiscal rules had come 
under no strain in the first term, ensuring there was no challenge to the 
narrative of fiscal prudence. That narrative had nonetheless begun to evolve, 
with the specific vocabulary of prudence being much less frequently invoked 
after 2000. This was apparently deliberate, one official recalling that “in the 
early budgets, Prudence was there, very much. She was quietly dropped 
though.” (Interview F). Two things appear to have happened instead: generic 
references to the fiscal rules became more common (Fig. 4.8), providing a 
technocratic stand-in for prudence, which had become an object of satire in 
the press. And, to the extent that prudence was still invoked, its meaning had 
become differentiated. At the outset in 1997, prudence described the 
government’s fiscal self-binding, but as early as 1998 it also became attached 
to spending announcements as “prudence for a purpose”. This rhetorical 
segue might be seen as simply descriptive of the policy shift from deficit 
reduction to spending growth, but it is noteworthy that the policy shift was  
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Figure 4.7: Macrostability rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2007 
 
Figure 4.8: Prudence rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2007 
 
Figure 4.9: Variants of prudence, by audience 
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Figure 4.10: Current budget surplus, budget forecasts and outturn, % of GDP9 
 
 
presented in terms of an existing rhetorical framework that invoked caution, 
frugality and the prioritisation of stability. The social purpose of the new 
spending plans was not put forward as justification on its own; even with a 
huge parliamentary majority and highly favourable economic conditions, new 
public spending required a side-order of prudence to make it palatable. 
Unlike the original “prudence”, the rhetoric of “prudence for a purpose” 
was deployed only selectively. Figure 4.9 breaks down prudence language into 
subcategories: ‘responsibility’, which relates to the fiscal rules, debt reduction 
and sound public finances; ‘purpose’, which relates to increased public 
spending often justified as “prudence for a purpose”; ‘hybrid’, in which third 
way rhetoric links fiscal responsibility with public investment as a win-win; and 
a residual ‘neither’ category. While fiscal responsibility remained the most 
common usage of prudence, there was also a substantial volume of rhetoric in 
which the language of prudence was adapted to justify public spending. But 
while parliamentary statements made liberal use of both variants, the idea of 
prudence for a purpose was almost never articulated before a business 
audience, who got unadulterated prudence. This rhetorical inconsistency 
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might look like an internal validity problem, weakening the coherence of the 
narrative and indicating it was perhaps not sincere in the first place. In fact, 
once again this rhetorical differentiation represents strong continuity with the 
underlying ideas in the fiscal causal story, which had always privileged stability 
over public investment. The fact that the fiscal rules – the constrained 
discretion – was everywhere discussed, while the spending – the exercise of 
discretion – was only sometimes articulated, is perfectly consistent with a 
narrative that says spending is only permissible when, and because, policy has 
been conservative enough to create the political space for it. In the rhetoric 
and in the thinking, stability and sound finance was essential while social 
purpose was conditional.  
 The tension between prudence and purpose would bite on the New 
Labour government in the second term, when rising spending and weak 
revenues combined to put pressure on the government’s ability to meet its 
golden rule. The first external validity challenges for the prudence narrative 
emerged from 2002-03, when tax revenues began to disappoint (Wren-Lewis 
2013: 37), opening up a gap between outturn data and the forecasts (see 
figure 4.10). At the 2003 Budget the estimate for the 2002-03 fiscal position 
turned from surplus to deficit for the first time in Labour’s tenure, with the 
current budget expected to return to balance in three years times. That 
horizon would prove elusive: the point at which the budget was expected to 
return to surplus moved back by another year at five out of six budgets from 
2003-2008. While the existence of a deficit would not of itself mean breaking 
the golden rule over the cycle, persistent deficits were eroding the margin by 
which it would be met, raising the prospect that some policy change would be 
necessary to avoid a breach. 
 In the event, the necessary breathing space was created not by 
changes to tax or spending, but by redefining the cycle. Nothing was done 
until mid-2005, allowing Brown to go into the general election campaign with 
no change to his core message. Two months after the election the government 
announced an update of its analysis of the economic cycle, which was now 
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deemed to have begun in 1997, not 1999 as previously stated (HM Treasury, 
2005c). This had the effect of counting in the initial two years of fiscal 
contraction to offset later deficits, increasing the government’s leeway by 
£22.5 million in 2005-06, which was then expected to be the last year of that 
cycle and the point at which the books would have to balance (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies 2006: 23). The re-dating of the beginning of the cycle was 
arguably consistent with the government’s stated methodology: the better-
than-expected GDP growth in 1999 meant that the economy had been nearly 
on-trend in that year, rather than dipping below trend and closing out a short 
cycle as originally thought. The government therefore argued that revising the 
start of the cycle to 1997 was simply a correction in line with the empirical 
evidence. However the timing of the change was greeted with widespread 
cynicism, with the respected Institute for Fiscal Studies noting that “the case 
for making this judgment in the summer of 2005 seemed little stronger than at 
any time in the previous five years” (Institute for Fiscal Studies 2007: 41). 
 Further redefinitions of the cycle followed, this time adjusting its 
estimated end-point. The Pre-Budget Report in 2005 responded to weak 
growth forecasts by pushing the end of the cycle back to 2008-09. When the 
growth forecast improved again, PBR 2006 largely reversed that change, 
bringing the end of the cycle back up to 2006-07. That last revision exposed an 
irony at the heart of the fiscal framework: for a government running deficits, 
strong growth data which brought the economy back to trend sooner than 
expected created a problem by giving them less time in which to adjust fiscal 
policy to meet the golden rule. In the end, Brown decided that narrowly 
meeting the rule over a nine year cycle from 1997-2006 was good enough, and 
declared the cycle to have ended there. This undermined his earlier claim that 
Labour would have met the rule regardless of the change to the start point 
(Treasury Committee, 2005). According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
‘without the extra two years that the Chancellor added to the beginning of the 
cycle in 2005, Treasury forecasts would now show him breaking the rule by £5 
½ billion’ (2007: 2)”. Despite this, ending the cycle in 2006 locked in a verdict 
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that, in the final analysis, the golden rule had been met, by a margin of 0.1% of 
GDP (HM Treasury, 2006a). 
 The question is why these rather transparent contortions were 
considered necessary in the first place. The causal story had been predicated 
on the idea that the markets would only bear public spending if it was 
appropriately constrained, making credible fiscal rules the government’s 
bulwark against a loss of confidence. But at no point in the pre-crisis period 
had the markets given any signal that they were concerned. When Labour 
took office, interest on government bonds had already been falling for several 
years, from a high of 12 per cent in 1990 to around 8 per cent in 1997 (Fig. 
4.11). This trend would continue under New Labour, who saw the cost of 
borrowing almost halve over their first three years in government. Gilt yields 
remained low, in the range 4-6%, for the rest of the pre-crisis period. The 
markets’ confidence in the solvency of the UK government was further 
underlined by Britain’s ability to raise financing over longer time periods, 
culminating in 2005 when the Bank of England issued its first ever 50-year gilts. 
Not only was a Labour government paying no additional premium on 
borrowing, but it was attracting better rates than its Conservative 
predecessors, both during its initial two-year period of austerity and through 
the fiscal expansion that followed. If the golden rule had been crucial to that 
outcome one would have expected the government to pay a penalty after 
2005, when it became clear that only by redefining the cycle would the rule be 
met. No such market reaction is evident, suggesting that several years of 
increased public spending had been absorbed with equanimity, irrespective of 
the precise position on the golden rule. 
The government was interpreting low borrowing costs as proof that 
their framework was delivering, with Brown arguing that the new long-running 
bonds were “only possible because of our long term stability” (BUD05). The 
official narrative explicitly assigned the credit for low bond yields to the policy 
framework, asserting that “through [its] open and transparent framework, the 
Government [had] been able to bridge the credibility gap” (Balls & O’Donnell 
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Figure 4.11: Quarterly average yields (%) from 10 year government securities, 1984-200710 
                                                        
10 Source: Bank of England, series IUQAMNPY, retrieved April 2016 
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2002: 157). And if prudence were responsible for the benign borrowing 
climate, it followed that prudence must still be indispensable. It might just as 
credibly have been argued that the government’s ability to finance its debt 
cheaply was a consequence of financial globalisation, not domestic policy, (e.g. 
Kitson & Wilkinson, 2007), and that the golden rule was epiphenomenal to 
Britain’s good credit. That reading would, however, have been incongruent 
with Labour’s causal story, which held that the fiscal rules were essential to 
contain the threat posed by public spending. Meeting the fiscal rules was 
necessary not because they identified the material threshold between risky 
spending and safe spending, but because they provided a one-line defence of 
whatever spending they encompassed. It was a property of the narrative, not 
the markets, that so long as the fiscal rules were technically intact, spending 
plans must be unimpeachable. 
The redefinition of the cycle in 2005 seems to have had less impact on 
market confidence than on the government’s political confidence. In 2005 the 
frequency count for prudence rhetoric was lower than in any other pre-crisis 
year (Fig. 4.8) with just a single mention of prudence and a handful of 
references in the Budget and PBR statements to meeting the fiscal rules. From 
2005 onwards, the prudence theme dropped out of speeches to business 
audiences altogether, and almost disappeared from party conference 
speeches, but continued in parliamentary statements reporting on the fiscal 
balances.11 After a quiet 2005 Brown did go back to reporting the fiscal rules, 
but in a largely defensive manner, simultaneously defending spending growth 
as essential investment, while criticising deficit spending by the Conservative 
governments that had been responsible for underinvestment in the first place: 
“The last Conservative Government had two economic cycles. 
They failed to meet the golden rule in the first economic cycle 
by £150 billion and they failed to meet it in the second cycle 
                                                        
11 Budget tables also continued to report the fiscal position under the heading 
“fairness and prudence” until 2008. 
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by £250 billion, so we will take no lectures from the 
Conservatives on that” (HC Deb, 2005-06: 441 col. 1495) 
For a Labour Chancellor to be effectively casting the Thatcher administration 
as spendthrift shows how far the narrative commitment to the fiscal rules had 
taken them. The fiscal rules had not constrained policy in the way they had 
been designed to, but this had had little or no impact on government 
borrowing costs. The external validity of this part of the narrative – both its 
diagnosis of the problem and its application of a cure – was by now obviously 
weak. Despite this Labour chose to shore up the internal validity of the story 
by continually repeating that the rules were critically important, that they had 
been met, and that they would continue to be observed in the future.  
 
2004-06: continuous growth in every quarter 
Further challenges to the external validity of the macrostability narrative 
occurred in the period between 2004 and 2006, when the GDP growth figures 
once again weakened. Figure 4.3 shows that growth slowed considerably in 
2004-05, before rebounding in late-2005 and dropping again, almost touching 
zero, in mid-2006. This volatility appeared to catch the Treasury by surprise; 
whereas in March 2005 the Budget had predicted 3.25% growth for the year, 
by the Pre-Budget Report in December that estimate had been cut by 150 
basis points, to 1.75%, which proved accurate. Until 2005 Labour’s growth 
forecasts had been accurate to within 50 basis points, with the exception of 
1999 when growth had been 75 basis points better than expected. In 2005 
forecast error was, for the first time, substantial and on the downside (Fig. 4.2).  
For the economy to be underperforming at this stage was especially 
problematic given the causal story Labour had advanced. Low inflation had 
been delivered; strong and steady growth was supposed to follow. A slow 
2004 and a volatile 2005 do not look like major problems in the knowledge of 
what came next, but such hindsight was not available to Brown and his 
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colleagues, and in the context of the time the data would have been worrying, 
coming as it did alongside the revisions to the measurement of the golden rule.  
The Conservative opposition attacked the weak 2005 figures as “among the 
weakest in the developed world” (HC Deb. 2005-06: 440 col. 614), contrasting 
Britain’s 1.75% growth forecast with an anticipated 3.6% in the United States 
(HC Deb. 2005-06: 441 col. 1494). 
The government’s response to this challenge was a combination of 
concern and defiance. On one hand, they became less inclined to talk about 
economic stability, with the total frequency of macrostability rhetoric falling 
from 2005 onwards (fig 4.7). Qualitatively, however, the disappointing growth 
figures did not prompt any moderation of the message, which was if anything 
increasingly strident. Throughout the second term Brown had developed a 
rhetorical formulation based on the claim to continuous growth in every 
quarter, and even as growth wavered he continued to offer increasingly 
triumphalist variations on the theme: 
“I can tell the House that Britain has now enjoyed the longest 
period of peacetime growth since records began in 1870 – 
over 130 years ago.” (PBR03) 
“Having asked the Treasury to investigate in greater historical 
detail, I can now report that Britain is enjoying its longest 
period of sustained economic growth for more than 200 
years; the longest period of sustained growth since the 
beginning of the industrial revolution.” (BUD04) 
“In other words Britain will extend the longest period of 
uninterrupted growth in the industrial history of our country.” 
(PBR04) 
“Britain is today experiencing the longest period of sustained 
economic growth since records began in the year seventeen 
hundred and one. And the foundation of this Budget is our 
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determination to maintain British stability and growth.” 
(BUD05) 
“This is my tenth Pre Budget Report and under this 
government the tenth consecutive year of growth.” (PBR06) 
“My eleventh Budget… is built on the foundation of the 
longest period of economic stability and sustained growth in 
our country's history.” (BUD07) 
Besides being obviously hubristic, this form of words shows that the 
government’s measure of economic success had been simplified almost to a 
single point: anything but negative quarterly growth. The sophistication of the 
early problem analysis, which highlighted industrial capacity, housing volatility 
and productivity as relevant to the maintenance of a stable economy had now 
been reduced to a single test, that if growth was positive (or even zero) in 
every quarter then stability had been achieved. The fact that continuous 
quarterly growth had been maintained through periods of challenge was taken 
as particularly strong evidence of success, as argued in Brown’s 2006 budget 
statement:  
“Even when facing, in succession, the Asian crisis, the it 
bubble, an American recession, Euro area stagnation, and 
most recently the challenge of the oil shock and house price 
inflation – challenges which in previous decades led to British 
recessions – our economic framework for stability has proved 
robust and prudent.” (BUD06) 
The narrative had not only survived a decade in government more or less 
unchanged, it appeared to take new strength from the idea that it had held 
steady through various tests.  
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Two phases of narrative evolution 
The analysis presented in this chapter allows us to begin drawing some 
conclusions about how Labour’s core economic narrative evolved over its first 
ten years. The narrative went through two distinguishable phases, in each of 
which the relationship between internal and external narrative validity has a 
particular shape. The first phase, between roughly 1997 and early-2000, is a 
period of narrative construction and assertion. Speeches in this period set up 
the causal stories on macroeconomic stability and fiscal prudence, often 
explaining the thinking behind key policies at some length. In reality, this 
construction phase will have begun before 1997 as the ideas were worked up 
in opposition, but by definition the government narrative launched with the 
general election victory in 1997. Rhetoric in this period was building the 
platform for Labour’s policy framework, making the case for Bank of England 
independence, inflation targeting, the new fiscal rules and the initial 
commitment to fiscal restraint, though with the promise that such prudence 
would serve social purposes later. Internal validity in this period is extremely 
strong, with the two themes of stability and prudence being mutually 
reinforcing and consistently expressed. External validity, for a new 
government, cannot be proven but may be inferred in the absence of disproof, 
and Labour benefited from benign economic conditions that did nothing to 
overturn the plausibility of their narrative in the early years. 
 The New Labour case suggests that external narrative validity may be 
viewed in Popperian terms, with a narrative gaining its strength not by positive 
proof but by withstanding attempts at falsification. For Labour, the first such 
moment came in 1999 when a downgraded growth forecast put the optimism 
of the government’s causal story in doubt. Growth then exceeded 
expectations, so a moment of potential narrative falsification passed 
harmlessly. This near miss may actually have been more consequential to the 
evolution of the narrative than if the data had remained narrative-neutral that 
year. If growth had been neither better nor worse than expected the 
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construction phase might have lasted longer, with Labour simply continuing to 
assert the logic of their policy framework and promising it would bear fruit in 
the future. Instead, the year 2000 appears to have been an important turning 
point as the rhetoric went from advancing the possibility of future stability to 
claiming it had now been achieved. 
 From 2000 the narrative went into a second phase, characterised by 
repetition and reinforcement.  This phase differed from the construction 
period in that external validity challenges were frequently present, putting 
pressure on the government’s ability to maintain that their policies were 
delivering results as predicted. None of these challenges, however, proved 
decisive. In each instance, unfavorable economic data could either be 
interpreted to fit the causal story (e.g. when a brief housing market slowdown 
proved that macroeconomic policy had contained the housing inflation 
problem), or accommodated through backstage adjustments (to the inflation 
measure, and to the fiscal rules) that left the headline story intact. In this 
period the government showed a growing tendency to confirmation bias, since 
the narrative provided the frames by which they could interpret uncertain 
economic signals as confirmatory of their causal story. As a consequence, 
whenever external and internal validity appeared to be in tension, Labour’s 
response was to double down on the internal consistency of their message, 
compensating for weaker external validity by reinforcing internal validity. 
 Chapter 2 put forward a theoretical case for political narratives being a 
source of continuity, rather than change, and indeed the New Labour case 
displays just such a tendency. Labour’s domestic narrative was not only geared 
to delivering stability in the economy but in policy; prudence implied not 
circumspection but the determination to stick with the chosen course. 
Labour’s problem analysis was most complex during the construction phase, 
during which time the rhetoric could reflect on the weaknesses of the British 
economy as a means to justifying particular policies. In the reinforcement 
phase, however, the diagnosis was locked down; all that remained was to 
show that the situation was being steadily improved, and that policy could 
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take the credit for the improvement. To the extent that policy was not 
changing, this narrative continuity might be considered unsurprising, since if 
no new policies are envisaged there would be little need to rethink the 
presentation. However, rhetorical consistency is evident even when policy did 
change, as when fiscal policy went from contraction to expansion. The 
narrative did not alter with the policy reversal, but rather sought to frame 
change as continuity, presenting new spending as necessary investment, 
prudently undertaken, and above all as consistent with what Labour had been 
saying all along. Narrative continuity operated to stabilise policy frameworks 
both against external challenges and across periods of internal adjustment. 
 There is some evidence that over time this rhetorical continuity 
became more difficult to sustain, leading the government to narrow its top 
line message and thus its measures of success. This was essentially a 
Lakatosian move, as peripheral elements of the problem analysis such as 
housing market volatility were sacrificed to preserve the integrity of the core. 
Dropping the concern with housing market inflation was a change to the 
narrative – and a change to policy, with the switch to CPI – but not one that 
required any concessions from the ideational core, in which the primary 
inflationary threat was understood to come from government and from wages, 
not from asset prices or private debt. Adjusting the measurement of the 
economic cycle was a policy swerve, but one that left alone the central 
assumption that government spending could not be safely justified in any 
other way but by reference to its constraints.  
The reinforcement phase saw the narrative not only survive external 
challenges, but entrench against them. By 2007 what Labour’s economic story 
had lost in sophistication it had made up in tenacity, with each restatement of 
the core message making it less likely that the next challenge would provoke a 
rethink. Interview evidence from senior staff corroborates this interpretation: 
“it almost wouldn’t have mattered what crisis had hit the UK 
economy, I could have predicted that Gordon Brown’s main 
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message will start with “we will do nothing that will put at 
risk the stability of the British economy that we have fought 
so hard to achieve”… and it wouldn’t have mattered what. 
And I think you heard exactly that sort of language after 9/11, 
exactly that language [after] the dotcom crisis… any of those.” 
(Interview E) 
“I think consistency was the main thing, in that you know, ‘we 
will not let these shocks put us off our long term path’.” 
(Interview F) 
Narrative reinforcement in this phase occurred not in spite of economic risk 
but in direct response to it. By continually renewing their commitment to core 
rhetorics and core ideas, New Labour met every challenge to the external 
validity of their political economy by reinforcing the internal structure of their 
rhetoric, narrating the great moderation into being. 
 
Interests, institutions or ideas? 
It remains to determine whether the tenacity of Labour’s stability and 
prudence rhetorics should be viewed as evidence of ideational stasis, as 
opposed to institutional inertia or the straightforward politics of interests. 
Institutionalist explanations typically posit that the state-as-actor produces 
policy continuity because policy models have become embedded the 
organisational architecture, and so become self-perpetuating. This has some 
clear relevance to the New Labour programme, which actively sought to 
harness the intransigence of institutions when it enacted Bank of England 
independence and the Code for Fiscal Responsibility. These acts of self-binding 
were designed to create institutions with their own causal power to prevent 
the government, and its successors, from reverting to short-termism in 
monetary and fiscal policy. Policy continuity in that context could simply be 
Labour making the best of the constrained position that was the inevitable 
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result of their framework. Furthermore, the fact that they later chose to bend 
the new rules at the margins might suggest that Labour may to some extent 
have relaxed their initial concern for inflation and prudence, but could only 
relax so far within their self-imposed institutional fetters.  
 However, the rhetorical evidence does not point to a government that 
no longer believed in its initial positions. While Labour were unwilling to pare 
back their spending plans when the fiscal rules began to bite, they continued 
to insist on the compatibility of the spending with the fiscal rules, on the 
grounds that the new stability had delivered an economy capable of 
supporting increased spending without excessive borrowing. Part of the 
reason the fiscal rules had come under pressure was the government’s belief 
that buoyant tax revenues in the early years represented a structural 
improvement rather than a cyclical windfall (Wren-Lewis, 2013). That is, the 
government had quickly decided that their policies had worked, with stability 
and prosperity now going hand in hand. Admitting the incompatibility of their 
spending plans with prudence would have implied the admittance of doubt 
about whether their policies for stability could really square off inflation and 
growth, and there is no sign that such a radical rethinking was being 
contemplated. Labour’s confidence in their policy prescriptions went beyond 
acceptance of the new institutional reality; after the 1999-2000 turning point 
they were not only committed to their economic ideas in principle but 
convinced of their success in practice. Subsequent challenges in the form of 
slowing growth, consequent fiscal pressure and rising inflation made life more 
difficult, but do not appear to have shaken their faith in the overall approach. 
There is clear evidence of ideational dynamics at work in the 
reinforcement phase in particular. The publication of the Balls & O’Donnell 
book was the action of a government so confident of its analysis that it 
presented it as a fully worked up treatise which, they humbly suggested, might 
become required reading for economics undergraduates alongside standard 
textbooks (2002: 1). As time went on, this self-confidence did not wane, but 
developed further into hubris. Labour’s unwillingness to engage with 
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economic data unless favourable; the tendency to confirmation bias in the 
face of uncertainty; even the ways in which the narrative did change: all these 
point to a government deeply wedded to its central assumptions. The 
keystone ideas remained intact throughout: inflation targeting as the primary 
path to stability, government as a primary source of instability, and 
macrostability as a precondition for all other policy goals.  
 Nonetheless, there was substantial overlap between ideas and 
interests in this period. For example, Labour’s retreat from the idea that 
housing market volatility should be repressed looks like straightforward 
venality when the homeowning majority were benefiting from rapidly growing 
housing wealth. A government that had promised to rein in unsustainable 
consumption booms was now becoming comfortable with a consumer-credit 
based growth model. Narrative continuity was, to a certain extent, papering 
over ideational compromises driven by electoral self-interest. As long as 
growth and inflation remained just steady enough, there was little incentive to 
reflect or change course. The stability narrative was a construction, and a 
particular interpretation of the economic conditions, but it was one that had 
been extremely politically fruitful for nearly a decade, ensuring that the 
government’s original ideas and their concern to present a positive account of 
their time in government were generally aligned. 
The economic tranquility of the pre-crisis decade therefore offers too 
few degrees of freedom to fully adjudicate between ideas and interests as 
possible drivers of Labour’s policy choices. In conditions of relative economic 
tranquility, material interests and ideational commitments could remain in 
close touch with one another, albeit that they went through some moments of 
challenge. The financial crisis of 2007-10 would, however, radically realign the 
material conditions, providing an excellent test of the power of those interests 
as against ideas. Chapter 6 will pick up the stability and prudence themes in 
the crisis period. First, though, we turn to the other key dimension of Labour’s 
economic story: globalisation and financial capitalism.  
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5. Embracing the market  
Narratives of globalisation and financial capitalism, 1997-
2007 
 
The previous chapter discussed the core themes in New Labour’s domestic 
economic narrative, focusing on monetary and fiscal policy. While stability and 
prudence formed the bedrock of Labour’s domestic policy agenda, to properly 
understand their overarching political economy it is necessary to connect the 
domestic agenda to New Labour’s broader philosophy of market capitalism, 
which may be summarised as the belief that embracing open markets offered 
the best prospect of delivering prosperity for the many. To that end, this 
chapter will track two further narrative themes: Labour’s philosophy of 
globalisation, and their approach to the most global of sectors, financial 
services. As before, it will unpack the two themes as causal stories and then 
track the interaction of those narrative constructions with external economic 
signals over time, with a view to understanding how the foundations for 
Labour’s eventual crisis response were laid during the preceding period of 
stability. 
 The following analysis will show that Labour’s globalisation narrative, 
like the prudence and stability narratives, went through an initial period of 
construction followed by a period of reinforcement and deepening ideational 
entrenchment. Academic critiques of Labour ‘s globalisation rhetoric have 
tended to assume that it was a convenient justification for the party’s 
reorientation towards a winning electoral coalition, and thereafter a means of 
justifying otherwise controversial policy choices (Watson & Hay, 2003; Cerny & 
Evans, 2004; Dye, 2015). Such accounts, though important in exposing the 
contingency of the economic assumptions inherent in Labour’s pro-
globalisation story, tend to understate or assume away the possibility of a 
genuine ideational commitment to those assumptions. This chapter will show 
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that while the globalisation narrative undoubtedly had “strategic applications” 
(Dye 2015: 547) it was not merely “an attempt to provide a largely pragmatic 
political project with some belated ideological coherence” (Cerny & Evans 
2004: 52). Rather, it represented the internalisation by Labour thinkers of a 
particular school of economic thought, in which free trade and open markets 
were believed to bring not just economic but social benefits. I will argue that 
Labour’s fashioning of free trade theory into a centre-left prospectus for 
growth deserves scrutiny as something other than cynical triangulation toward 
the political centre ground. Instead, by interrogating it in terms of the 
imperative to balance internal and external narrative validity, we see that 
globalisation was another domain in which ideas and rhetoric were not simply 
a cover for, or a projection of, Labour’s underlying interests. Rather, the 
narrative was the channel through which the government sought to define the 
public interest as served by, not threatened by, free markets, an interest-
construction that allowed Labour to reconcile the otherwise competing claims 
of their economic and social agendas.  
The chapter will go on to argue that the inter-connectedness of 
interest-perceptions, rhetoric and ideas was nowhere more evident than 
Labour’s rhetoric on the regulation of financial markets. New Labour’s 
narrative treatment of the finance sector drew significantly on the high level 
themes already discussed, in particular those of stability and globalisation; 
over time, however, the notion of embracing globalisation would come to 
overtake concerns about stability. Policy on financial services would give 
practical application to the high level ideas in New Labour’s political economy, 
as Labour’s in-principle determination to embrace globalisation became an in-
practice embrace of the City, whose growing prosperity in the pre-crisis years 
was believed to demonstrate the correctness of a policy model based on free 
trade and light-touch regulation. Viewed in terms of narrative dynamics, it 
appears that the tendency to confirmation bias was particularly strong in 
respect of the finance sector, whose success underpinned not just the growth 
model of New Labour, but its intellectual model too.  
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Embracing globalisation: New Labour’s rhetoric of open markets 
Colin Hay has argued that “the significance of globalisation and claims made 
about globalisation to the political economy of New Labour can scarcely be 
overstated” (2005: 31). The invocation of a new, global, era in which global 
markets were both the context for, and an ever-present constraint on, 
policymaking was to provide the bedrock for the remaking of the ‘New’ Labour 
party in the early 1990s. In particular, the globalisation narrative allowed the 
party’s modernisers to move away from traditional leftwing positions not by 
attacking them from first principles but by declaring them obsolete, fitted to a 
context that no longer existed (Watson & Hay 2003). Daniel T. Dye’s close 
analysis of New Labour’s globalisation rhetoric shows that this language was 
deployed to stake out new and electorally promising political terrain, Labour 
arguing that “the world has irreversibly changed, the traditional debate 
between different models of national economy are irrelevant, but there is an 
opportunity for a new politics centred on preparing Britons for a global future” 
(2015: 541). Where the stability narrative had served to build up Labour’s 
reputation for economic competence, the globalisation narrative described a 
context in which competence could be defined as monetary and fiscal 
conservatism, legitimating a break with the so-called ‘old left’ on the grounds 
that it was essential to adapt to a new world. 
The globalisation narrative theme was built around two interlocking 
claims about the world economy. The first was that global markets were now 
an incontrovertible fact of life, to be treated as inevitabilities – an ostensibly 
straightforward economic argument about the irreversibility of technological 
change. The 1997 election manifesto stated bluntly that “we accept the global 
economy as a reality” (Labour Party, 1997), and the point would be repeated 
down the years, as when Brown argued that “the real question is not whether 
[globalisation] exists or not, but whether it is well managed or badly managed” 
(CBI06b), or when Blair told his party that the evidence for globalisation was 
now so undeniable that “you might as well debate whether autumn should 
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follow summer” (Blair, 2005, quoted in Dye 2015: 531). Resistance to these 
new realities would, it was argued, be futile at best, self-defeating at worst, 
and protectionism of all kinds should be rejected because “there is no shelter 
in siege economics” (CONF98). The contestability of these claims has been 
frequently highlighted in the political science literature (see especially Watson 
& Hay, 2003), but Labour projected them with absolute certainty.  
The second, more political, claim was that despite the potential for 
insecurity in global markets, Britain should adopt a positive stance in which 
globalisation was understood as an opportunity rather than a threat. The new 
world was presented as a source of new prosperity, provided Britain could be 
brave enough to embrace market openness: 
“For our country, the first industrial nation, this new global 
economy driven by skills, creativity, and adaptability offers a 
historic opportunity.” (GE2 Budget97) 
“With ever more rapid changes in technology and ever more 
fierce global competition in almost every product and 
service… people are, understandably, less certain of the 
future. But globalisation also brings vastly increased 
opportunities for individuals, businesses and countries. And it 
falls to us now to maximise the opportunities of globalisation 
and to minimise its risks.” (MH02) 
This rhetorical juxtaposition of risk and opportunity was critical to Labour’s 
story on global markets. In this narrative, globalisation’s downsides were not 
entirely airbrushed but were always presented as being manageable within an 
economic model that prioritised flexibility and openness over protection and 
mitigation. While risks, or “challenges”, were frequently noted, this 
acknowledgement was nested within an overarching narrative in which 
globalisation was presented as “inevitable, immutable and inherently positive” 
(Berry 2011: 194); a “benign, if challenging, opportunity if only we responded 
to it appropriately” (Denham 2011: S47). 
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Rhetoric in this theme was of course closely related to the broader 
‘third way’ ideas of the New Labour era, purporting to split the difference 
between Old Labour interventionism and Thatcherite laissez-faire. On the one 
hand, Labour declined to pursue any significant decommodification of Britain’s 
political economy, rejecting any notion that citizens should be shielded from 
markets. Tony Blair’s rhetoric, in particular, made sweeping claims about the 
socially disembedded nature of global capitalism, and the necessity of facing it 
head-on: 
“The character of this changing world is indifferent to 
tradition. Unforgiving of frailty. No respecter of past 
reputations. It has no custom and practice. It is replete with 
opportunities, but they only go to those swift to adapt, slow 
to complain, open, willing and able to change.” (CONF05b) 
On the other hand, Labour envisaged a role for government in helping to 
prepare people to take their opportunities in the marketplace. Britain was to 
maximise its opportunities in the global age through supply-side flexibility, 
investing in a workforce well equipped to find new work if the old jobs moved 
elsewhere.  Skills and education were therefore presented as the means of 
thriving in the new world: 
“The new realities of fast changing labour markets mean 
there is a constant need for retraining and upskilling by the 
British workforce in the new global economy.” (MH97) 
 “The way forward is neither old style regulation or a crude 
form of deregulation, which leaves the unskilled without the 
training or education essential for employability. The way 
forward is one that recognises that bringing out the best in 
people by policies that ensure opportunities for all is the best 
route to prosperity in the modern world.” (MH98) 
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In other words, it was right that global markets dictated the survival of only 
the fittest, but the government was prepared to subsidise economic gym 
memberships for its citizens. 
Supply side reform notwithstanding, it was suggested that Britain was 
uniquely well placed to benefit from global markets, provided it could 
maintain an openness to trade that was presented as somehow a 
quintessentially British virtue: 
 “In this new century, globalisation with all its opportunities 
and despite its insecurities can herald a new period of British 
success precisely because enduring British qualities – our 
internationalism, spirit of enterprise, fair play and creativity – 
can come to the fore” (MH02)  
“If we can build a British progressive consensus around these 
long term economic decisions, then globalisation is indeed 
made for Britain and British prosperity.  And we, Britain, can – 
equipped for the future –  be, just as Britain triumphed in the 
industrial revolution, one of the global economy's greatest 
success stories and look forward to a century of British 
achievement.” (CBI04) 
Policies under the heading of globalisation would include, for citizens, 
investment in education and skills and, for business, ‘flexibility’, particularly in 
respect of employment, deregulation, infrastructure investment and the 
promise of macroeconomic stability. Barriers to entry into British markets 
would be removed, the corollary of which was that barriers to exit must also 
be lower. As such Labour’s embrace of globalisation was effectively a bet on 
the idea that in an open economy, businesses would be reassured by having 
the option easily to disinvest, but would have no reason to exercise that 
option. The government was adamant that “with the right policy approach – 
openness to trade, a flexible economy and a focus on skills and enterprise – 
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the UK stands to gain in terms of productivity, growth and jobs.” (HM 
Government, 2004: 13).  
 The causal story on globalisation (Table 5.1) thus presented an 
assessment of the situation (globalisation is real, all-encompassing and 
irreversible) and a congruent policy prescription (market openness, plus skills 
and education). Predictive claims in this narrative theme are harder to pin 
down, because they mostly take the form of an implied counter-factual in 
which a retreat to protectionism makes everything worse. Concrete 
arguments against protectionism were mainly expressed in historical terms, 
built on a highly simplified account of 20th century capitalism in which the 
turn to trade tariffs after the first world war had ended the rapid growth of 
the 19th century and led directly to the Great Depression (e.g. HM Treasury, 
2004c: 7-9). It was not made explicit what might happen if such protectionism 
were reenacted, but it was made clear that any movement in that direction 
should be rebuffed, Brown arguing in 2003 that “in a global economy, the case 
for free and open trade more pressing than ever before, we must stand firm 
and resist political pressures for protectionism” (MH03). 
This emphasis on resisting political pressures is significant because it 
references the same underlying assumptions as were evident in the stability 
and prudence narratives: that economic risk originates in, or at least is 
amplified by, the political realm rather than the markets. Protectionism is 
populist; it must therefore be dangerous. Just as Labour’s monetary policy was 
built on surrendering the government’s discretion over interest rates to 
institutionalise resistance to inflationary populism, on trade Labour sought to 
achieve an anti-protectionist consensus that would allow global markets to 
operate unimpeded by democratic pressures. Once again, the vision was of 
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Table 5.1: Globalisation as a causal story 
Narrative theme 
 
Diagnosis Prescription Prediction 
Embracing 
globalisation 
Globalisation is incontrovertible and 
irreversible. 
 
Retreating to protectionism will be 
economically damaging. 
 
Globalisation creates risks but also 
opportunities. 
 
Market openness through free 
trade, flexibility and the removal of 
protectionist barriers. 
 
Investment in skills and education 
to help people compete in open 
markets. 
Britain’s openness allows it to 
perform better than more 
protectionist nations. 
 
Global markets bring more benefits 
than problems. 
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politics as a contaminant, whereas the sterilisation of political forces would 
lead to temperate, benign markets and rising prosperity. 
This all begs the question: how on earth had centre-left political party 
adopted a set of assumptions in which markets were naturally beneficent, and 
politics generally a source of risk? What ideas made that position tenable? The 
answer emerges from a closer inspection of the globalisation narrative, 
particularly as it reached its fullest expression during the mid-2000s. During 
their second term the New Labour government produced a series of 
pamphlets in which the intellectual basis of their pro-globalisation policy was 
explicated more fully, just as the Balls & O’Donnell book had done for the 
monetary and fiscal framework (HM Government 2004; HM Treasury 2004, 
2005a, 2005d). These publications argued, based on theories of comparative 
advantage, that fully open and flexible markets would enable each nation to 
specialise differently and appropriately to their natural and human resources, 
thus increasing total efficiency and maximising growth.  
Once again, these ideas were not unique to Labour but represented the 
mainstream economic consensus of the period, which was overwhelmingly 
pro-free trade. Greg Mankiw observed in 2006 that “few propositions 
command as much consensus among professional economists as that open 
world trade increases economic growth and raises living standards” and in the 
early 1990s, when New Labour was forming its positions, those on the 
respectable left wing of the profession were equally happy to argue that free 
trade was, if not optimal, the least of all evils (Krugman, 1993). Crucially for 
Labour, this theoretical consensus gave them confidence that they could 
embrace global markets without seeing themselves as laissez-faire neoliberals 
because increased specialisation “in the long run… benefits everyone by 
increasing the global potential for growth” (HM Treasury, 2005d: 3).  
Allocative efficiency through free trade would, it was believed, ensure that 
market openness was not a race to the bottom, but a positive-sum route to 
higher growth that would therefore bring benefits across the global 
marketplace: 
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“Protectionist fears generally rest upon the belief that 
international trade and investment are a zero-sum game. But 
one more job in India does not mean one less job in Britain. 
More growth in China does not mean less growth in Britain.” 
(HM Government 2004: 10) 
That being the case, economic and social objectives could be understood as 
mutually reinforcing, rather than in tension, and Labour could advocate free 
trade as a question of global social justice as well as economic advantage. This 
logic was particularly evident around 2005 when Britain placed trade justice at 
the heart of its agenda for its simultaneous presidencies of the EU and G7, 
presenting tariff reduction and market openness as serving both fairness and 
mutual benefit: 
“We will benefit as developing countries grow. Above all, it is 
morally right that developing countries should be able to lift 
their people out of poverty. But their growth is in our interest 
too: as people in the developing world become richer, we will 
all buy more from each other.” (ibid: 10) 
The difficulty with the economic case for positive-sum globalisation was 
that it dealt in aggregates, leaving the distribution of gains from free markets 
unexplored. The literature on free trade drew on Ricardian insights that 
demonstrated positive-sum outcomes for nations trading across specialisms; 
that literature was, however, primarily concerned with overall gains, not the 
distributional consequences of market openness. Comparative advantage 
theory promised a larger pie across trading nations, but made no assurances 
about how that pie might be shared within nations. (Mumy, 1986). For Labour 
to adapt this classless theoretical construction into a policy model for a centre-
left government required a particular interpretation of the economics, in 
which the general interest was assumed to be served by first securing 
comparative advantage leading to higher growth, after which there would be 
time enough to consider the distribution of its proceeds. Just as the prudence 
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narrative had established a hierarchy of priorities in which stability must 
precede public investment, so the globalisation narrative implied that market 
liberalisation must precede redistribution because “there was room for 
‘fairness’, but only on the basis of growing national prosperity” (Berry, 2011: 
70). The rhetoric was somewhat vague on the mechanisms by which the many 
would come to benefit from globalisation, eliding the question of whether 
opening the door to the global capitalism was a sufficient or merely a 
necessary condition for shared prosperity. Brown did, however, argue 
explicitly that opening up markets was in the interests of the majority, and so 
congruent with leftwing values: 
“Friends, just as on the economy the decisions we have taken 
have not ignored Labour values but honoured them, so too in 
the times ahead – as we meet and master the next wave of 
global economic change – the future will belong to those 
countries that by flexibly opening the doors of opportunity, 
nurture the full potential not just of a few – as in the 
industrial age – but of the many... I believe that we in Britain 
can – even amidst the pressures and insecurities of 
globalisation – become the first country of this era to 
combine enterprise and economic strength with a strong 
public realm where... we eradicate child and pensioner 
poverty.” (CONF03) 
The narrative’s central claim, then, was that it was not only possible to 
combine market openness with social justice, but that it was imperative to do 
so because under globalisation, competing successfully in global markets was 
the only viable means to social democratic ends. 
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Globalisation rhetoric over time 
Having outlined Labour’s causal story on globalisation, the next step is to 
assess whether, and how, it changed over time. While New Labour’s 
globalisation rhetoric was born out of the process of rebranding the party in 
opposition, content analysis of the government’s rhetoric shows that Labour’s 
rhetorical recourse to globalisation only increased once they were in 
government. Indeed the globalisation theme dominates the corpus of 
speeches in this analysis, particularly in Labour’s second and third terms of 
office. “Global” is the fifth most used word in the sampled speech material, 
appearing 590 times across 65 speeches, or an average of nine times per 
speech. “Globalisation” gets a further 107 mentions. From 2001, this language 
appeared in every single speech in the corpus, suggesting a growing 
preoccupation with Britain’s place in the world economy, culminating in the 
flurry of pro-globalisation publications in the mid-2000s. Given this rhetorical 
prominence, and the obvious relevance of the globalisation narrative to the 
politics of Labour’s response to global economic crisis, this was undoubtedly a 
crucial dimension of their overall economic narrative.  
 
Figure 5.2: Globalisation rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2007 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
GLOBALISATION GLOBAL ECONOMY
 132 
Compared with the stability narrative, which was clearly pinned to data 
on inflation and GDP growth, identifying the key measures of success for the 
globalisation narrative – and thereby identifying the key moments of external 
validity challenge - is not straightforward. The predictions in the globalisation 
narrative are more negative than positive: eschew protectionism or things will 
be worse; there are risks but openness will forestall them. Such loose 
predictions do not lend themselves to clear validation or falsification, but 
despite this, certain key indictors can be identified as relevant to the narrative 
in its own terms. The central claim in this theme was that Britain was 
strengthened by its relative openness to global markets; that is, success under 
globalisation was defined in relative terms. In particular, the globalisation 
theme turned on the contrast between pro-market Britain and its more 
protectionist European neighbours. By embracing globalisation Britain was 
expected outperform countries that are less willing to do so, moving the UK 
“up the world economic league” (MH97) and making it an exemplar of the 
benefits of open markets. The key measure of external validity was therefore 
the relative growth performance of Britain and the other advanced economies, 
usually defined in government rhetoric as the Group of Seven (G7) countries.  
Figure 5.3: UK growth ranking in G7, 1997-200712 
 
                                                        
12 Source: OECD, retrieved May 2016 
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Once again, early indications were that the external validity of this 
theme was strong. The comparison with other G7 nations (Fig. 5.3) fit the 
narrative very neatly in the early years of the Labour government, as Britain 
went from the middle of the pack on GDP growth in 1997 to the fastest-
growing G7 nation in mid-1999 (another side-effect of the rebounding growth 
that had buoyed their stability narrative in that year). Between 2001-03 Britain 
was consistently outperforming most other G7 economies. The UK’s rise to the 
top of the G7 rankings had less to do with strong GDP growth than the relative 
weakness of its competitors at the time. Nonetheless, the fact that Britain’s 
modest growth rates help up during the post-9/11 period of global economic 
turbulence led Gordon Brown to conclude that the government’s pro-stability-
pro-globalisation stance was working: 
“So while some Pre-Budget representations claimed Britain 
was worst placed of any to withstand the global slowdown, 
the OECD and IMF have both forecast that Britain this year 
will have the highest growth of any of the G7 countries.” 
(PBR01) 
 “Some have argued Britain is least well placed to cope with 
global slowdown. In fact taking growth last year, this year and 
next year together, Britain is not the weakest but the 
strongest of the major economies. And while Japan, America 
and Germany have all been in recession, Britain has now 
grown consistently in every quarter for the last five and a half 
years “ (PBR02) 
In the period 2001-03, the ‘embracing globalisation’ narrative appeared to 
have particularly strong external validity, with the UK consistently at or near 
the top of the growth rankings.  The evidence appeared, at this point, to 
vindicate Britain’s stance on macrostability and market openness, fulfilling the 
predictions of the narrative as causal story. Brown’s rhetoric implied a causal 
relationship between economic flexibility and global success, by grouping the 
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UK with the United States in implied contrast to a sclerotic, anti-globalisation 
Europe: 
“This year, 2002, amidst the worst global slowdown for nearly 
thirty years, the British and North American economies will 
grow faster than all other major economies… [and] I can 
report that next year   in 2003   Britain and North America are 
now forecast, even in a still uncertain and unstable world, to 
continue to be the fastest growing of all the major 
economies.” (PBR02) 
Also around that time, the government amplified its rhetoric on the benefits 
of openness, arguing that economic challenges must be met not with caution, 
but with confidence, and a renewed commitment to “reform” to make 
markets ever more open: 
“In this global downturn all of us, each continent, must play 
our part, do our duty, and face up to our responsibilities in 
sustaining and strengthening economic recovery around the 
world: Japan taking decisive action on financial sector reform; 
America showing corporate reform working; Europe matching 
efforts to promote economic reform with efforts to 
encourage domestic demand; All of us insisting on a new 
round of trade liberalisation.” (CBI02) 
Speaking from an apparent position of strength, Britain was not only 
concluding that its pro-global markets stance had paid off, but that others 
should pursue similar reform efforts. 
After 2003 however, G7 and Euro area growth recovered while UK 
growth fell, creating a potential external validity problem for the globalisation 
narrative. Furthermore, UK quarterly growth rates after 2005 were more 
volatile than those of their comparators, taking Britain from the top of the G7 
rankings in late 2005 to seventh place in early 2006, and back to first in 2007. 
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This very volatility presented a validity challenge to a narrative that said pro-
globalisation policies should be better for stable prosperity than protectionism, 
since while the narrative could accommodate the idea that world growth 
might go through slow patches, it dictated that open, flexible Britain should 
get through those bad spells better than most. The period to 2003 had seen 
the economic data move closer to the government’s story, but after 2003, the 
disjunction between rhetoric and evidence was widening again.  
Labour’s globalisation narrative, however, appears to have been 
undisturbed by these less favourable signals, and though Britain’s absolute 
and relative performance was fluctuating, the rhetoric was on an unbroken 
upward trend. The volume of rhetoric in this theme rises nearly every year (Fig. 
5.2), reaching some 14 per cent of all words in the corpus by 2006. The 
content of that language also changes over time, with references to 
globalisation becoming both more frequent and more explicit. Discussions of 
the global economy had always been part of New Labour’s lexicon, but the 
specific term “globalisation” first enters our corpus of speeches in 2001. With 
Britain performing strongly compared with G7 comparators, Gordon Brown 
was apparently now happy to use this technocratic term in public, overtly 
making the case for globalisation-as-opportunity. The word globalisation had 
first appeared in Brown’s speeches during a spell of good data in 2001-02, but 
it did not disappear when the growth outlook changed. After 2003, the 
number of references to globalisation continued to increase, though the 
comparison with other G7 nations was (unsurprisingly) only reported in years 
when it was favourable to Britain, as in 2005 when Brown boasted that “again 
North America and Britain will see the fastest growth in the G7” (BUD05). In 
2004 and 2006, in-year G7 comparisons were noticeably absent, substituted 
by the looser claim that “over recent years [the UK has been] contributing 
more to the growth of the world economy than all the G7 countries put 
together” (MH04, emphasis added). This rhetorical sleight-of-hand suggests 
the government was well aware of the sometimes uneasy fit in those years 
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between their narrative and its key measure of external validity. Nonetheless, 
Labour’s in-principle commitment to market openness was unwavering.  
I suggest that this rhetorical continuity arises precisely because the 
preceding period had allowed the causal story on globalisation to become fully 
embedded. As far as Labour was concerned, by 2002 the causal story had been 
first hypothesised and then proven, with Britain’s ascent to the top of the G7 
rankings despite a global slowdown proving that the government’s pro-market 
stance had passed the test. The expected conclusions had been drawn; the 
loop was closed. That being the case, new evidence would be highly likely to 
be interpreted as confirmatory of the narrative, rather than challenging to it. 
For example, in 2003, Gordon Brown made explicit the conclusion he had 
drawn from the recent turbulence, and Britain’s relatively smooth passage 
through it: 
The lessons I learn from the recent downturn are that to 
succeed in the new global economy we must… not be 
protectionist but pursue free trade; and that we must 
embrace reform to make our economies more flexible.” 
(MH03). 
Very similar rhetoric persisted through the less favourable 2003-05 period: 
“The Britain that will succeed in this open global economy will 
be the Britain that, true to our history, rejects any form of 
protectionism or parochialism.” (MH05) 
“The pace of globalisation requires us to push ahead with 
greater determination and greater urgency a set of 
comprehensive economic reforms.” (ibid) 
Such rhetoric effectively doubled down on the existing causal story, 
interpreting possible setbacks not as a reason to change course, but as a 
reminder to redouble Britain’s commitment to market liberalism. This heroic 
interpretation was made possible by the confidence generated by the previous 
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period in which the narrative had appeared to be proven correct. Though the 
external validity of the narrative became more questionable, its internal 
validity was continually being shored up. 
Qualitatively, there is also evidence of a deepening attachment to the 
globalisation narrative over time, and in particular to the emphasis on 
opportunity rather than risk. From the start, Labour’s rhetoric was clear about 
the need to “combine open markets, free trade and flexibility with investment 
in people and also fairness to them” (PBR06) – that is, to acknowledge the 
potential downsides of globalisation by matching market openness with 
supply-side reform. However, as time went on this emphasis on domestic 
policy to mitigate globalisation’s risks was overtaken by a new emphasis on 
‘building a consensus’ for globalisation, both at home and internationally: 
“I want to build in Britain an even deeper lasting British 
consensus – a shared national economic purpose… [so that] 
we become, in the era of globalisation, one of the world's 
most enterprising, flexible and successful economies.” (Brown, 
PBR03). 
 “Some day, some party will make this country at ease with 
globalisation. Let it be this one.” (Blair, CONF05b) 
“it is for us to be evangelists for globalisation, taking on the 
anti globalisation and protectionist forces who fail to 
recognise today's economic truth that free trade, open 
markets and flexibility are preconditions of modern economic 
success across our global economy… we need a worldwide 
campaign for globalisation and its benefits.” 13  (Brown, 
CBI06b) 
                                                        
13 For context: this passage of the speech has Brown referencing the irony 
in a protester’s banner at the Washington G7, which read “worldwide 
campaign against globalisation”. His “worldwide campaign for 
globalisation” is a play on that language. 
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In particular, Brown saw a role for Britain in persuading the European Union of 
the benefits of market liberalism, particularly after the French and Dutch 
publics had voted ‘no’ in referenda on the Treaty establishing a European 
Constitution in 2005. Brown’s analysis was that “Europe’s voters are telling us 
that globalisation has led them to feel economically insecure” (MH05); his 
solution was not to address the insecurity, but to challenge the public’s 
misperception of it by fostering a discourse in which citizens are made to 
understand that “the economic reality is no longer as it was in the 1980s” and 
that “each continent is part of – and benefits from – globalisation as a whole” 
(ibid). 
This rhetorical shift is subtle but important, since it changes the policy 
prescription: rather than government being responsible for producing a 
workforce with the necessary skills for global business, its main challenge is to 
make people see the opportunity: 
  “If we can show people that by equipping themselves for the 
future they can be the winners not losers in globalisation, 
beneficiaries of this era of fast moving change, then people 
will welcome open, flexible, free trade and pro competition 
economies as an emancipating force.” (MH07) 
Embracing globalisation thus became an end in itself; by this point, the notion 
of risk and insecurity was being situated less in the global economy than in 
people’s misperceptions of its threats, which had to be corrected before it led 
to protectionism. Government, in this narrative shift, goes from being a 
manager of global market forces to a cheerleader for them, and in the process, 
the narrative became less and less open to change. By positioning Britain as an 
exemplar of, and advocate for, positive globalisation, Labour left no room for 
doubt or reflection on how well it was working out in practice. The UK position 
was, by this time, rhetorically and ideationally locked in.  
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The narrative applied: financial capitalism under New Labour 
Labour’s approach to the financial sector was, in many respects, an extension 
of its wider thinking on economic stability, which held that predictable and 
constrained government would deliver temperate market conditions. On one 
hand, Labour’s policies on financial regulation were informed by their 
approach to stability in the broader economy, to extent that financial stability 
was framed as a third pillar alongside monetary and fiscal stability (Brown, 
2002: x-xi). Financial instability was acknowledged to have been a serious 
problem for the UK in the past, and more recently to have erupted in other 
parts of the world, including in the Asian crises of the early 1990s. However, 
this past instability was interpreted primarily as evidence of the need for 
governments to be viewed as stable and credible. For example, in respect of 
the Asian currency crises of the 1990s: 
“These financial crises… have demonstrated clearly the need 
for national governments, which are dependent for 
investment funds on the day to day confidence of 
international investors, to pursue consistent and credible 
policies that guarantee stability.” (Balls & O’Donnell 2002: 
302)   
In this regard Balls & O’Donnell were echoing previous statements by Brown, 
as when he told the Council of Foreign Relations in New York that: 
“the answer to the uncertainty and unpredictability of rapid 
financial flows is… the certainty and predictability of well 
understood procedural rules for monetary and fiscal policy” 
(Brown 1999, quoted in Watson, 2013: 9) 
As Arestis and Sawyer noted in 2001, the underlying presumption in Labour’s 
political economy was “that instability emanates from government policy… 
rather than from private markets” (p.264). 
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However, Labour’s rhetoric on financial markets was also the place 
where their concern for stability converged with their ideas about 
globalisation. New Labour’s unequivocal view of the financial sector was that it 
exemplified the potential of a positive attitude toward global markets. From 
the start, Labour were at pains to emphasise their friendliness to the financial 
services industry, with Brown’s first Mansion House speech extolling the 
virtues of the City of London: 
 “[The City] has demonstrated the best qualities of our 
country, what can be described as the British genius: always 
outward looking and open to the world; invariably innovative; 
aware of the need for hard work and perhaps most relevant 
of all, to the bewildering changes we see around us, 
continuously willing to respond and adapt to changing 
conditions and emerging technologies.” (MH97) 
Over the next ten years, Brown would repeatedly express his admiration for 
the City’s willingness to compete and thrive in international markets, holding 
up the financial services sector as the acme of successful globalisation: 
“It is part of the greatness of this City of London's history that 
as the world economy has opened up, you have succeeded 
not by sheltering your share of a small protected national 
market but by striving for a greater and greater share of the 
growing global market…. Always outward looking - for 
centuries part of a trading empire - you have taken 
globalisation in your stride, its risks and opportunities, and 
have become ever more international in your reach. What 
you, as the City of London, have achieved for financial 
services we, as a Government, now aspire to achieve for the 
whole economy. ” (MH02) 
“The City of London – and our financial services industry   has 
learnt faster, more intensively and more successfully than 
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others the significance of globalisation: that you succeed best 
not by sheltering your share of a small protected national 
market but by striving for a greater and greater share of the 
growing global market; and that stability, adaptability, 
innovation and openness to new ideas and to global trading 
opportunities – great British assets and advantages   matter 
even more today than ever. And what you have achieved for 
the financial services sector, we as a country now aspire to 
achieve for the whole of the British economy. “ (MH04) 
“The City is a prime example of a sector which has responded 
successfully to the challenges of globalisation and reaped the 
benefits.” (HM Treasury, 2005d: 30) 
“The city of London is showing us that Britain can succeed in 
an open global economy, a progressive globalisation, a Britain 
that is made for globalisation and a globalisation that is made 
for Britain.” (MH06) 
This pro-finance rhetoric appears to have been more than just flattery of 
potential donors, (or perhaps mollification of the party’s traditional 
antagonists). Such themes were, unsurprisingly, most prominent in speeches 
to business audiences such as the CBI conference, or the annual Mansion 
House Dinner. However the same message was also present in policy papers 
and transmitted to much less favourable audiences, as in 2006 when the then 
City Minister, Ed Balls, told a Fabian Society fringe meeting of his party’s 
conference that large bonuses for bankers were defensible because "if the City 
is doing well, the country is doing well. When it prospers, we all prosper" 
(Evening Standard, 2006). Whether this consistency across audiences should 
be read as indicating true ideational conversion, or just committed service to 
vested interests, will be discussed in more detail below, but the government’s 
willingness to make the case for financial liberalisation even to unfriendly 
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audiences does indicate a narrative, and a policy set, that was being robustly 
defended against challenges. 
The manner in which the new financial regulator was established further 
illustrates Labour’s embrace of a pro-finance idea set, since it displays an 
overriding concern with supporting the future success of a valued industry.  
The new regulator was given four statutory objectives: maintaining confidence 
in the financial system; improving public understanding of the financial sector; 
protecting consumers and reducing financial crime. It is striking that the first 
two objectives related not to the structure or activities of the financial services 
industry, but to its perception by outsiders. This was a vision of financial 
markets in which market failures could generally be corrected by transparency 
and good information, requiring only limited enforcement activity to deal with 
outright breaches. This vision was enthusiastically taken up by the regulator 
itself, which proclaimed itself “keen to ensure that our regulatory 
interventions always add to rather than detract from the positive impacts of 
market forces and really are justified in terms of the level of risk to our 
statutory objectives” (Cole, 2006). On the whole, Britain’s status as a leading 
participant in global financial markets was assumed to provide more solutions 
than problems, needing only to be supported by government and 
communicated to the public at large. Concerns about risk, especially systemic 
risk, were very little in evidence. Rather, the causal story assumed that 
financial stability was primarily a question for policymakers, that London’s 
financial services industry was a national asset and that the regulatory 
framework should do as much to nurture as to control it (table 5.4). By 
legislating for stability, and otherwise acting only insofar as it would further 
liberalise financial markets, Labour hoped to unleash the full growth potential 
of the financial sector, to Britain’s ultimate benefit. 
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Table 5.4: Financial capitalism as a causal story 
Narrative theme 
 
Diagnosis Prescription Prediction 
Financial 
capitalism 
The City of London exemplifies 
success through embracing global 
markets. 
 
Past financial instability has arisen 
from government mismanagement. 
Deregulate financial services to 
improve competitiveness. 
 
Government intervention limited to 
stable macro policies and removal 
of regulatory burdens. 
Macroeconomic policy will ensure 
stability, allowing space for the 
financial services sector to prosper.  
 
 
 
 144 
Financial sector rhetoric over time  
Having established a causal story on the financial sector, how did that story 
evolve, if at all? To what extent did it encounter challenges to its external 
validity? The quantity of rhetoric on financial services and the City of London 
was largely stable over the period to 2007 (Figure 5.5), being mainly confined 
to predictable, set-piece speeches to business audiences such as the annual 
Mansion House speech. The exception to this trend was the language of 
regulation, which increased dramatically in volume between 2002-2006. 
Closer examination of this change reveals that the upswell of regulatory talk 
was in fact an increase in references to deregulation as Labour increasingly 
pursued a liberalising agenda for business in general, and financial services in 
particular, both domestically and in EU negotiations. Furthermore, this 
rhetorical push on deregulation was reflective of a broader qualitative shift in 
the financial sector narrative over time, as Labour gradually de-emphasised 
their initial concerns with stability, and instead focused on the ways in which 
the financial sector embodied their theory of globalisation as a source of 
opportunity.  
Figure 5.5: Financial sector rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2007 
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Early rhetoric on the financial sector tended to draw on language from the 
government’s stability narrative, identifying financial stability as a priority for 
both domestic action and international cooperation. According to Gordon 
Brown, globalised markets made supra-national regulation imperative, since 
“because today's financial markets are global, we need not only proper 
national supervision but also a second fundamental reform - global financial 
regulation” (CFR99). While domestic reforms including the new regulator were 
quickly completed, international cooperation on financial stability proved 
more difficult to achieve. Labour had attempted to put the UK “at the 
forefront of [an] unprecedented international reform effort” (Balls & 
O’Donnell 2002: 316) and they did succeed in generating a fair degree of 
consensus around this agenda, as in 1999 when the G7 agreed to establish the 
Financial Stability Forum to “promote international financial stability, improve 
the functioning of markets and reduce systemic risk” (Group of Seven, 1999) 
However, while the Forum brought national regulators and central banks 
together, its powers were advisory only, with little traction on individual 
nations, much less the private sector itself. As a result, this “loosely assembled 
regulatory and institutional framework… [lacked] coherence and political 
legitimacy” (Alexander et al, 2007: 23). The Balls & O’Donnell book hints at the 
government’s frustration at the limited progress made on international 
financial regulation, particularly in respect of private sector engagement, 
where the authors argued there was still a need for “a new framework of 
partnership… which ensures that all parties which benefit from the 
international financial system play their part in maintaining stability” (2002: 
208). In other words, by 2002 no such partnership had yet been meaningfully 
forged, while implementation of the principles agreed in 1999 remained 
patchy at best.  
Despite the limited progress in coordinating financial regulation on the 
international front, the calm conditions of the late 1990s and early 2000s were 
allowing Labour to feel confident that their domestic policies were at least 
delivering improved financial stability for the UK.  We have already seen that 
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there were few challenges to the external validity of Labour’s stability and 
globalisation narratives in their early years in government, and indeed there 
had been plenty of vindication during that period. In respect of financial 
services, there was also plenty of positive feedback, with the new tripartite 
regulatory framework winning praise from international observers including 
the IMF, which described it in 2003 as being “in many respects… at the 
forefront internationally” (International Monetary Fund, 2003: 1). 
It is around this time that the rhetoric of financial stability seems to 
disappear from view, being replaced by a new preoccupation with regulatory 
policy in general, and deregulation in particular. Figure 5.6 breaks down all 
references to regulation in our corpus into four subcategories: those primarily 
concerned with stability; those primarily concerned with competitiveness; 
those relating to both stability and competitiveness, and a residual category in 
which neither is referenced. It shows that while in the late 1990s 
competitiveness language was present in less than half of all regulatory talk, in 
the 2000s it rapidly emerged as the major frame through which regulatory 
policy would be approached, accounting for 80 per cent of all regulatory talk 
by 2001. This proportionate increase, combined with the rising overall volume 
of regulation rhetoric between 2002-2006, shows the extent to which 
deregulation was becoming a central theme of Labour’s narrative for business 
and for the City of London in particular. Labour’s policy agenda for the 
financial sector was now explicitly deregulatory, focused on reducing burdens 
for businesses in general, and financial firms in particular, and promising to 
bring forward “measures - both for the City and beyond - to tackle 
unnecessary and wasteful bureaucracy and red tape” (MH04). 
If the first phase of Labour’s financial sector policy had been the 
establishment of the new regulatory framework, the second phase was the 
pursuit of deregulation. In policy terms this meant repelling EU attempts to 
introduce new regulation, and recommitting to ‘proportionate’, ‘risk-based’, 
‘principles-based’ or ‘better’ regulation that created a “supportive regulatory  
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Figure 5.6: Subcategories of regulatory rhetoric, 1997-2007 
  
environment” (HM Treasury 2005b: 48) at home. The policy shift was 
accompanied by a rhetorical shift; for example, in 2005 the government was 
reframing its regulatory reforms as having been geared to competitiveness 
rather than stability, claiming a causal link between their regulatory policies 
and the ongoing banking boom, and celebrating the fact that the new 
tripartite model had been no barrier to City profits: 
“It is widely accepted that the new regulatory framework has 
been a success. The UK’s approach has been followed by a 
number of other countries, including Germany. The UK 
financial services industry has continued to flourish following 
the government’s reforms.” (HM Treasury, 2005b: 49) 
That is, it was a matter of pride that competitiveness had held up despite 
government intervention; the regulator’s success was to be judged by its not 
having derailed a boom. This emphasis on supporting competitiveness – as 
opposed to containing risk, the more obvious role of a regulator – was critical 
to enabling the second phase of policy in which deregulation overtook stability 
as the primary concern.  
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The new rhetoric of deregulation for competitiveness drew less on the 
stability narrative than on the globalisation narrative, in which the role of 
government was to legislate for stability and then withdraw, allowing markets 
to operate:  
“Government and others have a role in delivering a 
competitive business environment for financial services 
activity in the UK. That means good regulation – through 
setting up the Financial Services Authority and now ensuring 
that EU-driven regulation is proportionate and consistent 
with wider economic goals.” (HM Treasury 2005d: 4) 
In regards to the European Union, policy papers from the Treasury made clear 
that “EU legislation should be a last resort”, used only if “competition policy, 
market-based solutions and initiatives at a national level” had been exhausted 
(HM Treasury, 2005b: 50). Political speeches also made the point increasingly 
bluntly: 
“I believe, too, we should consider how we can continue to 
extend our risk-based approach, applying the concept of risk 
not just to the enforcement of regulation, but also to the 
design and indeed to the decision as to whether to regulate 
at all. And we will take the fight on deregulation to Europe.” 
(CBI06a) 
In that spirit, Brown and Balls convened a new ‘High Level Group on City 
competitiveness’, hosting bank Presidents and Chairmen for a seminar at 
Number 11 Downing Street in October 2006 to discuss, amongst other things, 
“proposals to reduce administrative burdens of regulation, to take further 
action against unnecessary gold-plating of European Directives and push for a 
more de-regulatory stance in the EU under the German presidency” (HM 
Treasury, 2006b). Balls told a banking audience in 2006 that Britain’s approach 
to international regulatory coordination was now mainly about repelling the 
threat of externally imposed rules, stating bluntly that: 
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“I am determined to protect our domestic regulatory 
approach from global developments… [we will] enable the 
FSA to veto changes to regulatory provisions proposed by 
these bodies that would impose an unnecessary or 
disproportionate obligation or burden.” (CITY06) 
By now, competitiveness was routinely emphasised over stability and risk, 
Balls arguing that international regulatory policy must “ensure we have the 
best possible environment in which our financial services industry can prosper 
and create jobs” (ibid). 
There is a clear connection between this deregulatory push for the City, 
and Gordon Brown’s stated aim to evangelise for globalisation. Labour did not 
only consent to deregulation, quietly acquiescing to the wishes of key 
interests; they wanted to deregulate in the open and persuade everyone of 
the rightness of doing so: 
“Even with the global challenges now clear, and this year has 
brought them home as never before, I am optimistic that as 
an ever more enterprising nation, we can build a national 
economic purpose: a consensus around our shared belief in 
stability; investment in science, education and transport; a 
radical commitment to minimise regulation and to maximise 
flexibility; and to reach out and to take our rightful place in 
the world.” (CBI05, emphasis added) 
And, once again, Labour were at pains to present their support for global 
finance as both economically and socially beneficial. Financial sector 
competitiveness was presented not as a narrow win for that industry, but as 
serving the broader purpose of transmitting globalisation’s benefits, through 
financial channels, to the economy at large. Treasury analysis argued that the 
financial sector “and in particular the City of London… plays an important role 
in securing for everyone the benefits that wider, deeper and integrated 
markets offer” (HM Treasury, 2005b: 2). Furthermore, increasing financial 
 150 
integration for developing economies was presented as a matter of global 
social justice, on the basis that “developing the financial services sector should 
stimulate economic growth, particularly in emerging economies” (ibid: 5). 
These claims were not without supporting evidence; the Treasury was 
drawing on academic studies showing that other things being equal, increased 
financial integration might produce better outcomes for developing 
economies (ibid: 6, Box 2.1). The point is not that Labour were wholly wrong 
about the benefits of market openness, but rather that they were increasingly 
emphasising those benefits and downplaying potential risks. The internal logic 
of the globalisation narrative dictated that financial globalisation must be a 
good thing, almost regardless of the prevailing conditions. Market openness 
was the clear choice in good times, and the right choice in difficult times, 
making Labour’s narrative largely impervious to fluctuations in global growth 
or market performance.  Indeed, the high point of Labour’s globalisation and 
deregulation rhetoric in 2005 and 2006 coincided with some of the weakest 
data on growth, G7 ranking and the public finances, suggesting that weak 
signals from the economy were either considered irrelevant to the case for 
deregulation, or as further justification for pushing ahead. 
This is not to say Labour now lacked any concept of financial risk. 
Where developing nations were concerned, Labour did show some 
circumspection around the process of market opening, suggesting 
liberalisation should proceed in an “orderly” manner by matching increased 
openness with institutional reform. There was also some acknowledgement of 
the risk of financial contagion, given the increasingly open channels between 
markets in different parts of the world, though again this risk was seen as a 
problem mainly for emerging economies with vulnerable currencies. However 
the principle of liberalisation was throughout presented as unimpeachable, 
with Labour calling for “an approach to capital account liberalisation in the 
developing world which is bold in concept, but cautious in implementation.” 
(Balls & O’Donnell, 2002: 306, emphasis added)  And it was further assumed 
that innovative financial products were ensuring that risks were distributed as 
 151 
never before, offsetting the threat of contagion “by encouraging the use of 
new instruments, such as derivatives, to hedge and diffuse risk” (HM Treasury 
2005b: 6). To the extent that financial stability was still under discussion by the 
mid-2000s, stability risks were presented as mostly for, and in, developing 
countries, whose increasing integration into global capital markets might 
expose the weaknesses of their regulatory apparatuses. The advanced 
economies with their more stable and transparent policy frameworks were, by 
implication, much less vulnerable. 
In summary, New Labour’s rhetoric around financial services appears 
gradually to have tilted away from the cautious, defensive, stability narrative 
towards the more optimistic, assertive, globalisation story: that is, away from 
concerns about risk and towards the idea of opportunity. Implicit in this 
narrative and policy shift were two underlying ideas. First, that financial risk 
was largely exogenous to the UK, whose cutting edge regulatory model and 
constrained, transparent government made it a least-likely candidate for 
financial instability. The government acknowledged the existence of other 
jurisdictions in which weak institutions meant the threat of government-
stoked instability was less well contained than in Britain, but believed that by 
exporting the UK regulatory and macroeconomic framework to developing 
economies, those risks would over time be reduced. Capturing the benefits of 
globalisation depended, it was argued, on having “the necessary frameworks 
in place” (ibid: 2) but the clear view was that for the UK, that was already the 
case. UK regulatory policy was assumed to represent best practice, to be 
defended at home and exported abroad; residual risks would be dealt with 
once the rest of the world caught up with the cutting edge British model. 
There was no hint in this rhetoric that Britain’s openness might also increase 
British vulnerability to shocks in global markets, or that UK regulatory 
framework might need to evolve to keep up with new risks.  
Second, the government’s concern with the contagion risks posed by 
developed nations’ institutional immaturity points once again to the idea that 
economic risk originates mainly in government weakness rather than market 
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dysfunction. The Balls and O’Donnell book went as far as itemising the failures 
that had, in their estimation, caused a variety of crises in Asia, Russia and Latin 
America in the 1980s and ‘90s. They identified five problems: poor financial 
regulation and supervision; the perception that government would backstop 
private risk; bad investment decisions “as a result of directed lending practices 
and close relationships between governments, banks and businesses”; a lack 
of transparency in policymaking and “poor lending decisions and inadequate 
risk assessment by western banks” (2002: 302). Or, rephrased slightly: 
regulatory failure (by government); moral hazard (created by 
government/central banks); crony capitalism (in which entanglement with 
government contaminates the purity of the market mechanism); opaque 
policymaking creating uncertainty (government again) and, it is conceded, 
some bad judgments by western banks. That is, four out of five problems were 
the responsibility of the public sector. Developing nations should strive toward 
financial stability not by closing off to western banks, but by adopting UK-style 
governance aimed at facilitating pure, honest, and thus stable, financial 
capitalism. 
As we have seen, New Labour’s approach to the financial sector 
represented a point of convergence between the government’s narrative of 
stability and their theory of globalisation. Measures of, and challenges to, the 
external validity of this theme could conceivably have come from either 
direction, with the narratives predicting both financial stability and a 
prosperous, liberalised financial sector. Either macroeconomic instability or 
City underperformance would have been sufficient to undermine the financial 
sector narrative, and these twin vulnerabilities should, logically, have doubled 
the overall fragility of such a story. However in the period 1997-2007, when 
there were few validity challenges on either front, the dual nature of this 
narrative theme allowed it to become powerfully self-reinforcing. On the one 
hand, the booming financial sector was taken to indicate that the government 
had succeeded in delivering macrostability, giving business the confidence it 
needed to prosper: that is, a prosperous financial sector must indicate a stable 
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business environment. A causal story that originally said “we must be stable in 
order to prosper” became a conviction that “we are prospering therefore we 
must be stable”. And on the other hand, the absence of financial instability 
was taken as proof that open markets could, in the right policy environment, 
be a benign force: that is, openness is not the threat; policy instability is. 
Market openness and competitiveness could, apparently, be compatible with 
stability provided the market believed in the government’s commitment to a 
stable and minimally interventionist policy model. In this way, financial 
services rhetoric in the pre-crisis period functioned less as a distinct narrative 
theme than as a confirmatory case study for New Labour’s economic story as a 
whole.  
 
Analysis: from narrative construction to reinforcement 
Viewed in terms of narrative evolution, Labour’s rhetorics of global and 
financial markets display similar dynamics to the stability and prudence 
themes examined in chapter 4. An initial period of narrative construction and 
institutional reform gives way to a reinforcement phase in which policy is 
mostly static, while the rationale for, and success of, the early reforms is 
continually asserted. Indeed, during this reinforcement phase the narrative 
itself may have limited the space for policy change, since the problems 
identified in the original causal story had already been addressed, notably with 
the establishment of the new financial services regulator. Without a 
reassessment of the causal story as a whole, further policy change was difficult 
to contemplate because the space for a new problem analysis was effectively 
nil. Subjected to these narrative dynamics, policy for the financial services 
sector went from being a sub-set of Labour’s concern for stability to the poster 
child for the success of their pro-stability, pro-market policy mix.  
And, just as the success measures for Labour’s stability narrative 
narrowed over time, so their globalisation and finance rhetorics gradually 
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narrowed in scope. On globalisation, the early rhetoric made clear that 
rejecting protectionism should be accompanied by investment in skills to 
support people in coping with free markets. Over time, however, openness to 
globalisation was increasingly presented as a freestanding good. In regards to 
the financial sector, we observe a gradual tilt from problem analysis (“we must 
pursue stability”) to problem solved (“stability is a given: we can therefore 
take credit for City success”). External signals were largely irrelevant to the 
continued projection of this narrative, except to the extent that challenging 
conditions were interpreted as requiring a redoubled commitment to the 
government’s existing policies.  
This narrative entrenchment was further reinforced by Labour’s efforts 
to persuade international counterparts, in Europe and in the developing world, 
that they should emulate Britain’s macroeconomic and regulatory policies. For 
example, the hermetic self-confidence of the Balls & O’Donnell book 
demonstrates that, as early as 2002, Labour were certain enough of the 
success of their first term reforms as to preserve them as artifacts to be 
studied by future policymakers. The publication of such a full account of the 
government’s rationale, with a body of evidence for its apparent success, is a 
perfect example of rhetoric becoming constitutive, rather than simply 
descriptive, of policy. The book did not simply describe what had been done; it 
solidified the narrative, in full and in public, making it much harder to revise 
that rationale later. Two senior officials remarked on the impact of such 
publications on ensuring policy continuity: 
“those were documents prepared under the Chancellor’s 
directions, they were… that’s the way they believe, they think 
the economy operates… I think, to the extent that it’s real it is 
going to constrain you. Because it’s saying that there are 
choices and we’ve made these choices, not other choices. 
Can you do u-turns and say actually that wasn’t the right 
thing? It’s quite hard.” (Interview F) 
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“So as well as [the] broader message, you then get this… call 
it the rationalists’ message. It explains in tedious detail all the 
mechanisms of the framework… it was going to be a 
university textbook… No false modesty there.” (Interview D) 
It is possible that the difficulty of performing a u-turn resided in the 
appearance, rather than the substance of changing direction mid term. 
However, a deeply embedded narrative would plausibly constrain not just a 
government’s ability to be seen acting differently, but also its space to think 
differently. The next section considers this proposition in more detail by 
considering whether Labour’s narrative commitment to the benefits of global 
and financial capital was a reflection of their ideology, or simply a rhetorical 
front for a government hemmed in by political or economic interests. 
 
Ideas, interests or institutions? 
It has been suggested that Labour’s embrace of globalisation as an external 
constraint was a “politically expedient” cover for a party repositioning itself 
toward the swing voters it needed for a majority (Watson & Hay, 2003: 290). 
However, once again I suggest that the presence of party-political strategy 
does not imply the absence of genuine ideological conversion. New Labour 
were in the business of reconciling that which had previously been thought 
irreconcilable, not just in their rhetoric but in their thinking. Tony Blair often 
claimed that he was operating out of pragmatism, not dogma, and Labour’s 
economic narrative was built on the conceit that it was not ideology but fact; 
ironically, this very assertiveness suggests the presence of deeply held 
ideational commitments. The globalisation narrative was not only a tool for 
persuading the public that a new era warranted a new government; it was an 
attempt to convince the public of what Blair and Brown held to be newly-
revealed truth, on the basis of which New Labour could claim to be the only 
party who understood the economic realities of the looming 21st century.  
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Another, alternative argument is that New Labour’s deregulatory 
overtures to the City of London were less a triumph of ideas than a textbook 
example of regulatory capture by a well-resourced industry lobby. The fact 
that Labour’s new single regulator, the FSA, was established to be leaner and 
less adversarial than its US counterpart, the SEC (Daripa et al 2013: 81) could 
be interpreted as a clear example of regulation “acquired by the industry 
and… designed and operated primarily for its benefit” (Stigler, 1971: 3). The 
very fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer addresses the Mansion House 
dinner every year ensures that opportunities for capture are present. The 
favourable economic climate ensured that the clubby atmosphere of the 
Mansion House dinner was never disrupted, which Daripa et al argue provided 
a favourable climate for lobbying, since “a benign environment… makes for 
easier regulatory capture by a wealth-generating financial sector. The pattern 
of regulation under Labour bears all the hallmarks of such tendencies” (2013: 
93). 
The difficulty with the ‘regulatory capture’ explanation is that it assigns 
total causal power to the relationship between financial sector lobbying power 
and government policy on financial regulation. Implicit or explicit in the 
literature on regulatory capture is an assumption that government’s 
regulatory stance toward a given sector springs primarily from the relationship 
between the government and each separate regulated industry. This imposes 
an epistemological straightjacket on the analysis, since for financial sector 
lobbying to be the principal driver of regulatory policy for finance, it is 
necessary for financial regulation to be conceptualised as distinct from other 
kinds of regulation, and regulatory policy as distinct from other kinds of policy. 
By defining the dependent variable (financial regulation) in this way we have 
also defined the expected parameters of its explanation (financial lobbying). 
This chapter suggests that such an explanation is incomplete at best, since it 
detaches the question of financial regulation from the wider political economy 
of the government designing the policy. In the case of New Labour, as we have 
seen, that wider intellectual landscape significantly informed the approach to 
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financial sector policy, providing an ideational prism through which uncertain 
data could be interpreted as validating a pro-globalisation, pro-finance policy 
stance. Without that wider context, the push to light-touch regulation of 
banking could theoretically be viewed as pure capture; in that context, 
however, it appears rather more complex. 
Furthermore, most capture literature sets up the relationship between 
regulator and regulated as essentially oppositional, drawing on an intellectual 
lineage back to Milton Friedman’s market liberalism, which considered 
government activity always and everywhere an unwelcome interference in 
private concerns (Friedman, 2002). Carpenter & Moss’ recent edited volume 
on regulatory capture approaches the matter from a more positive starting 
frame, assuming regulation to be directed toward the public interest, but they 
similarly conceive of government and market as two opposing poles. 
Regulatory capture occurs when “regulation, in law or application, is… 
directed away from the public interest and toward the interest of the 
regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself” (Carpenter 
& Moss 2013: 13). That is, regulatory policymaking is assumed to be a struggle 
between what government, the instrument of the people, would ideally like to 
do, and the power of well-resourced sectoral lobbies to override the public 
interest and impose their own preferences. 
If that is true, it is unclear how a centre-left party, with ambitions to 
protect the public interest, and with an enormous parliamentary majority, 
could have been so completely captured as to deregulate their way towards a 
banking crisis. Theories of interests must surely confront the fact that New 
Labour’s accommodations of finance capitalism were not defeats for the 
government, but were proactively pursued. They went well beyond a few 
pieces of friendly legislation (or omissions to legislate), nor did they proceed 
by the “quiet politics” of backroom influence over areas screened from public 
view (Culpepper, 2011). Rather, Blair and Brown’s support for the banking 
sector was loudly expressed, in public and often. Their support of pro-City 
regulation was not expressed in pragmatic terms, but in the language of 
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principles and values, holding up the City as a national asset and an exemplar 
of the kind of economy Labour wished to cultivate. The literature on capture 
implies either conflict and resistance, or covert operations; there is little 
evidence of either here.  
To define New Labour’s embrace of the city as regulatory capture is to 
stretch the definition of capture far beyond its usual scope, which turns on the 
implied venality of politicians accepting campaign contributions in return for 
more-or-less reluctant acquiescence. Some of the literature on capture does 
expand its conception of capture beyond this, as in James Kwak’s notion of 
“cultural capture”, which starts from the insight that 
“both the capture model and the public interest model of 
regulatory action assume that regulators are rational actors: 
either they maximize their material self-interest or they 
maximize their consciously held policy interests. However, 
there is another possibility: that regulators are susceptible to 
nonrational forms of influence, which interest groups can 
exploit to achieve the practical equivalent of capture – 
favorable policy outcomes.” (2013: 76) 
The juxtaposition Kwak makes is somewhat crude: either politicians are 
rational maximisers or they are irrational, subject to being duped into making 
bad policy by crafty interest groups. However, it does helpfully open up an 
alternative understanding of regulatory capture in which sociological, and 
perhaps ideational, forces are at work. Hanson and Yosifon’s work on the rise 
of rational-choice theory in legal economics also advances a more sociological 
account of how thinking institutions may come to be captured:  
“It is necessary to look deeper than the behavior of the 
captured institutions and individuals… much of the power of 
deep capture comes from the fact that its targets include the 
way that people think and the way that they think they think.” 
(2003: 214) 
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I suggest that if New Labour were indeed captured by the finance industry, it 
was a kind of capture that went well beyond creating a strong enough 
incentive to compel them to act against their, or the public’s, best interests. 
Rather, Labour were subject to a kind of self-imposed intellectual capture, 
having internalised a set of concepts that permitted them to believe that pro-
City policy served the general good. Labour did not believe themselves to be 
weighing competing interests and opting to serve those of the powerful over 
those of the people; they believed themselves to have reconciled the two. The 
government’s overarching narratives of stability and positive-sum 
globalisation provided readily applicable frameworks of understanding 
through which the very notion of conflicting interests could be rebuffed. Policy 
could then proceed in the belief that economic and social goals were not just 
compatible but inseparable. 
In regards to the UK, conceptualising capture as an ideational process 
rather than a battle of interests is particularly compelling because the nature 
of Britain’s political system makes interest-based capture far more difficult 
than in the United States (Hopkin & Alexander Shaw, 2016). First-past-the-post 
elections and a majoritarian system of government concentrates power in the 
executive branch, granting a government enormous power to pursue its 
legislative agenda with few impediments. Effective lobbying in such a context 
will have less to do with identifying veto players, of which there are few, and 
more to do with agenda setting that influences the overall strategy and 
legislative programme of the executive before it gets anywhere near 
parliament. In such a context, influence based on material power is an all-or-
nothing game, since the party in power must be either influenced or ousted 
altogether. Ideational influence, on the other hand, can be continuous, 
progressive and far less risky, since it ensures that whoever is in power, the 
ideas underpinning their policy actions may be made favourable through the 
maintenance of a generally benign intellectual climate. Britain’s cross-party 
veneration of the City of London, which persisted through the pre-crisis 
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decades (and substantially since then), is a clear example of such Ideational 
capture in action. 
This chapter has demonstrated that New Labour’s approach to 
financial regulation, far from being a discrete policy question, was in fact 
informed by a series of mutually reinforcing narratives about the economy at 
large. By broadening the lens to situate financial regulation within Labour’s 
wider economic narrative, we see that New Labour’s capture by the financial 
sector was possible not in spite of, but because of, Labour’s broader 
ideological positions. The government’s narratives on stability and 
globalisation offered frameworks of understanding in which regulatory policy 
could be pro-business without, it was believed, being against the interests of 
the wider public. Labour’s positive-sum globalisation narrative allowed them 
to get comfortable with financial capitalism and, even more importantly, it 
prevented discomfort from setting in later. The narrative became a bulwark 
against doubt, internally perfect and perpetually self-validating. Ideas, in 
Labour’s pre-crisis decade in government, achieved far more for the finance 
sector than brute interests could have hoped to do. 
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6:  Crisis, Part I 
Content analysis of New Labour’s resilient neoliberalism, 
2007-2010 
 
 “Britain cannot afford a recurrence of the all too familiar 
pattern of previous recoveries: accelerating consumer 
spending and borrowing side by side with skills shortages, 
capacity constraints, increased imports and rising inflation. 
Already there are warning signs that this pattern could be 
repeated. In similar circumstances some of my predecessors 
have ignored these signs while others have deluded 
themselves into believing that growth, however unbalanced, 
was evidence of their success. I will not ignore the warning 
signs and I will not repeat past mistakes.” (Brown, BUD97) 
 
“Booms channel too many resources into speculative 
activities and not enough into others, hampering economic 
progress. The fleeting gains that such episodes bring are 
invariably far outweighed by the pain of the downturn that 
must follow.” (HM Treasury, 1998: para 2.04) 
 
“We will never return to the old boom and bust.” (Brown, 
BUD07) 
 
When New Labour came to office in 1997, the then-Chancellor of the 
Exchequer appeared to have a clear-eyed awareness of Britain’s economic 
weaknesses. With the recession of the early 1990s still a recent memory, 
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Gordon Brown was prepared to be frank about the British economy’s 
propensity for speculative booms and unbalanced growth, followed by 
overheating and disaster. A decade of continuous GDP growth later, Prime 
Minister Brown would find himself presiding over the largest financial and 
economic crisis for generations; a crisis which, moreover, arrived as a 
complete surprise to Britain’s government despite embodying the very 
weaknesses that had been identified at the start. This extraordinary failure of 
insight has been much noted but very little explained. How could the same 
Chancellor who vowed never to ignore the warning signs go through a decade-
long boom without becoming concerned it might be a bubble preparing to 
burst? This chapter will show that Brown’s myopia in 2007 was substantially a 
product of his narrative, within which he was now cognitively and discursively 
trapped. Indeed, the narrative boundaries that prevented Labour from 
foreseeing the crisis would also ultimately constrain the government’s ability 
to understand, and adapt to, the crisis it once it occurred. 
Let us briefly recapitulate the ideas that have been identified, in the 
last two chapters, as having been in play in Labour’s political economy over 
the period 1997-2007. They can be summarised in four dimensions 
corresponding to our four narrative themes:  
o First, that economic risk originates in government, which is 
capricious and short-termist, not in markets, which are 
rational. Inflation is the economic manifestation of 
government irresponsibility. Macroeconomic stability is 
therefore a function of constrained monetary policy rather 
than constrained markets. 
o Second, that fiscal restraint can further reinforce confidence 
and credibility, such that social democratic policies may be 
affordable. However progressive spending plans are 
conditional on, and subordinate to, the achievement of 
macrostability. 
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o Third, that while globalisation brings some upheaval, it also 
contains great opportunity, which can be realised by opening 
markets fully and equipping citizens to become competitive 
participants in them. 
o Fourth, that the financial services sector exemplifies the 
positive potential of embracing global markets, and should be 
deregulated to fully unleash its capacity for innovation and 
risk-distribution. 
To these four substantive ideas, each of which was present in the causal story 
as early as 1997, we may add a fifth, which was developed over time: that the 
ideas above had been proved right by all the evidence of the past decade. Both 
the fact of the long boom and Britain’s record of continuous growth 
throughout it, even (perhaps especially) through periods of challenge, were 
taken as proof that the narrative had been validated. Stability and growth 
were being compatibly advanced. The British economy was now strong 
enough to withstand challenging conditions in the global market, from the 
dotcom bubble, to Enron, to 9/11 without serious incident. The medicine had 
worked, and for policymakers it remained only to hold a steady course. 
We have already seen that the substance of New Labour’s political 
economy was informed by, and situated within, the intellectual mainstream of 
the time. So too was their confidence in the success of the prescription. Much 
of the literature on the so-called Great Moderation was devoted not just to 
proving the existence of a new and less volatile equilibrium, but to assigning 
the credit for the new economic tranquility to policy rather than to luck. 
Academic papers used language that was professionally equivocal, assigning 
only a minority share of the credit to monetary policy improvements; for 
example, Stock & Watson (2002) estimate that better policy had been 
responsible for just 10-15% of the reduction in volatility. Nonetheless such 
analyses reinforced an increasingly pervasive sense that macroeconomic 
policy since the mid-1980s had been a clear force for good. Taken up by 
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public-facing economists, notably by Ben Bernanke in a famous speech in 2004, 
this evidence was presented as being rather more decisive: 
 “If the Great Moderation was largely the result of good luck 
rather than a more stable economy or better policies, then 
we have no particular reason to expect the relatively benign 
economic environment of the past twenty years to continue… 
My view is that improvements in monetary policy, though 
certainly not the only factor, have probably been an 
important source of the Great Moderation.” (Bernanke, 2004) 
Adapted still further into political rhetoric, the caveats in the academic 
literature were of course all but lost, with the role of luck being largely 
downplayed and the role of policy put front and centre, as in Alistair Darling’s 
claim, as late as September 2008, that “thanks to the reform of economic 
policy in 1997, we have seen the longest period of continuous growth in living 
memory” (MAIS08). But even in the academic debate, the only question being 
considered was how to weight the relative significance of three causes of the 
moderation: structural changes such as the shift from manufacturing to 
services; sheer good luck in the reduced frequency of exogenous shocks in the 
period; and policy skill in the new era of macroeconomic management. 
Nowhere in any of this was it considered that the “moderation” might be 
concealing its own in-built self-destructive tendencies; that it was “actually a 
reflection of policies that were bound to fail in the end… a series of bubbles, 
each larger than the last, and each encouraged by a combination of financial 
deregulation and expansionary monetary policy” (Quiggin 2012: 14-5). The 
fact of the moderation was assumed to be secure, and the causes of it 
assumed to be at least partly attributable to good policy, in which case the 
benefits of the new macroeconomic wisdom would endure as long as it 
continued to rule the policy roost. In the story that academic and professional 
economists were telling themselves, as in Labour’s political narrative, the 
changeability of government was the main acknowledged risk; the potential 
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for policy and markets to become mutually-reinforcing risk-generators was 
excluded. 
 This combination of economic ideas and narrative reinforcement offers 
a new and simple answer to the question of why Britain’s government did not 
see the financial crisis coming. They did not foresee the crash because it was 
outside the terms of their narrative, and years of rhetorical work validating 
that narrative meant there was no longer any appetite to question it. In 
substance, a crash based on market irrationality and systemic mispricing of 
risk was not only unpredicted by the evolved narrative, but inconceivable 
within it. Markets were supposed to be stable and self-correcting, provided 
government’s ability to spring surprises remained closed off. And, thanks to 
the dynamics of narrative construction, they didn’t simply fail to see the crash 
coming; the government’s cognitive and political investment in their causal 
story meant that they had become less likely to see it as time went on. To the 
extent that the narrative had encountered challenges to its external validity, 
these had been absorbable within the logics of the existing story, allowing it to 
not just survive periodic tests, but to emerge from them with renewed 
confidence. What had not killed the causal story had incrementally made it 
stronger. 
 
The puzzle restated  
This chapter now turns to the question of why the largest economic shock in 
several generations did not provoke more change. New Labour were a broadly 
centre-left government, under a new leader ostensibly more leftwing than his 
predecessor, whose core voters were hurt by the crisis and whose intellectual 
edifice should have been invalidated by it. What is more, as the quotes at the 
top of this chapter demonstrate, adapting the narrative to the crisis did not 
require new thinking, exactly; a return to Gordon Brown’s 1997 analysis of the 
fragility of economic booms would have been sufficient. Given that 
background, how on earth did Labour become another example of the strange 
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non-death of neoliberalism? Several propositions are present in this framing 
and need to be clarified. First, that New Labour’s pre-crisis political economy 
can reasonably be characterised as neoliberal in character. Second, that it 
remained so after the crisis. Third, that this continuity was surprising and 
requires explanation. I will briefly take these claims in turn. 
The question of how far New Labour should be considered neoliberals 
has been endlessly debated, both contemporaneously and in retrospect. Alan 
Finlayson noted as early as 2003 (pp. 179-87) that academic treatments of 
New Labour’s political economy have been overwhelmingly concerned, 
implicitly or explicitly, with the same question: whether New Labour should 
rightly be considered a social democratic or a neoliberal project (see also 
Diamond, 2013 for a review of this debate). Some have emphasised New 
Labour’s continuity with Labour’s history (Beech & Hickson 2007) and their 
commitment to achieving social democratic ends within the constraints of late 
capitalism (Glyn & Wood 2001; Watson 2008). Others have insisted that New 
Labour made a decisive break with social democratic traditions, adopting new 
assumptions about the rationality and inexorability of market forces and 
getting comfortable with a growth model  based on private debt (Crouch, 
2009; Diamond, 2013; Hay, 1999, 2013). This more critical literature 
acknowledges the presence of progressive impulses in New Labour’s social 
policy, but sees them as peripheral compared with New Labour’s embrace of 
market liberalism, a view exemplified by Arestis and Sawyer’s famous 
contention that New Labour’s economic policy amounted to “neoliberalism 
with a human face” (2001: 275).  
When New Labour were still in power such debates were part of an 
ongoing battle for the soul of the government, whereas historical accounts can 
afford to be more equivocal, and have tended to present more nuanced 
conclusions. In this vein Craig Berry argues that there was a significant 
accommodation of, but perhaps not full conversion to, neoliberalism, 
suggesting that Labour managed to “uphold a policy agenda consistent with 
neoliberalism while rejecting neoliberalism’s ontological assumptions” (2011: 
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95). Still others have suggested that to look for a coherent philosophy, 
neoliberal or otherwise, is to miss the point: for example Martin Carstensen’s 
work on ‘bricolage’ (2011) emphasises the pragmatism and incrementalism in 
most political projects, which borrow policy ideas, or parts of ideas, that serve 
their ultimate purposes without concerning themselves overmuch with fidelity 
to a particular school of thought. Tony Blair’s managerial style of government 
appears in certain regards to fit this picture, Blair himself suggesting that he 
turned to academic thought mainly for an idea of “what works” (2010: 216).  
However, on the evidence of the last two chapters, I tend to agree with 
those who see New Labour’s political economy as neoliberal rather than social 
democratic in its central assumptions. The elevation of macroeconomic 
stability (i.e. inflation hawkishness) over social policy, the implicit faith in the 
wisdom of markets, the mistrust of government’s populist tendencies and the 
mania for globalisation all point in that direction. While Labour undoubtedly 
possessed many progressive impulses – the purpose in their prudence – their 
insistence on the primacy of stability over all other goals placed the neoliberal 
parts of their thinking at the essential core of their politics. Nor was their 
neoliberalism a pragmatic accommodation, despite Blair and Brown’s 
ostensibly pragmatic rhetorical justifications of it. New Labour’s intellectual 
constructions were neither reactive nor piecemeal, but were assembled 
carefully over years in opposition and in government. The evidence of the last 
two chapters shows clearly that while policy bricolage may have been 
occurring at some levels, there was a substantive vision at the heart of the 
New Labour project that must be accounted for at the level of ideas, and those 
ideas were substantially neoliberal in character.  
It is insufficient, however, to leave it there. Delivering a verdict from on 
high as to the true nature of a political project misses a key dimension: what 
the architects of New Labour thought they were doing. While it is important to 
be clear about the neoliberal character of many of Blair and Brown’s core 
ideas, it is equally important to recognise they would themselves have 
rejected the charge of being neoliberals, and were happy to claim in various 
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contexts that they were social democrats, progressives or even (in Brown’s 
case) socialists. Labour’s own argument was that the juxtaposition of these 
two ideological poles was misguided; yesterday’s debate. They did not believe 
themselves to be choosing sides between the neoliberal and the social 
democratic; rather they believed themselves to have united the two, Blair 
telling his party in 2000 that “self-interest and the common good are at long 
last in alliance” (Blair, 2000, quoted (as 1999) in Finlayson 2003: 184).  
In academic terms it is no longer fashionable to talk about ‘third way’ 
politics except as a tag for a rather shallow and outmoded discourse, an 
embarrassing piece of Blair-era branding. However, for the purposes of 
understanding New Labour’s narrative this will not do; third way thinking was 
essential to New Labour’s internal logic, and was as present in Brown’s 
philosophy as in Blair’s. Whether the term was used or not, Labour’s narrative 
throughout its time in government was a third-way construction, insisting on 
the compatibility of economic and social objectives, on the newness of the 
economic conditions, and thus the redundancy of any politics predicated on 
tensions between state and market. New Labour’s political economy rested on 
the assertion that by the institution of macrostability, the circle could be 
squared: markets would serve the masses as well as capital, and the pursuit of 
growth, trade and liberalised finance would not be a betrayal of the working 
classes but the key to their future prosperity. Labour’s enthusiasm for financial 
globalisation was made possible by their belief that well-functioning markets 
would ensure finance served the common interest, rather than only its own. 
This chapter, and the next, therefore make a working assumption that New 
Labour, in the pre-crisis period, had been operating with a broadly neoliberal 
idea set but without believing themselves to be neoliberals or to have 
sacrificed social justice to the market. Patrick Diamond has suggested that 
“the Labour party needs to be understood in terms both of ideas and of the 
dilemmas that they create” (2013: 92). I suggest that the keystone of New 
Labour economics was not the dilemmas it created, but its insistence that the 
old dilemmas were no longer relevant.  
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The second claim on which this chapter rests is that New Labour’s 
essential political economy remained broadly neoliberal even after the crisis, 
and that they are therefore an exemplar of the larger puzzle in which the 2008 
financial crisis did not upset the dominant economic paradigm of the great 
moderation period. As discussed in chapter 2, there is now a substantial 
literature around the puzzle of neoliberalism’s surprising resilience since, and 
despite, the financial and economic crisis of 2008-onwards (Callinicos 2012; 
Crouch 2011; Mirowski 2013; Schmidt & Thatcher 2013; Quiggin, 2009; Farrell 
& Quiggin 2012).  In Britain, the sharp turn to austerity by the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government post-2010 swiftly recast 
a crisis of private risk as one of public debt (Blyth, 2013a) but there is also 
room to reflect on how far New Labour were also participants in British 
neoliberalism’s non-crisis.  
It must be acknowledged that the neoliberal order has not been 
entirely undisturbed since the crisis. There has been much recent commentary 
on the rise of a new strain of populism (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; Schmidt, 2017) 
that speaks the language of anti-globalisation, describing an economic 
nationalism that is in direct opposition to the pre-2008 Washington consensus. 
As Blyth and Matthijs have recently observed, “it is now no longer unthinkable 
that the neoliberal macroeconomic regime has run its course and that a new, 
neo-nationalist one will take its place” (2017: 223). The rise of President 
Donald Trump in the US, and the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union 
are the most vivid examples of this new politics in action, and suggest that 
eight or ten years after the crash the ideational rupture presented by the crisis 
may finally be opening up new political fronts, albeit not by effecting the 
Polanyian renaissance of social democracy that many in comparative political 
economy seem to have expected (Alexander Shaw 2017b; Hopkin 2017). 
However, this nascent populist revolution does not yet obviate the puzzle of 
neoliberalism’s non-death, for two reasons. First, it remains to be seen 
whether the new populism is truly an alternative political paradigm, or just an 
electorally expedient set of arguments made by those who continue to 
 170 
operate a neoliberal policy set in practice. There appears to be a disjunction, 
to say the least, between Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric and his emergent 
record in office, which may yet prove solidly neoliberal in character. Likewise, 
Britain’s withdrawal from the European single market does not necessarily 
imply a withdrawal from liberal market logics more generally. Second, if the 
new populism is indeed an alternative paradigm on the rise, its rapid ascent to 
power has been supported by a wave of voter discontent with relatively little 
political groundwork, such that despite its recent electoral success the new 
populism has only a tenuous grip on the institutions of government in the 
liberal economies. Established elites remain deeply wedded to the neoliberal 
paradigm, which is still institutionally and intellectually dominant, as well as 
being clearly aligned to the economic interests of capital. Neoliberalism had 
found new expression in the austerity politics that dominated the immediate 
post-crash period, and it may yet find ways to colonise the terrain being 
opened up by economic populists. The new wave of populists are doing 
business in an institutional landscape that continues to be dominated by 
neoliberals with long years of experience in operating the machinery of 
government; populism has so far not replaced that elite but is improvising a 
working coalition with it (Alexander Shaw, 2017b). Neoliberalism’s non-death 
therefore remains very much a live concern.  
The New Labour case is germane to the puzzle of resilient liberalism 
because they were a particularly good candidate for ideational change, given 
the scale of the crisis and the fact that neoliberalism was always a somewhat 
uneasy fit for a centre-left party. We have seen that Labour’s accommodation 
of neoliberalism relied on their faith in third-way arguments that erased the 
tension between market freedom and the common interest, between socially-
motivated policy and efficient markets. When the crisis made that intellectual 
manoeuvre impossible, why did Labour not choose the other side of the 
argument? The timing of the crash in 2007 ensured that Labour went into the 
crisis with a new leader ostensibly to the left of Tony Blair. It is at least 
plausible that when faced with the failure of third-way political economy they 
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might have reverted to their social democratic roots rather than continuing on 
a neoliberal trajectory.  
The empirical literature on Labour’s crisis response is in fact rather 
inconclusive as to whether or not they should be understood as having 
changed direction after 2007. On the one hand, Colin Hay has credited Gordon 
Brown with having led “a surprisingly co-ordinated if short-lived proto-
Keynesian counter-offensive to the crisis” (2013: 25), suggesting some 
significant movement away from Labour’s pre-crisis orthodoxy. Some very 
large policy decisions were made, from the nationalisation of the retail bank 
Northern Rock in early 2008, to the £500bn recapitalisation and rescue 
package for the wider banking system in October that year, to the 
government’s embrace of a version of Keynesian stimulus via the Bank of 
England’s various liquidity schemes. The contrast between Labour’s relatively 
interventionist stance in 2009, and the subsequent turn to austerity and small 
government under a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition after 2010, lends 
weight to the conclusion that New Labour under Brown did respond to the 
meltdown in recognisably leftwing ways, that should prevent their being 
pigeonholed as unrepentant neoliberals. 
However, others have found evidence of ideological continuity through 
crisis. Hodson and Mabbett, writing mid-crisis in 2009, drew on Peter Hall’s 
classic framework to suggest that policy change was occurring only at the level 
of instruments and institutions, stopping short of change to the third-order 
goals of economic policy, which remained “rooted in the policy paradigm that 
[Labour] put in place after 1997” (2009: 1042). More recently, English et al 
have used fuzzy set data comparing Conservative and Labour framings of the 
crisis, finding that “the critical juncture of the economic crisis did not 
challenge… the neoliberal consensus in British politics” (2016: 593). That 
finding is somewhat problematic however, since it relies on measuring the 
distance between Labour and Conservative positions at any given time, rather 
than movement in Labour’s own position over time. It thus situates post-crisis 
politics based on Conservative rather than Labour positions, which makes it 
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difficult to assess whether Labour’s own thinking had failed to evolve, or 
whether they had moved the debate but taken the Conservatives with them. 
We currently lack a detailed empirical account of New Labour’s crisis response, 
as it evolved over the two or three years to 2010, that would allow us to 
satisfactorily tease out both the policies and the motivating ideas that drove 
politics in that period.  
The empirical analysis that follows will show that the opportunity for 
paradigmatic change was not just missed by the Labour Government; it was 
actively repelled. The Labour government’s response to crisis, and Gordon 
Brown’s response in particular, was to emphasise continuity over 
responsiveness, and to continually restate the government’s commitment to 
the policy axioms of the great moderation era. Fast footwork on policy during 
the banking crisis was not matched by rhetorical innovation, and indeed the 
struggle to preserve the integrity of the old narrative became a major brake on 
the government’s ability first to conceive new policy solutions and, later, to 
explain those they did conceive. In the early part of the crisis there was an 
ongoing attempt to frame policy change as exceptional and short-term. Later, 
as the policy mix became more radical, there remained an overarching 
impulse to protect the validity of pre-crisis ideas, by insisting on the 
exogeneity of the crisis and denying any link between policy in the great 
moderation period and the subsequent meltdown. Given the scale of the 
disaster, new policies could now be openly advocated, but Labour’s crisis 
rhetoric still sought to discursively contain them, either by making the crisis 
exogenous to, rather than directly contradictory of, their causal story, or by 
embedding policy change within the globalisation-as-opportunity part of the 
narrative. That is, even in the face of the mother of all external validity 
challenges, Labour remained strikingly concerned with internal narrative 
validity, in a mostly failed attempt to absorb the crisis into existing ideational 
frameworks.  
The third claim this chapter makes is that Labour’s resilient liberalism 
through the crisis was a non-obvious outcome and so requires explanation. I 
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suggest that this is surprising because it contravenes theories of political 
action based on interests and those based on ideas. As far as interests are 
concerned, if Labour’s economic liberalism had represented a capitulation to 
the material interests of the wealthy and powerful in Britain’s financialised 
economy, the crisis should have brought it all crashing down. The financial 
sector had never been in a weaker position to argue its interest. Popular anger 
with the banks gave Labour an opportunity to reorient around the interests of 
their core voters and champion a leftist populism, should they have so wished. 
A more radical realignment of the material conditions could hardly be 
imagined. And in respect of ideas, as we have seen, there is a plentiful body of 
theory that suggests exogenous shocks provide perfect conditions for 
ideational rupture and change. Neither of these schools of thought obviously 
predict an outcome in which a seismic financial and economic crisis does not 
significantly disrupt the rhetorical or policy status quo. If New Labour’s crisis 
response was a non-death for their brand of conscientious neoliberalism, the 
question is simply: why? Was it simple institutional stasis, or something else?  
The rest of the analysis will proceed as follows. First, it is necessary to 
establish when the government became persuaded that they did indeed have 
a crisis to deal with – in our terms, when they acknowledged the existence of 
an external validity problem. To that end, content analysis of speeches is used 
to trace the language in which the government named the growing economic 
crisis in the period between mid-2007 and mid-2010. Second, further content 
analysis tracks the evolution of rhetoric in our four themes, looking for 
evidence of change and/or continuity. Based on these findings a broad picture 
is established of when, and whether, the crisis began to impact on the 
government’s economic narrative by bringing internal and external validity 
into tension with one another. This structured analysis sets up the next 
chapter, in which a detailed qualitative account of the crisis period is 
developed, in which the interaction of internal and external validity is explored 
in finer detail. Out of that account, further phases in the life cycle of the 
economic narrative are added to our typology. 
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Content analysis: naming the crisis 
In order to arrive at a systematic assessment of Labour’s crisis vocabulary, 
content analysis was conducted on a collection of speeches from the crisis 
period, with the specific objective of isolating the names the government gave 
the economic crisis in the period between mid-2007 and the 2010 general 
election. For the purposes of this exercise a new corpus of speeches was 
selected, which differs from that used in the longitudinal analysis of narrative 
themes in the previous two chapters. The goal of this new crisis corpus was to 
produce a more fine-grained picture of how the government’s rhetorical 
vocabulary changed over a period of less than three years, so it was necessary 
to include more speeches to leave smaller gaps between them. The crisis 
corpus duly contains 28 speeches, 14 of which are additional to those included 
the main narrative corpus. The additional speeches were also selected in order 
to provide an even balance between the government’s two principal speakers 
during the crisis periods, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer Alistair Darling. The additions ensure an even spread over time, 
with the crisis corpus containing three speeches per speaker from late-2007, 
five each from 2008 and 2009, and one speech per speaker from the short pre-
election period in early 2010. Chapter M1 sets out the coding framework and 
operational methodology in full, including a list of speeches included in the 
corpus (Table M1.5).  
 The 28 speeches in the crisis corpus were manually coded to identify 
sentences in which the crisis was referenced and given a name, be it specific 
or euphemistic: for example “these difficult times”, “the global financial crisis” 
or “the recession”. The resulting body of text (some 350 segments in total) 
could then be analysed mechanically, tracing the occurrence of certain 
keywords through the period, and allowing for comparisons between the two 
speakers. The value of this two-stage process was that it ensured irrelevant 
occurrences of keywords could be excluded: for example, references to 
different periods of “crisis” or to other sorts of “difficulties”. The first round of 
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coding effectively created a population of language that related specifically to 
the financial crisis as the object of interest; the second, more mechanistic 
round of coding searched that population for patterns. This method does not 
obviate the necessity to qualitatively assess what was happening to the 
narrative, but it provides a semi-structured basis for doing so, distilling some 
120,000 words of speech material into a manageable but complete dataset of 
crisis-naming rhetoric. 
 Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate whether or not particular crisis keywords 
were present in coded segments from each of the speeches analysed. (Note 
that it does not indicate how often a word was used, simply whether it 
occurred in a speech or not.) Alistair Darling and Gordon Brown’s speeches are 
presented separately, to enable us to see whether their choice of words 
evolved differently. In both sets of speeches, two distinct phases are 
observable. Between mid-2007 and mid-2008, the vocabulary chosen by both 
Brown and Darling is that of “uncertainty”, “difficulties” and “turbulence”, 
which lexicon is replaced in late 2008 with a new vocabulary of “crisis”, 
“recession” and “downturn”. The rhetorical turning point is, unsurprisingly, in 
September 2008, which saw the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman 
Brothers and the near-meltdown of the global financial system. The crisis 
corpus includes Brown and Darling’s speeches from the Labour Party 
conference, which took place one week after Lehman’s insolvency; it therefore 
picks up the government’s thinking at the very height of the financial crisis. In 
Brown and Darling’s 2008 conference speeches we see two rhetorical phases 
overlap, with both men continuing to talk about turbulence and uncertainty, 
while also introducing the word crisis as a descriptor for the first time. After 
September 2008, the language of turbulence and uncertainty is mostly 
dropped, and the government’s vocabulary becomes centred on “crisis” and, 
especially, the bluntly technical term “recession”.  
There are, however, some observable differences between Brown’s 
language and Darling’s. The first is that Brown does talk about crisis as early as 
2007. However, the word crisis is not at this point a descriptor of the current 
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Table 6.1: Names for the crisis, Alistair Darling speeches 
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Table 6.2: Names for the crisis, Gordon Brown speeches 
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Table 6.3: Naming the crisis as “recession” 
 
 
P
re
-B
u
d
ge
t 
R
ep
o
rt
 
C
B
I C
o
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
Fo
re
ig
n
 P
re
ss
 
A
ss
o
ci
at
io
n
 
St
 P
au
l’s
 
B
u
d
ge
t 
C
B
I D
in
n
er
 
M
an
si
o
n
 H
o
u
se
 
La
b
o
u
r 
P
ar
ty
 
C
o
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
La
b
o
u
r 
P
ar
ty
 
C
o
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
R
eu
te
rs
 
C
B
I c
o
n
fe
re
n
ce
 
P
re
-B
u
d
ge
t 
R
ep
o
rt
 
P
ro
gr
es
si
ve
 
G
o
ve
rn
an
ce
 
B
u
d
ge
t 
AVG 
 Nov 08 Jan 09 
Mar 
09 
Apr 
09 
May 
09 
Jun 
09 
Sep 09 
Oct 
09 
Nov 
09 
Dec 
09 
Feb 
10 
Mar 
10 
Brown 
Frequency 
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problem; rather, Brown juxtaposes his early references to “turbulence” against 
previous episodes of “crisis”, as here: 
“In the last 10 years our commitment to stability has been 
tested again and again, in the Asian crisis in 1997/8, the Russian 
crisis, the American recession, the trebling of oil prices, and of 
course in the last month with a wake up call for every financial 
system round the world, a wave of turbulence that started in 
America, then Germany, has impacted on all countries and 
tested the stability of our own system.” (REUT07) 
That is, when Brown talked about crisis in 2007 he was not naming the emerging 
economic problems, but using the example of previous crises to suggest that 
Britain had seen far worse in the past, and had always survived with economic 
stability intact. “Crisis” serves here as a contrast to “turbulence”, not as a 
substitute for it. 
The second difference is Gordon Brown’s avoidance of the word 
‘slowdown’. In the first half of 2008 we see gradual movement toward naming 
the crisis as an object rather than an open-ended condition, with Darling 
beginning to speak of a “world economic slowdown” (BUD08), albeit that this 
was carefully framed as the product of exogenous and generalised “external 
shocks which are affecting every economy in the world” (MH08). John Quiggin 
has observed that at this stage, there was still a good deal of resistance to using 
the word recession, noting that “a great deal of energy was expended in 2008, 
arguing that, despite obvious signs of economic distress, the required two 
successive quarters of negative growth had not yet been observed” (2012: 11). 
As shown in table 6.2 Gordon Brown did not use the word slowdown in any of 
the speeches analysed here, suggesting some greater reticence on his part about 
acknowledging the poor growth outlook. 
Thirdly, while the term ‘recession’ was adopted by both Brown and 
Darling from late-2008, figures 6.4 and 6.5 show that it was a much more central 
component of Darling’s language than of Brown’s. Throughout 2009, most 
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Figure 6.4: Crisis names, percentage of all descriptors by speech, Darling 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Crisis names, percentage of all descriptors by speech, Brown 
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speeches by Alistair Darling adopted ‘recession’ as their main crisis descriptor, 
using this term about two thirds of the time; otherwise, it was ‘crisis’ or 
‘downturn’. Brown, meanwhile, preferred the generalised term ‘crisis’, making 
much more limited use of ‘recession’.  This difference suggests a degree of 
narrative divergence between the two men that warrants further exploration. 
After 2009, the word recession accounted for around 60-70 per cent of all crisis 
descriptors in each Alistair Darling speech (with the exception of the 2009 
Mansion House speech, with 38%). Darling’s 2010 Budget speech says recession 
20 times. In Brown’s speeches in the same period recession accounts for a 
smaller share of all crisis names, generally no more than 40 per cent (with the 
exception of his 2009 Party conference address, with four references out of six 
total). Darling says recession more frequently than Brown, and the word 
accounts for a larger proportion of his overall crisis vocabulary (Table. 6.3). 
Part of this difference can be accounted for by the fact that at this time, 
Gordon Brown was adopting a particular set of euphemisms for his speeches to 
the Confederation of British Industry, based around “difficulties”, leaving 
recession as a smaller share of the total. In Brown’s CBI speeches, ‘difficulties’ is 
used as a crisis descriptor in passages expressing sympathy for, and solidarity 
with, the embattled business sector, acknowledging the crisis somewhat 
obliquely as “difficult times” and couching that acknowledgement in optimistic 
and pro-business language. For example, in November 2008 Brown was at pains 
to express confidence that “together we can take the British economy through 
difficult times and equip ourselves for our global future” (CBI08b), framing 
government and business as allies in confronting a difficult but surmountable 
problem. By 2009, the language of “difficult times” was even more clearly an 
attempt to frame an optimistic and collaborative response to the downturn. By 
talking about shared difficulties Brown reaffirmed his friendliness to the private 
sector and exhorted business leaders to a kind of Dunkirk spirit in the face of 
crisis: 
“This is a most difficult time. It's a most testing time. You're in 
the eye of the storm… And I believe we owe to you all this debt 
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of gratitude for the resilience that you've shown facing a 
worldwide recession… I believe that being tested now, you are 
showing that we are innovative, that we are dynamic, that we 
are enterprising, that we can come through these difficulties.” 
(CBI09a) 
Two things appear to be going on in the 2009 speeches. Brown’s decision to 
soften his description of the crisis as “difficulties” in front of one particular 
audience appears part of an attempt to maintain friendly relations with business 
representatives when (and perhaps because) the government’s economic policy 
had become more unorthodox. But at the same time, the Chancellor was 
becoming comfortable with the liberal use of the word recession to a degree that 
the Prime Minister was not. This finding, of apparent divergence between 
narrators, will be explored further in the qualitative account in Chapter 7.  
The other key finding of this content analysis exercise is, however, that 
Brown and Darling appear to have reached the same rhetorical turning point in 
September 2008. This is not particularly surprising given it was the month that 
saw the most dramatic events of the global banking crisis, including the collapse 
of US investment giant Lehman Brothers on 15 September. The 2008 Labour 
Party Conference took place just a week later, making those speeches rhetorical 
time capsules from the very height of the crisis. The fact that both Brown and 
Darling’s conference speeches now adopted the language of crisis was a 
conscious and coordinated change after a long period in which the word had 
been deliberately avoided. Gordon Brown’s wife reportedly asked him, in 
October 2008, “are we allowed to call it a financial crisis now or are we still 
saying downturn?” to which Brown replied “I think we can safely call it a crisis 
now”(Pearson, 2008). However tongue-in-cheek the question, Sarah Brown had 
hinted at the deliberation behind the government’s choice of crisis descriptors. 
Their reticence to name the crisis as such – or even to acknowledge its existence 
– spoke to Brown’s longstanding caution about the potential for government’s 
language to move markets. As such Brown’s government could not be the first 
mover; it would only talk about a crisis after everyone else was doing so too.   
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Change and continuity in the four narrative themes 
The ‘crisis names’ coding exercise suggests two distinct phases in Labour’s crisis 
thinking: circumspection up to September 2008, and open acknowledgement of 
crisis thereafter. We might reasonably expect the main themes in the narrative 
to evolve around this turning point. Did this happen? Or, as in previous episodes 
of instability, did the narrative persist in the face of external challenges? This 
section returns to longitudinal content analysis of the main themes in the pre-
crisis narrative, to ask when and if they displayed any change in response to the 
newly-acknowledged crisis.  
Content analysis for the four themes returns to the main corpus of 
speeches used in the previous two chapters, which is comprised of five set-piece 
speeches by the Chancellor each year: the Budget, Pre-Budget, Mansion House, 
CBI Conference and Labour Party Conference speeches. As before, this corpus 
allows for longitudinal analysis including a comparison between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods. Figures 6.6 to 6.9 show the extent to which key vocabulary in 
Labour’s pre-2007 narrative continued into the crisis period. Each chart shows 
the total frequency count for coded language in the four themes, over the period 
1997-2009 (updating the counts shown in chapters 4 and 5). The year 2010 is 
excluded because only one speech, the 2010 budget statement, features in the 
corpus for that year, compared with five speeches for each previous year. While 
it would be possible to express the counts as a percentage of total words and so 
control for the smaller sample of speech material in 2010, this would not deal 
with the underlying difference between years in which we can take observations 
from five different speeches, given to different audiences, and a year in which 
only one speech to one type of audience is present. A simple frequency count 
excluding 2010 is therefore presented as a fairer reflection of rhetorical trends 
over time. 
These data allow us to see, at a high level, the extent to which narrative 
themes developed in the pre-crisis period survived into 2008 and 2009. It is 
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Figure 6.6: Macrostability rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2009 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Prudence rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
STABILITY BOOM AND BUST
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PRUDENCE FISCAL RULES
 185 
Figure 6.8: Globalisation rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2009 
 
Figure 6.9: Financial sector rhetoric (frequency) 1997-2009 
 
Figure 6.10: Subcategories of financial sector rhetoric, 1997-2009 
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immediately apparent that 2008 saw a resurgence of stability rhetoric (Fig 6.6), 
which appears twice as frequently in 2008 as in 2007. That is, even as the 
economy destabilised and uncertainty increased, the language of stability 
became a larger not a smaller feature of the government’s narrative. This finding 
appears strongly consistent with the patterns outlined in the previous two 
chapters, where increased uncertainty about the external conditions led to 
narrative reinforcement, focused particularly on stability. That is, the 
deteriorating economic conditions in 2008 appear to have provoked the familiar 
defensive reaction in the government’s narrative. External validity challenges in 
2008 prompted rhetorical continuity, not change, in this theme. 
Other parts of the narrative displayed more change in 2008 and 2009. 
References to prudence were very few in 2008 and absent altogether in 2009, 
perhaps reflecting the handover from Gordon Brown to Alistair Darling. However 
references to the fiscal rules continued into 2008 before vanishing in 2009, 
suggesting a critical break between those two years. In the globalisation theme, 
coded rhetoric increases in frequency in the crisis period, appearing more often 
than in any year except 2006, which was the apotheosis of Gordon Brown’s 
“evangelists for globalisation” period. Noticeably however, the emphasis is on 
the global economy rather than globalisation per se, suggesting a qualitative shift 
in the way this theme was being invoked that requires more careful unpacking in 
order to determine whether this high frequency count represents narrative 
continuity or change. Finally, the financial sector narrative theme sees a slight 
drop in rhetorical activity in 2008, before increasing again in 2009. Given the 
onset of a global banking crisis in late 2008 this is perhaps not surprising. It is 
noteworthy, however, that within this theme there is a shift toward regulatory 
keywords, which become a greater proportion of the total language around the 
financial sector. And indeed the nature of that regulatory language changes. 
Figure 6.10 shows that whereas the principal focus of regulatory rhetoric before 
the crisis had been on financial sector competitiveness, from 2007, through 2008 
and especially in 2009, there is a new emphasis on the relationship between 
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regulation and financial stability. This finding points to an important policy and 
perhaps ideational change in respect of the banking sector. 
To summarise: the stability theme shows the strongest evidence of 
rhetorical continuity into 2008, before a change in 2009. The globalisation theme 
also appears to show some headline continuity but perhaps with a change of 
emphasis in the underlying language. The prudence theme appears to fall apart, 
or be abandoned, after the change of Chancellor. The financial sector theme 
shows the strongest evidence of change, with a significant alteration in the 
content of rhetoric in that area. 
 Of course, to the extent that rhetorical change can be observed, it might 
be accounted for not by responsiveness to the changing economic conditions, 
but simply by the transition from Brown to Darling as Chancellor in 2007, which 
happens to have coincided with the onset of crisis. Since the longitudinal content 
analysis is based on a set of speeches by the Chancellor, these were delivered by 
Brown until mid-2007 and by Darling thereafter. It is therefore necessary to take 
observations from the crisis period that include Gordon Brown, and to compare 
Brown’s language with Darling to see what, if any, differences may be observed. 
Figures 6.11 and 6.12 therefore code for the four themes using our crisis corpus, 
presenting Brown and Darling’s frequency counts separately. This is the same 
corpus of 28 speeches used in the ‘crisis names’ coding exercise, having been 
constructed to focus on a shorter period of time and, in particular, to facilitate a 
comparison between the two key speakers in the period 2007-2010. By coding 
these speeches for the four themes already identified as present in Labour’s pre-
crisis narrative, we can examine the extent to which Brown and Darling stuck to 
the same rhetoric after the crisis, and so determine whether there were 
important differences in the ways these two speakers narrated the crisis.14 
 
 
                                                        
14 See Chapter M1 for a further discussion of the methodological implications 
of the leadership transition in 2007. 
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Figure 6.11: Thematic rhetoric in Gordon Brown speeches, crisis corpus 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Thematic rhetoric in Alistair Darling speeches, crisis corpus 
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This new coding exercise reveals several things about the evolution of 
Labour’s narrative, and perhaps their thinking, through the crisis period. First, it 
appears that both Brown and Darling reverted to the stability theme as a 
response to uncertainty in 2008, but that this tendency was, perhaps surprisingly, 
a particularly marked feature of Alistair Darling’s speeches in that period. Most 
prominently, the Budget statement in March 2008 and the Chancellor’s Mansion 
House speech in June 2008 each made liberal use of familiar language, restating 
the importance of stability and the government’s track record in achieving it 
through the monetary and fiscal policy frameworks. That is, the stability 
narrative does not appear to have belonged only to Gordon Brown but to be a 
more integral part of Labour’s economic story across the leadership change and 
well into 2008. In 2009, however, both narrators move away from the stability 
narrative somewhat, but it remains a larger proportion of Brown’s coded 
language after that point than of Darling’s, suggesting a differential degree of 
attachment to that language after the September 2008 turning point. Once again 
this finding will be picked up more thoroughly in the qualitative account. 
 The more marked difference between the two speakers can be observed 
in relation to the globalisation theme. Brown’s crisis rhetoric makes quite 
frequent reference to globalisation, particularly from late-2008 and into 2009. 
One-off keynote speeches such as his address to the Foreign Press Association in 
January 2008, and at St Paul’s Cathedral in March 2009, lean particularly heavily 
on this rhetoric. Darling, by contrast, speaks very little about globalisation but 
refers frequently to the global economy. That is, to the extent that the 
‘embracing globalisation’ narrative persisted into the crisis period it was mostly 
via Brown, with Darling’s global economy talk representing change rather than 
continuity. We already know that in this period Darling’s preferred descriptor for 
the crisis was “recession”, while Brown preferred to use the more nebulous 
“crisis”. Taken together with the divergence in their recourse to globalisation, 
this suggests a fundamental divergence between the two narrators in late 2008 
and 2009. 
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 We have seen that there was an increase in rhetoric in the financial 
markets theme in 2009, driven particularly by an increase in regulatory language. 
Furthermore, this regulatory language is shown to be qualitatively different than 
in the pre-crisis period, with the emphasis moving from financial sector 
competitiveness to financial stability. Coding for this theme in the crisis speech 
corpus reveals that this narrative change was almost entirely driven by Alistair 
Darling, not Gordon Brown. Darling spoke far more about regulation than Brown, 
particularly in his 2009 Mansion House speech, which contained a fairly long 
discussion of the need for global regulatory supervision of finance. Brown mostly 
avoided the topic, and where he did speak about regulation it was mostly in ways 
that affirmed previous positions rather than repudiating them. In particular, 
Brown continued to defend the British model of regulation as basically sound, 
and to locate any “regulatory deficit” at the international level (FPA09). That is, 
Brown’s crisis rhetoric embodies a degree of narrative continuity on financial 
regulation, whereas Darling’s displays some change, promising domestic, as well 
as international regulatory improvements.  
 
Internal and external validity tradeoffs, 2007-2010 
What we appear to find, based on content analysis of Labour’s rhetoric in the 
period 2007-10, is the existence of two distinct narrative phases, before and 
after the banking meltdown of September 2008. For simplicity, these can be 
labeled as early crisis and late crisis periods. In the early crisis period, we 
continue to see a high degree of narrative continuity, with familiar themes being 
mobilised in response to growing uncertainty. As before, greater economic 
uncertainty appears to have generated renewed political and narrative certitude, 
particularly around the theme of stability. In the late crisis period, rhetorical 
shifts appear that seem to indicate the narrative has been forced to bow to 
events in some important respects. That is, the banking meltdown of September 
2008 finally provided an external validity challenge large enough to cut through 
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the tendency to narrative reinforcement that had characterised Labour’s 
approach until then. 
These are, however, only headline findings based on the presence or absence of 
certain language. It is not possible to use content analysis to grasp subtler 
evolutions in the meaning and significance of headline themes, or their 
connection to ideational change. For example, it is not possible to tell from 
content analysis alone why the rhetorical turning point in September 2008 came 
about. Was it because events had finally persuaded the government that this 
was a crisis? Or had they believed in the existence for some time but remained 
circumspect about saying so? For questions of this nature, qualitative-historical 
analysis is required. Chapter 7 therefore picks up the historical account begun in 
chapters 4 and 5, tracing the evolution of internal and external validity through 
the period 2007-10. 
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7:  Crisis, Part II 
Narrative continuity and policy change in the financial crisis, 
2007-2010 
 
Content analysis of crisis-naming rhetoric indicated that there were two distinct 
periods, before and after September 2008. The qualitative account put forward 
in this chapter largely confirms this finding, and further shows that in the period 
up to mid-2008, despite mounting challenges to the external validity of the 
narrative, very little rhetorical and ideational change was evident. During this 
time, the now-familiar tendency to narrative reinforcement was not only present, 
but had become a real constraint on policymaking.  The early-crisis period 
provides particularly strong evidence for the power of narrative and ideas to 
exert independent causal power, solidifying over time to become self-reinforcing 
mechanisms for the maintenance of the status quo. The stability and 
globalisation themes were particularly resilient during this time. Into 2008, as the 
economy turned downwards, there was also a short-lived attempt to interpret 
the crisis in terms of British resilience, by arguing that the UK’s open, flexible 
economy and credible policy frameworks would make it well placed to weather 
the storm. This too represented a form of narrative continuity, retooling pre-
crisis logics for the crisis period. By mid-2008, however, evidence of a deepening 
global downturn and serious problems in the banking sector was putting the 
narrative under extreme strain. 
The turning point in September 2008 was a brief moment of narrative 
disarray, as both external and internal validity broke down. The immediate 
response to the meltdown in September 2008 was characterised by narrative 
dissonance as the government tried to adapt a new story for new times without 
invalidating the prior story. After this point, the scale of the external validity 
challenge posed by the banking crisis did provoke quite considerable policy 
change, and some significant narrative change, as the content analysis had 
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indicated. But, as we shall see, there was also a surprising degree of narrative 
resilience into this late-crisis period. The final breakdown of internal validity 
came about in 2009-10, not only – or even primarily – because the crisis had 
finally led to ideational change, but because of a divergence between Brown and 
Darling that reflected their differential investment in the pre-crisis story. 
 
Late 2007: Northern Rock as a test of Labour’s economic philosophy 
We have seen that in the period to 2007, the government’s usual response to 
events that put their economic story under pressure was to recommit to their 
four narrative themes. That is, they typically responded to external validity 
challenges by prioritising internal narrative validity, repeating core ideas, 
revisiting familiar rhetoric and reassuring the public and the markets that they 
would not change course in the face of economic turbulence. The 2007-08 period 
saw the same pattern repeated again, this time in response to the early tremors 
of a banking crisis, most significantly the failure of Northern Rock.  
Formed out of a series of mergers of building societies, Northern Rock 
was a medium sized, publicly traded retail bank and an important presence in 
the British mortgage market. By 2006 it claimed to be the UK’s fifth largest 
mortgage lender, with over £100 billion in assets (Ridley, 2006). Pursuing an 
aggressive strategy of “capital efficiency” (i.e. leverage) to support growth in its 
lending book, it was particularly well known for offering mortgage loans for up to 
125 per cent of the value of a home. Problems at Northern Rock first came to 
public attention on 13th and 14th September 2007, when BBC correspondent 
Robert Peston broke the news that it had approached the Bank of England for 
emergency funding. Like many financial institutions at the time, Northern Rock 
relied heavily on overnight funding via the ‘repo’ markets for its immediate cash 
flow. The bank’s mortgage business was highly geared, based on a business 
model that assumed a buoyant housing market and the ready availability of 
relatively cheap liquidity, both of which had indeed been present throughout the 
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early-2000s. By 2007 however, emergent losses in the US sub-prime market had 
begun to change that benign operating context, and the quality of Northern 
Rock’s own asset book was beginning to be affected by rising arrears rates, 
suggesting that bad mortgage loans might not be a purely American problem. By 
mid-September, unable to raise short-term finance in the markets, Northern 
Rock turned to the Bank of England for an emergency loan. When news of that 
approach leaked it prompted Britain’s first bank run in 150 years, as depositors 
queued outside branches to withdraw their savings.  
A straightforwardly political reading of the problem might have favoured 
a quick bailout for Northern Rock: the future of the bank would directly impact 
constituents in Labour’s traditional heartlands, and local MPs were quick to 
mobilise in support of government assistance for the only retail bank still based 
in the north east of England (Carlin, 2007). Nothern Rock operated out of 
headquarters in Newcastle and acting as the principal sponsor of Newcastle 
United football club. Many of its shareholders were also based in the region, 
being former depositors who had acquired shares when the then-building society 
demutualised in 1997. It was thus symbolically and materially important in the 
Labour Party’s traditional heartlands, and its collapse would have been highly 
damaging to the government even without spillover effects on public confidence.  
Yet the government was deeply reluctant to take the bank into public 
ownership, to the extent that they spent the last months of 2007 desperately 
seeking a private investor to effect a rescue instead: 
 “there was this whole awkward phase in which the then Prime 
Minister was desperate to find someone to buy it... [but] it 
became rapidly clear that you were only ever going to do a deal 
like that, if at all, on incredibly disadvantageous terms.” 
(Interview A) 
“we spent months dealing with Branson, and Flowers… who 
offered us ludicrous deals… and we would all kind of look at 
each other and think, what are we wasting our time on this for? 
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It was a small bank, we just needed to get on and nationalise it.” 
(Interview F) 
Only when these private deals had proved so monumentally unfavourable to the 
taxpayer as to be ruled out, could a government bail-in be considered.  
Why then did a government-led rescue not materialise more quickly? 
What is striking about the Northern Rock episode is not simply that the 
government was reluctant to go for nationalisation, but the sheer length of time 
it took them to come around: almost five months in total. Institutional inertia 
might offer one plausible explanation for the delay, and indeed it has been 
suggested that the slowness of the government response reflected a lack of 
institutional capacity, particularly in the Treasury, to respond to banking failures 
(National Audit Office, 2009; Public Accounts Committee, 2009). Officials who 
were present at the time acknowledge that few people in the Treasury staff had 
ever witnessed a bank failure, and that there was a lack of institutional memory 
to draw on in designing the response: 
“the number of individuals in the Treasury who dealt with a 
failed bank... probably one or two tops, if any. So, you've got to 
remember you're building capability.” (Interview G)  
“Northern Rock forced us, as an institution, to confront the fact 
that we had visibly failed; to confront the fact that we were 
demonstrably short of expertise in a very important area” 
(Interview A)  
Legal barriers can also be added to these capacity constraints, since the 
government initially lacked a legal basis on which to nationalise Northern Rock, 
taking powers in the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 that would allow 
nationalisation to be enacted via secondary legislation. Once in place, that 
legislation made it possible for subsequent actions, including the partial 
nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley building society in September 2008, to 
proceed more rapidly: 
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“our resolution regime was inadequate and our deposit 
protection regime was inadequate. So, that whole five months… 
should never have happened, basically it should have been 
resolved over a weekend and we subsequently had the 
technology to do that… the resolution of Bradford and Bingley… 
was an absolutely brilliant, clinical, over the weekend operation, 
which is how we should have dealt with Northern Rock had we 
been on the ball and had we had the tools.” (Interview A) 
It seems clear, therefore, that the Northern Rock response had been constrained 
by the process of designing a suitable legislative instrument, and that the 
slowness of the government’s response was partly caused by the need to 
improve Treasury capacity and to retool legal frameworks. 
However, accounts that treat institutional factors as the main brake on 
government action offer only a partial explanation for the Labour government’s 
gradual inching toward nationalisation for Northern Rock. Such explanations 
focus primarily on the operation of government and its capacity to implement 
policy, rather than the decision-making that sets the policy in the first place. This 
political dimension is explicitly off-limits for certain commentators: the NAO, in 
particular, is barred from critiquing government policy and may only comment 
on the effectiveness of its implementation. As such they will tend to emphasise 
administrative barriers to action over political ones. For political economy 
purposes, this will not do, since there remains the prior question of what the 
institutions of government were being asked to deliver, and why.  
If we examine the coordinative processes leading up to the Northern 
Rock rescue, we see that while institutional constraints were present, the long 
lead-up to nationalisation reflects more than simple institutional inertia. The 
evidence does not suggest that ministers were ahead of their departments on 
this matter, nor that institutional conservatism was blocking the preferred 
political solution, but rather that the barriers to action on Northern Rock were 
rooted in ideational and narrative constraints on the government’s willingness to 
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nationalise. One senior official recalls that the Treasury was prepared to 
recommend nationalisation for Northern Rock quite early on, but ministers were 
deeply worried about the politics of a Labour administration pursuing that 
course: 
“If you look at Northern Rock, I mean we all knew straight away 
you had to nationalise Northern Rock, right? But Alistair, and 
Gordon, were absolutely paranoid that they wouldn’t do it. 
Because they said Labour can’t be nationalising banks... they 
were saying well ok, that’s an easy solution for you, but it’s 
politically costly for us, so go off and explore other options. 
Therefore we went off and explored other options. [Then we’d] 
come back and say well none of them work, so let’s nationalise. 
And that’s what we did.” (Interview F) 
“[Brown] was terrified of having to nationalise. Because he felt 
that… people would think somehow that this was a dangerous 
left-wing thing to do” (Interview A) 
“What was extraordinary was the difficulty we had in getting 
agreement that Northern Rock should be nationalised. It was 
clear to [senior official] and myself pretty much from October, 
that this was going to happen. I think Alistair Darling really knew 
deep down probably from November but there were just big 
obstacles and this comes back to how some narratives can get in 
the way. The whole point of New Labour was that it didn't 
believe in nationalisation” (Interview B) 
Thus it was not until February of 2008, some five months after the bank run, that 
Brown “accepted with an incredibly heavy heart the reality of the choice the 
Treasury presented me with” (Brown, 2010a: 29), and nationalisation went 
ahead. 
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If it was not institutional reticence that delayed Northern Rock’s 
nationalisation, might it have been simply a presentational problem: fear of 
performing a u-turn? Alistair Darling was apparently wary of the appearance of 
nationalisation, believing that even if it might be the functionally right policy 
option, it was one the public was not yet ready to accept. If nationalisation were 
to be successfully explained to voters, a softly-softly approach would be 
necessary to pave the way for the ideational shift it implied. However, the 
problem ran deeper than that: nationalization did not only contradict the 
government’s story but its most important ideas. Gordon Brown acknowledges in 
his 2010 account of the crisis that in late-2007 the nationalisation of a bank 
remained firmly in the “unthinkable” column: 
“I was against nationalisation… and at that stage I would not let 
it be considered. I favoured a private-sector buyout… Tony Blair 
and I had spent twenty years building New Labour on the 
foundation of market competition, private enterprise, and 
economic stability as the path to growth and I was not prepared 
to undermine that painstaking work with one decision” (Brown, 
2010a: 23).  
One official interviewed was clear that government’s wariness of nationalisation 
was not simply about the optics of the government owning a bank, but was 
rooted in quite fundamental concerns about the proper role of government: 
“I don't think it's [just] symbolism, I actually think when you step 
back ands think, when you nationalise an institution, you are 
effectively appropriating somebody else's property.” (Interview 
G) 
Northern Rock’s failure had effectively presented New Labour with a test of their 
core beliefs: was it worse to let the markets wipe out a private bank and its 
shareholders and depositors, or to have the state appropriate the assets of the 
bank and so partly protect their value? Deliberating that choice took five months. 
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Even once nationalisation was agreed upon, the rhetorical presentation 
of the Northern Rock rescue is further revealing of the ideational conflicts it had 
triggered for Labour. As Patrick Diamond has noted, “Labour ministers were 
continually reluctant to couch their approach in terms of state intervention” 
(Diamond 2013: 97), to the extent that the word “nationalisation” was initially 
avoided. For example, Alistair Darling’s January 2008 statement to Parliament 
(HM Treasury, 2008a) raised the possibility of nationalisation for the first time, 
but in mostly veiled terms: the Chancellor made six references to a period of 
“temporary public ownership” of the bank, and used the dreaded n-word only 
once. Despite being now persuaded of the merits of a public sector solution to 
Northern Rock’s problems, there was considerable reticence about making a 
positive case for government ownership, and the government’s discursive 
presentation of the policy attempted to soften the impact of nationalisation by 
couching policy change in terms that minimised the threat posed by government 
to the private sector. In the presentation of the bailout, “the key word is 
temporary” (Interview G); public sector ownership would be explicitly time-
limited and should be seen as driven by necessity, not ideology. Darling was at 
pains to reiterate that “a private sector solution for Northern Rock is the 
preferable route” (HM Treasury, 2008a) and that only once all other alternatives 
had been ruled out would nationalisation be on the table.  
The potential threat posed by Northern Rock’s rescue was thus 
neutralised by its confinement within familiar rhetorical boundaries. There would 
be no recanting of New Labour’s faith in the merits of private business and 
shareholder rights, and while the nationalisation of a bank might be 
unprecedented, the language in which it was expressed made clear that it should 
not be taken to signal any deeper re-evaluation of the relationship between 
government and market.  
“The policy decision was not 'government should own a bank'. 
The policy decision was: the consequences of not intervening in 
this bank are so systemic and so profound, that government is 
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going to take a temporary step to deal with those.” (Interview 
G) 
Indeed a major concern, following nationalisation, was that the public stake in 
Northern Rock should not disrupt the otherwise smooth functioning of market 
competition: 
“One of the things we did worry about in the first half of 2008 
was getting Northern Rock off the top of the Best Buy tables 
because it was unfair competition in some ways.” (ibid.) 
Even as the banking crisis gathered pace, such was the government’s instinctive 
disapproval of public ownership that they were keen to ensure a publicly owned 
bank not be competitive, lest it undermine the real market players. 
 In practice, the nationalisation of Northern Rock did not prove as 
politically explosive for Labour as they had feared: 
“They realised that the world didn’t cave in when a Labour 
government nationalised a bank. That actually people thought 
that was sensible” (Interview F) 
“this taboo moment had passed off without a great political 
downside.” (Interview A) 
Yet the protracted agonies Labour had gone through to arrive at this point 
provide clear evidence of the extent to which an existing idea-set, and an 
established narrative, can constrain policy. Labour initially resisted making a 
decision that would cut across their long-held belief in the primacy of private 
ownership and the efficiency of markets; once that finally became unsustainable, 
they made the change reluctantly and as unobtrusively as possible. Material 
interests (of Northern Rock depositors, and of the wider financial system) may 
have forced their hand, but ideas and discourse had mounted a formidable 
rearguard against the intrusion of these material problems, and sought to close 
around them again as quickly as possible. As one senior official put it: 
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“obviously in the end, we did do it. The world didn't fall in and it 
wasn't a particularly big deal, but it comes back to how the 
longer you've got a story, the more difficult it is to do something 
which cuts across it.” (Interview B) 
The five months of resistance to policy change we observe in the Northern Rock 
episode cannot be explained in terms of material interests, nor were they 
straightforwardly consistent with theories of institutional inertia. Rather, the 
slow walk to nationalisation is strongly indicative of the potential for narratives 
to outlive the conditions in which they were conceived, and so to constrain their 
narrators’ ability to adapt to change. 
 
Budget 2008: narrative reinforcement again 
Having broken through their initial reservations to nationalise Northern Rock, 
would Labour now take a different view of the state of the economy, and of 
government’s proper role in managing it? Officials involved at the time report 
that in early 2008, the Treasury still hoped Northern Rock’s failure would prove 
to be a singular blip: 
“at the time, the economy appeared to be still growing. 
[Northern Rock] appeared to be, if not an isolated event... it 
looked like a wake-up call… it certainly wasn't obvious that the 
whole…that the financial situation would deteriorate as rapidly 
as it did through 2008.” (Interview B) 
That being the case, the rhetorical stance taken by both Brown and Darling was 
to continue projecting confidence and treat Northern Rock like every other 
challenge to date: as a test that had been passed without disruption to the 
overall framework. 
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“the government was keen to try and convey a sense that it had 
a grip. That this thing was a one-off. You know, 'keep calm' kind 
of thing.” (Interview A) 
In early 2008, while Northern Rock was felt to have exposed some weaknesses in 
the regulatory system for banking, these were not yet thought to have systemic 
implications, and there is little evidence of the government experiencing doubts 
about the overall robustness of their economic policies. Rather, the evidence of 
early 2008 is that after another fairly serious external validity challenge, the 
government once again took refuge in internal narrative validity, mobilising 
familiar rhetoric in an attempt to discursively reconstruct the stability that had 
been threatened by the events of late-2007.  
This tendency was most clearly evident in the 2008 Budget, which was 
the first under Alistair Darling. The Budget statement was delivered on 12 March 
2008 in a context of heightened uncertainty about the prospects for the British 
economy, with the Institute for Fiscal Studies pronouncing the economic outlook 
“worse than it has been for some time” (2008: 2). Most commentators continued 
to project a slowdown though not a recession, and the scale of the expected hit 
on growth was disputed; that is, there was clearly a growing external challenge 
to the validity of the narrative, but the size of that challenge remained uncertain. 
The government’s response to the uncertain outlook was again characteristic of 
the narrative reinforcement phase, drawing very clearly on the stability and 
globalisation themes already developed and using those themes as a basis for 
the government’s interpretation of the economic data. 
At the time of the Budget, the Treasury still anticipated growth in the 
British economy in 2008, but had cut its estimate from 2.75% to 2%. The medium 
term forecast predicted a return to 2.5% growth in 2009, rising to 2.75% in 2010, 
reflecting an official view that the impact on Britain of a global slowdown in 2008 
should be moderate, and short-lived. Driven by this rather optimistic growth 
projection, fiscal forecasts were similarly predicting only a short-run problem, 
expecting that the fiscal deficit would increase slightly in 2008-09 and reduce 
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thereafter as growth recovered. The Treasury was aware their forecasts were 
somewhat more positive than those of influential commentators including the 
IFS, so Darling chose to justify this relative optimism by reference to relatively 
strong UK growth in the previous year when, “despite the slowdown in the world 
economy, in 2007 the British economy grew by 3 per cent – the fastest growth of 
any major economy”. The statement went on to emphasise that “while other 
countries have suffered recessions, the British economy has now been growing 
continuously for over a decade – the longest period of sustained growth in our 
history” (BUD08). So while 2008 was expected to be a difficult year, Britain was 
presumed to be in better shape than its major competitors, able to ride out any 
turbulence. The counterargument – that Britain’s rapid growth in 2007 might 
indicate a bubble market, or a more pronounced economic cycle than other 
nations – does not appear to have been contemplated; as ever, more growth was 
presumed to equal more stability. 
Inflation was causing some concern in early 2008. There had already been 
an inflationary moment in 2006, with Gordon Brown reporting at his final budget 
in 2007 that outturn inflation for the previous year had been 2.8%, above target 
and above the forecast rate of 2%. The 2007 outturn, now reported by Darling in 
Budget 2008, was back on target, but price rises in global commodity markets 
were now expected to push domestic inflation up again, with the 2008 budget 
forecast being increased to 2.5%. Darling’s response in the Budget statement 
was to acknowledge this upside risk while emphasising its manageability within 
the New Labour macroeconomic framework: 
“The reforms we have made since 1997 mean we can be 
confident about the inflation outlook… The success of the 
Monetary Policy Committee and the resilience of the UK 
economy is clear.” (BUD08) 
Despite Darling’s apparent confidence, it was deemed necessary to publicly 
renew the government’s vows with the inflation framework, reassuring the 
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markets that the new Chancellor would do nothing to loosen the system of 
inflation control put in place by his predecessor:  
“To provide certainty, and to build on this foundation of stability, 
I am today writing to the Governor of the Bank of England to re 
confirm that the inflation target for the Monetary Policy 
Committee remains 2 per cent on a CPI basis, entrenching our 
commitment to low inflation.” (BUD08) 
In reality Darling was required by the 1998 Bank of England Act to write an annual 
open letter renewing the inflation mandate of the Monetary Policy Committee. 
But the fact that in 2008 he chose to highlight this bit of routine business in his 
budget statement was a deliberate attempt to signal policy continuity, 
responding to inflationary spikes in global commodities markets by flagging the 
UK government’s ongoing commitment to low inflation. In other words, narrated 
stability was once again the antidote to uncertainty. 
Figure 7.1: Stability rhetoric (frequency) in Budget statements, 1997-2010
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stability in the statement, more than in any other Budget speech (Fig. 7.1). 
Interestingly, the previous peak year for stability talk in the budget statement 
had been 2004 with 26 references. In that year, as in 2008, inflation was causing 
concern, with RPI going through the symbolically important 3% threshold (albeit 
that the official inflation measure had been changed to head off that challenge), 
and the Bank of England raising base rates against the backdrop of a housing 
boom. It seems plausible that the 2004 budget had also been responding to 
external problems with an amplification of stability rhetoric. Now in 2008, a 
moment in which the economy was arguably less stable than at any time in 
Labour’s eleven years in power, the stability narrative was apparently finding its 
fullest expression.  
There are also striking qualitative similarities between the 2004 and 2008 
statements, suggesting that the 2008 speech had to some extent been modelled 
on the earlier statement. For example, compare the opening sentence in each of 
the two years: 
“The purpose of this Budget is to lock in, for Great Britain, an 
economic stability that can and will endure.” (BUD04) 
“Mr Deputy Speaker, the core purpose of this Budget is stability 
- now and in the future.” (BUD08) 
In both statements, at approximately 200 words in, the Chancellor highlighted 
the government’s record on growth: 
“I can now report that Britain is enjoying its longest period of 
sustained economic growth for more than 200 years…the 
longest period of sustained growth since the beginning of the 
industrial revolution.” (BUD04) 
“While other countries have suffered recessions, the British 
economy has now been growing continuously for over a decade 
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– the longest period of sustained growth in our history.” 
(BUD08) 
And in both budgets, the message was that while the world economy may turn 
down, Britain is was placed to weather the storm, thanks to Labour’s monetary 
and fiscal framework: 
“In the past Britain has been first in, worst hit and last out of 
world recessions… in 2004, of the G20 countries, Britain and 
America [are] again growing fastest.” (BUD04) 
“Between the early 1970s and the mid 1990s the UK was one of 
the least stable economies in the G7. Today we are the most 
stable… the reforms we have made since 1997 – independence 
for the Bank of England and tough fiscal rules – mean that 
Britain is now more resilient and better prepared to deal with 
future shocks.” (BUD08) 
Darling’s 2008 statement was thus overtly a continuity budget, using Brownian 
language, restating familiar messages, and framing the emerging crisis as a piece 
of bad weather that Britain expected to withstand as well, if not better than 
most. 
 The reference to Britain being “resilient” in the face of shocks is 
particularly important. Interviews with officials confirm that there was a 
deliberate attempt, around this time, to regroup rhetorically by emphasising this 
language in particular: 
“we developed a narrative, which was that Britain was well 
placed to weather the storm. We were resilient… we were doing 
ok.” (Interview B) 
Variants of the word “resilience” duly appear six times in the 2008 Budget 
statement, and were repeated in the press notices released alongside the Budget, 
which insisted that “the flexibility and resilience of the UK economy provides a 
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solid platform from which to face the global economic shocks” (HM Treasury, 
2008b). In reality this was less the development of a new narrative than the 
pointed continuation of the old one. Darling’s rhetoric in early 2008 was a 
straightforward recapitulation of the language of the Brown era, and a repeat of 
Brown’s favoured tactic of responding to unfavourable data with an explicit 
refusal to change course.  
While stability and resilience were the primary messages, all four of our 
pre-crisis themes appear in the 2008 Budget statement. The prudence theme is 
also there, but slightly tweaked for the downturn, Darling suggesting that the 
government’s record of fiscal restraint left a buffer for some counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy if needed: 
“It is precisely our commitment to… discipline and stability that 
gives us the flexibility now to respond to the global economic 
challenges we face today. Given the fundamental strength of 
our public finances, it is right to allow fiscal policy to support 
monetary policy over the period ahead in helping to maintain 
stability in the face of the global downturn.” (BUD08) 
And the statement referenced the globalisation theme, acknowledging the 
present turbulence but placing it within a framing that was still broadly 
optimistic: 
“throughout the world economies have benefited from the 
globalisation of trade and investment, which has delivered 
strong world growth. Here in Britain, our openness, our global 
reach, our history of scientific invention and creative success, 
make us uniquely placed to succeed in the global economy. But 
with the benefits of globalisation we see too how problems in 
one part of the world can quickly spread to another.” (ibid) 
So while the potential instability of the global market was acknowledged, it was 
still placed within a framing that saw globalisation as a net positive. There was 
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still no recognition that some of the “global” turbulence might originate close to 
home, in London’s financial sector. The usual glowing references to the financial 
sector were present, with Darling pledging policies to ensure “London retains its 
position as the world’s pre eminent international financial centre”. As ever, the 
answer was to remain confident and rely on Britain’s world class policy 
framework – particularly its anti-inflationary credentials – to steer the country 
through.  
The 2008 budget does provide an interesting test of the relative 
importance of ideas and institutions in creating rhetorical continuity. Material 
conditions can be mostly discounted: while nobody yet anticipated the scale of 
the coming downturn, it was clear enough in early 2008 that this would not be a 
good year, for the global economy or for Britain. Uncertainty was as acute as at 
any time since 1997, but this were certainly not an economy that could be 
considered self-evidently stable. The uptick in stability language was not 
descriptive of the conditions but an attempt to construct them as stable. It is 
fairly plausible, however, that the 2008 statement might have been the product 
of institutional continuity within the Treasury, with officials delivering their new 
Chancellor a speech built on the skeleton of older statements. Interview 
evidence confirms that in the absence of a strong alternate vision from Darling 
himself, the Treasury had defaulted to Brownian rhetoric as a matter of habit: 
“His first budget was a massive challenge for him, because 
frankly I'm not sure he’d thought through at that stage what his 
vision was for the British economy… [and] the Treasury has 
served up this narrative.” (Interview G) 
The familiar language in the statement was both a pragmatic choice (old 
statements being an easily available resource for Treasury speechwriters) and a 
tactical one, because Darling had been appointed by Brown to embody 
continuity rather than change: 
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“the whole reason that Alistair Darling was given that job was 
because – I remember this was the rhetoric, or the sort of 
explanation that we put out at the time – was that we wanted 
stability, we wanted continuity, we wanted, in inverted commas, 
a “safe pair of hands” in the Treasury, and also the language 
that we kept on using was that the markets had got so used to 
the idea that you would have one Chancellor in place for a long 
time, that what we didn’t want was that they would go back to a 
short-termist view of how long a particular Chancellor would be 
in place…” (Interview E) 
Given that background, can we give ideas any of the credit for the causing the 
non-change, or was it just institutions? The observed rhetorical continuity 
certainly implies a lack of ideational change, but the ideas may not have been in 
the driving seat; in this instance, the familiar rhetoric in the 2008 Budget 
statement might simply reflect the conservatism of officials for whom cut-and-
paste speechwriting was less risky than asking ministers to sign off new and 
untried formulations. If Darling did not push back against the Treasury’s default 
language, this might be taken to indicate an absence of ideas on his part. 
Another reading is that by this stage in the game, ideas and institutions 
were not easily separable. The use of familiar rhetoric by a new Chancellor 
reflected the institutionalisation of the narrative itself, and the internalisation of 
Brown’s core ideas by a Treasury that remained wedded to them even after he 
had left the building. By this point, Brown’s economic ideas were themselves an 
institution, structuring the operating environment for his successor and 
providing the Treasury with its default positions. After the budget, however, the 
spring and summer of 2008 did see the beginnings of a divergence between 
Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling’s economic narratives, in a way that strongly 
points to the independent causal importance of ideas, and prior narrative, in 
conditioning political choices during a crisis. 
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Mid-2008: the reinforcement phase breaks down 
As 2008 progressed Gordon Brown was, increasingly, prepared to acknowledge 
the growing sense of strain in the global economy, but this did imply any change 
in the overall messages. A speech to the Institute of Directors in April 2008 
(IoD08) is a good example, containing both references to a new problem (“a 
credit crunch which started in the American housing market”) and a very clear 
restatement of the old narrative themes. Most prominently, Brown reached for 
his globalisation rhetoric to interpret the growing crisis suggesting that “people 
will probably look back to say that this is the first truly global financial crisis of 
this new era of globalisation”. As in previous speeches, Brown’s major concern 
was that a protectionist response to market turbulence might undermine public 
tolerance of globalisation, and that governments should be leading their citizens 
to greater understanding of its benefits: 
“This is a testing time for all of us who believe in an open and 
flexible globalisation…  
… I see that there is a reaction building up: popular fears in 
America especially but across Europe too; people’s fears that 
they are not in fact the winners of globalisation but losers… that 
even when they are benefiting from low inflation and lower 
interest rates and cheaper consumer goods they are instead the 
victims not beneficiaries… 
… We have to be aggressive advocates together of free trade, 
openness, flexibility and an inclusive globalisation. We should 
start - businesses and governments together - by showing 
people that the rise of Asia - and the wider changes brought by 
globalisation – need not be a zero-sum game.”  
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The other narrative themes were also restated in this speech, from the 
argument that “an internationally competitive global Britain will maintain and 
enhance its flexibility through deregulation and competitive taxation” to a 
familiar pledge of “monetary and fiscal stability first and always”. It is clear that 
for Brown, any sense of economic challenge had done nothing to disrupt a 
narrative in which policy was already doing all the right things, and the main 
risks to prosperity came from “an anxious workforce and an uncertain people”, 
not from the things they were becoming anxious about. 
If Brown’s speeches to business were mainly focused on global 
competitiveness, the message for the British public was that they should take 
confidence from Labour’s record. Interviewed on live television in May 2008, 
after a poor set of local election results, Brown continued to pursue the ‘British 
resilience’ angle, saying the government was determined to “[show] people we 
can come through as we have in the past, very difficult economic times” (No.10 
Downing Street, 2008). The message was that these were global challenges, 
exogenous to Britain and affecting all nations, but that the government was 
confident they would be overcome. However the challenges to this narrative 
were becoming more direct; in the same interview Brown was asked explicitly 
whether the building crisis was the product of policy failures by the Labour 
government. His response was predictably defiant: 
Interviewer: 
 
A lot of people would say actually what’s happened over the last ten 
years is we’ve had a huge boom on the back of vastly inflated housing 
prices, and unsustainable personal borrowing, and as Chancellor you 
never tried to stop that happening. You went along for the ride and you 
didn’t warn people. And that’s what’s gone wrong now. 
 
Gordon 
Brown: 
 
It’s quite the opposite. We’ve had low inflation over the last ten years 
that has given us low interest rates and high levels of growth in the 
economy. And it’s because we took the difficult decisions to tackle the 
inflation problem in the British economy, the inflation problem that was 
bequeathed to us by our predecessors, that we have been able to grow 
and create three million jobs in the British economy over these last 11 
years. Now, we can have a debate about the economy. The issue at the 
moment of course is to come through these difficult times… 
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Later in the same interview, Brown was asked what he had learned about himself 
from this difficult week. The response: “that you’ve got to be resilient in the face 
of difficulties” (ibid). That is, the lesson was the same one Darling had expressed 
in the Budget two months earlier, and indeed the same conclusion Brown had 
been drawing from every challenge since 1997: that the right response to 
uncertainty was always to reject any change of course.   
 However there was, in this period, some work going on behind the scenes 
to prepare for the possibility the crisis would be worse than expected and, 
especially, that more banks might fail. Treasury officials responded to the 
Northern Rock episode by working up a “contingency plan for the possibility that 
actually Northern Rock was not just some random event… we’d have been 
completely mad not to have been thinking about [that]” (Interview A). Under 
Brown’s leadership, none of this could be discussed publicly, for fear of 
undermining public or business confidence, but this put the government in a 
position of seeming increasingly out of touch with reality: faced with a choice 
between appearing responsive to events, and projecting unwavering confidence, 
Labour consistently chose the latter. Alistair Darling, however, was less and less 
willing to hold the line, believing that perceived unrealism was becoming 
damaging to the government’s credibility. External validity and internal 
consistency – with the past narrative and between spokespeople – were 
increasingly pulling apart. The rupture came in August 2008, when Darling told a 
reporter from the Guardian that the economic conditions were now “arguably 
the worst they’ve been in 60 years. And I think it’s going to be more profound 
and long-lasting than people thought” (Aitkenhead, 2008). The interview 
provoked a furious reaction from Brown’s people, who saw the Chancellor’s 
intervention as reckless and a threat to confidence (see Darling, 2011: 105). The 
Chancellor, meanwhile, argued he was simply being realistic, and that to be 
otherwise would itself undermine the public’s faith in his economic judgment.  
There are two possible interpretations of this episode. In one analysis, the 
Guardian interview appears to have been the point at which the fissures in 
Labour’s coordinative discourse emerged into their communicative discourse, 
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suggesting some disagreements of substance that could no longer be contained. 
Alternatively, it is plausible that this was only a disagreement about press 
strategy, not about the economy itself. The evidence from those close to the 
dispute is mixed. Darling’s team acknowledge that the Chancellor’s intervention 
was an abrupt break with the old stability narrative, but argue that this reflected 
how the Treasury’s thinking had moved on through mid-2008: 
“in summer 2008… it was clear we were going to go into a 
recession… so it was a case of trying to incrementally move 
away from the bullish economic narrative that we'd had. And I 
just don't think you could do that in a way, so it turned out that 
the ‘60 years’ was the shock therapy that moved it on quicker 
than people expected.” (Interview G) 
Similarly, Darling’s own account of the episode suggests that the Prime Minister’s 
objections to the “worst in 60 years” formulation were rooted in Brown’s 
unwillingness to accept this new, pessimistic outlook; that is, in a disagreement 
of substance about the likely path of the crisis: 
 “[Gordon] said that the people he was speaking to were telling 
him the recession would be over in six months. I replied that 
that was not what I was hearing.” (Darling 2011: 106) 
Brown’s team at No.10 were, according to Darling, building their economic 
strategy on the basis of a short and shallow recession, whereas Darling’s 
Treasury was, he claims, increasingly convinced that the downturn would be 
longer and deeper than initially presumed.  
Brown’s people, on the other hand, argue that Brown was perfectly seized 
of the problem but was concerned to protect confidence, believing that 
whatever the government’s private assessment of the economy, it should never 
be caught talking Britain’s prospects down: 
“[Brown’s position was that] “you’ve always got to be incredibly 
disciplined in what you say because you can move markets”… 
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[that’s why] he operated his own self-denying ordinance, but 
also why he was quite brutal in the discipline he enforced on his 
minsters, about what they could and couldn’t say, and whether 
they were even allowed to talk about the state of the economy 
more broadly.” (Interview E) 
That is, Brown allies indicate that the disagreement was mostly about 
presentation, though they do not go so far as saying Brown agreed with Darling 
and the Treasury’s dismal view of the coming downturn. Gordon Brown’s recent 
autobiography revises the account still further, suggesting that he agreed at the 
time that Darling was “absolutely right” about the seriousness of the slowdown, 
though perhaps not right to suggest it was a British rather than an international 
slowdown (Brown, 2017: 305) 
 On balance, the suggestion that the rift between Brown and Darling in 
summer 2008 was purely about messaging is not very plausible. Brown certainly 
would not have chosen to make a public comparison with the 1930s but, that 
having been done, he could have chosen to back his Chancellor, confirm that the 
Treasury was preparing for the possibility of a serious downturn, and so ensure 
that the government was at least presenting a united front. Instead his poorly-
concealed anger at the Guardian interview compounded economic pessimism 
with cabinet division, giving the markets even more reason to be concerned. 
Brown’s defensive reaction fits more convincingly with the account given by 
Darling’s people, in which Brown was presented with alternative readings of the 
economy and chose to cling to the possibility that the more optimistic forecasts 
were correct. Brown and Darling were not only presenting the economy 
differently, they were interpreting it differently against a backdrop of heightened 
uncertainty. Moreover, the direction of their disagreement was not surprising 
when one considers the power of ideas: Brown, being more deeply wedded to 
the prior narrative than Darling, was also the most committed to finding 
confirmatory evidence for it, and less willing to countenance the reality of a 
serious problem.  Put another way: Darling’s adoption of pre-crisis narrative 
themes in his March budget appears to have been an institutionally-driven 
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default position, from which he was later able to detach himself. Brown’s 
attachment to those themes was operating at the level of ideas, and was 
therefore much more tenacious. 
 The dispute between Brown and Darling in August 2008 is therefore 
particularly good evidence for the causal power of narrative. Both men were 
subject to the same electoral and financial interests; both were operating within 
the same institutional framework. They faced the same economic conditions and 
the same uncertainty. Where they differed was in their degree of investment in 
Labour’s stability and prudence narrative. Brown had been instrumental in 
developing Labour’s economic story over the past fifteen years; he was politically 
and cognitively tied to its success. Darling had inherited the narrative as 
something akin to an institutional structure, delivering a Budget built on 
Brownian rhetoric because it represented the default position, rather than out of 
any deep ideational commitment. Darling was therefore more likely to respond 
to uncertain conditions by questioning the narrative; Brown responded to it by 
reactivating the same rhetoric and ideas which had been his antidote to 
uncertainty for a decade. 
 It should be noted that in mid-2008 Darling had not abandoned the prior 
narrative in its entirety. His assessment of the coming recession was a major 
departure from the stability theme in which the post-1997 macroeconomic 
framework would forever guarantee stable non-inflationary growth. But he 
remained committed to the other themes, particularly on globalisation and 
financial services. For example, Darling’s Mansion House speech in the summer 
of 2008 could have been written for Brown, setting out the usual paeans to 
globalisation as opportunity: 
“The forces of globalisation are becoming ever stronger. They 
bring both opportunities and challenges. We must never be 
complacent. But we should also be confident.” (MH08) 
On stability, however, Darling had made a critical break with a central tenet of 
the established causal story. His willingness to admit that the boom might be 
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over was a step outside the bounds of the macroeconomic narrative, in which 
neither boom nor bust should have returned; it was problematic for Brown 
because it called into doubt Labour’s account of the recent past as well as the 
future. 
The disagreements of August 2008 represent a crucial turning point in the 
relationship between external and internal validity in Labour’s economic 
narrative. Until now, external validity challenges had been absorbed into the 
narrative via the prioritisation of internal consistency. By holding to its habitual 
lines, the Labour government had always been able to wait for the external data 
to recover sufficiently that it could be interpreted in line with the narrative. That 
being the case, the very act of holding steady could then be held up as a 
successful policy choice. In the reinforcement phase, Labour’s dogged 
maintenance of internal validity was believed to have been the key to seeing 
Britain through difficult times, maintaining confidence during periods of 
uncertainty and then contributing to a sense of material vindication afterwards. 
In this ‘fake it and you make it’ approach to economic uncertainty, the actual size 
or shape of the external validity problems had become second order questions; 
what was going on in the economy was somehow less important than what was 
going on with the government’s ability to project confidence. Brown’s response 
to the 2008 downturn was an attempt to make the same rhetorical manoeuvre 
yet again, but he found himself blocked from doing so because the public 
differences between Chancellor and Prime Minister meant that internal validity, 
at least in the crucial stability theme, had broken down. The reinforcement 
phase had reached its limit, and a new validity tradeoff would be required. 
 
September 2008: Banking crisis provides the turning point 
The breakdown of internal validity in August 2008 came about because Brown 
and Darling responded differently to heightened economic uncertainty. In 
September, that uncertainty would be drastically reduced, as a full-blown 
banking crisis sent markets into turmoil but finally removed any doubt that the 
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long boom was over. The collapse of US investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 
September 2008 is now widely considered the defining event of the financial 
crisis, representing both the largest banking failure of the period and the one 
with the greatest potential to destabilise the wider financial system. Lehman’s 
ultimate collapse had been triggered not just by losses in its trading books but by 
a series of collateral calls from JP Morgan who, concerned about Lehman’s 
liquidity, required the immediate repayment of billions of dollars. Unable to 
meet those demands and unable to raise private capital elsewhere, Lehman’s 
liquidity problem became real and the bank went into administration. 
Uncertainty in mid-September centred on how many other banks might be 
similarly vulnerable; with market confidence failing and liquidity drying up, the 
contagion risk was enormous.  
But if financial market uncertainty had reached its zenith, political 
uncertainty about the existence of a serious problem had finally fallen away. As 
one Treasury official recalled: “the whole system seized up in early October 
[2008] and at that point it was clear that we were just in a totally different world. 
That we were heading for a serious downturn, a serious increase in the deficit” 
(Interview B). Whereas past EV challenges could be glossed over within Labour’s 
existing causal story, this one was undeniable: for a narrative based on economic 
stability, fiscal responsibility, positive globalisation and the merits of an open, 
self-regulated banking sector, the external validity problem posed by a global 
banking crisis could hardly have been more serious or self-evident. The financial 
market meltdown contradicted every theme in Gordon Brown’s causal story, 
suddenly and on a dramatic scale.  
The existence of a crisis was no longer a matter of debate, but it still 
remained to construct a causal story that could explain why the crisis was 
happening and what government should do about it. As we have seen, 
September 2008 did prove a rhetorical turning point, being the moment at which 
the government finally permitted itself to acknowledge the economic conditions 
constituted a “crisis” rather than just “turbulence” or “difficult times”. On one 
level, this is exactly what we would expect to happen, since the external validity 
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problem was now large enough to be incontrovertible. Events had left the old 
narrative clearly exposed, making this the obvious time for a rethink. But had this 
finally provoked the kind of ideational change that could repair the external 
validity of the narrative, even if it meant further sacrificing internal validity in 
order to make the change? Was acknowledgement of crisis the same as 
acknowledgement of the invalidity of previous thinking? Was this finally a shock 
big enough to challenge, and change, the big ideas of the great moderation 
period? 
As this section will show, there is evidence of rhetorical change, and indeed 
very significant policy change, in late-2008. Naming the crisis was the first step, 
and a sign that the government was finally starting to adapt. And of course, 
alongside these rhetorical concessions, new policies were being swiftly adopted, 
from measures to restrict short selling in financial markets, to a £25 billion bank 
recapitalisation scheme15 based on direct government investment in financial 
institutions, and a £250bn guarantee facility to underwrite banks’ medium-term 
debt refinancing. Each of these was a radical move that would have been 
considered dangerously interventionist only weeks earlier, and the speed with 
which they were announced put the UK out in front of the international 
community. Economist Paul Krugman (2008) complimented the UK government 
at the time for its “clarity and decisiveness” and even suggested that the UK 
government was proving less ideologically constrained than their American 
counterparts. The US Treasury, in Krugman’s assessment, continued to hold 
fundamental beliefs about the sanctity of private enterprise that were making it 
“hard to face up to the need for partial government ownership of the financial 
sector”, whereas Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling were now prepared to think, 
and then swiftly implement, the unthinkable. The UK government’s proactivity is 
particularly striking when compared with the extended period of foot-dragging 
before the nationalisation of Northern Rock, suggesting that if the old narrative 
                                                        
15 £25bn was the initial estimate of how much would be needed across 8 
banks – in fact £37bn was put into RBS and Lloyds/HBOS combined, just a 
week later 
 219 
had been constraining policy in 2007, it retained no such power in 2008. Had the 
narrative prison finally been escaped? 
  I suggest it is not quite that simple. In fact, closer analysis of Brown and 
Darling’s speeches in this period reveal a surprising degree of narrative 
continuity, even alongside quite radical policy change. There is evidence of an 
attempt to reset the causal story, but also of a simultaneous unwillingness to 
rethink it, leading to a bizarre situation in which the government could make 
policy that bore no relation to its old assumptions without ever admitting those 
assumptions had been wrong, much less that policy had played a part in creating 
the crisis. Indeed, Labour’s attempts to segue into a new causal story while 
denying any failure in the old one, are in fact highly revealing of how tenacious 
economic ideas and narratives can be, even under conditions of severe shock. 
The 2008 Labour Party conference took place just one week after the Lehman 
collapse (though before the announcement of the banking bailout package), 
making it the first important opportunity for Labour to narrate the crisis in set-
piece speeches and to explain why policymakers were doing what they were 
doing. Brown’s approach, in his Leader’s speech to the party conference, is worth 
quoting at length because it illustrates how the Prime Minister was, at that 
moment, suspended between the competing claims of continuity and change. He 
said: 
“Because this is a time of greater than ever change around us, it 
must be a time of higher ambition from us. And because the 
world of 2008 is now so different from the world of 1997 I want 
to talk about the new settlement we must build for these new 
times…  
…The collapse of banks, the credit crunch, the trebling of oil 
prices, the speed of technology, and the rise of Asia - nobody 
now can be in any doubt that we are in a different world and it's 
now a global age. 
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In truth, we haven't seen anything this big since the industrial 
revolution. This last week will be studied by our children as the 
week the world was spun on its axis and old certainties were 
turned on their heads. And in these uncertain times, we must be, 
we will be, the rock of stability and fairness upon which people 
stand.” (CONF08b) 
On the one hand, this excerpted passage describes the economic conditions as 
unequivocally new. Brown’s willingness to acknowledge the largest economic 
transformation “since the industrial revolution” was a significant departure, given 
his disputes with Darling just a month earlier on the “worst in 60 years” 
formulation. The end of the “old certainties” also hints strongly at ideational 
change, though Brown does not specify which certainties he means. Yet at the 
same time, Brown could not resist anchoring his analysis of the crisis in very 
familiar themes. The abrupt onset of “new times” and “different world” is 
attributed not just to short run changes like the banking crisis but, simultaneously, 
to technological change and the “rise of Asia” – that is, to the kinds of things 
Brown had been talking about under the heading of globalisation for many years. 
This rhetorical fusion of sudden crisis with longer running global transformations 
effectively rooted the conditions of September 2008 in the existing narrative, 
particularly the globalisation theme. There is therefore a kind of dissonance in 
Brown’s language in September 2008. It is unclear whether he believes the crisis 
should be understood as an economic meteor strike – sudden, novel and totally 
exogenous – or the culmination of a set of processes that had long been 
understood. These are quite different causal stories, and Brown had yet to decide 
which he was pursuing. And in the meantime, Labour would still claim to offer a 
“rock of stability”, as they had since 1997. The external conditions were presented 
as irrevocably changed, but the government was determined to embody 
continuity. 
There is also, in Brown’s conference speech, a rather brazen attempt to fit 
the crisis into a third-way framing that leaves Labour on the centre ground: 
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“just as those who supported the dogma of big government 
were proved wrong, so too those who argue for the dogma of 
unbridled free market forces have been proved wrong” (ibid.) 
This rhetorical swerve at once acknowledged the failure of market liberalism 
while refusing to acknowledge that New Labour were ever its proponents. Both 
the crisis and the errors it exposed were held at arms length. The coming policy 
changes could then be undertaken as if Labour had always been ready and waiting 
to make them: 
“And so it falls to this party and to this government, with its 
commitment both to fairness and to business, to propose and 
deliver what after recent events everyone should now be willing 
to accept - that we do all it takes to stabilise the still turbulent 
financial markets and then in the months ahead we rebuild the 
world financial system around clear principles. And friends the 
work begins tomorrow.” (ibid) 
The focus, in this rhetoric, is relentlessly forward-looking – it reads like a speech 
by a new government on its first day in office. There is no analysis of how the 
crisis might have come about, or who was to blame for the wholesale 
malfunction of the financial system. There is only a government poised to help, 
based on its unique ability to reconcile private profit with social justice. In other 
words, a very large change of policy is framed as being entirely consistent with 
New Labour’s values and yet, somehow, nothing to do with its record. 
Alistair Darling’s speech at the same party conference is equally striking as 
an example of rhetorical continuity around new policies. Much of the content 
was a straightforward restatement of familiar lines, as in the assertion that “the 
global economy brings not only threats but opportunities and we should be 
confident we can seize them”, the promise to “make sure that inflation does not 
become entrenched here” and the insistence that “we’ve taken the right long 
term decisions for our country” and that “the British economy has been a real 
success story in recent years” (CONF08a). But there was also a new defence of 
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interventionism, as in the deceptively radical statement that “we believe there 
is a role for government” (ibid). In particular, Darling signalled a new role for 
government in righting the financial system, including by “giving new powers to 
the regulators”. The Northern Rock rescue was held up as a policy success, and 
other interventions including the ban on short-selling and the government-
brokered merger of Lloyds TSB and HBOS were also defended.  
This new argument for government activism would make sense as part of 
an overtly new causal story in which there were new policies to be justified. But 
Darling went further, by suggesting that Labour had always been comfortable 
with interventionism and that their crisis response was therefore a continuation 
of existing principles, not a change. He implied this through a subtle reframing 
of the policy narrative that used very familiar language but reinterpreted 
Labour’s record in ways that are not in fact consistent with the logic of the pre-
2007 causal story: 
“Britain is in much better shape now than in the past to weather 
these global storms.  Our economy is strong, we have 
historically low levels of inflation and high levels of 
employment; achievements which owe a great deal to this 
party’s vision and to its values.  These values of fairness, of 
partnership, of belief in the role of government which is more 
important than ever after the events of the last few months.” 
(ibid.) 
Darling’s speech tried to present Gordon Brown’s record as having been built not 
on the constraint and containment of government’s destabilising influence, but on 
the positive vision of government intervention that he was now expounding. 
Whereas Brown’s speech had skirted around the problem of Labour’s record in 
office by speaking only about the immediate present and the future, Darling’s 
rhetoric attempted to revise the government’s account of itself and of the 
previous ten years.  
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This revisionist history of New Labour would be further developed on 29th 
September in Darling’s keynote Mais Lecture at City University in London 
(MAIS08). The Chancellor was using the lecture as an opportunity to signal 
another policy change, trailing the relaxation of Gordon Brown’s fiscal rules in 
anticipation of the crisis’ impact on the public finances. Clearly this was a 
significant policy change in its substance, given the symbolic importance of the 
fiscal rules to Labour’s economic story until that point. The Mais lecture gave 
the first signs that Darling’s fiscal policy would embrace a version of Keynesian 
demand stimulus, on the basis that “when private activity slows, it is even more 
important to maintain wider public spending… To increase borrowing in a 
downturn is sensible” (ibid). Compared with Brown’s prudence rhetoric, in 
which fiscal purpose was always subordinate to monetary stability, this was a 
major reversal.  
However, once again rhetoric was deployed to soften the blow. While Darling 
made clear that the fiscal rules would no longer constrain policy in the same way 
because “to apply these rules rigidly in today’s changed conditions would be 
perverse” he insisted that a degree of flexibility had always been built in, for use 
in exceptional circumstances. This would have come as news to anyone familiar 
with Gordon Brown’s repeated insistences that there would be no relaxation of 
fiscal prudence, but nonetheless that was now the chosen framing. Darling made 
the case that “constrained discretion… means combining credibility with 
flexibility”, and that the fiscal framework had always been designed to operate 
that way. On a technicality, this is true: the Balls and O’Donnell book had indeed 
left room for the theoretical possibility that a government which had established 
its credentials as fiscally prudent would have some room for manoeuvre in an 
emergency (2002: 37). But to highlight this point now promoted a theoretical 
footnote to the status of a philosophy. The original causal story had always had a 
totally different emphasis, and its exposition of the concept of constrained 
discretion had always placed the emphasis very strongly on constraint. Darling 
sought to switch the emphasis to discretion, and so present a large policy change 
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as if it were continuity. Darling even suggested that counter-cyclical spending has 
always been the government’s policy – the purpose in the prudence: 
“Because we acted to cut debt and live within our means, we 
were allowed the flexibility to support the economy. This is how 
extra borrowing cushioned past slowdowns – in 2000 when the 
internet bubble burst and in 2005 when the housing market 
slowed.” (MAIS08) 
This is again a rewriting of history: Brown’s justification for extra borrowing had 
always been that investment in public services was justifiable so long as 
macrostability had been achieved. Fiscal stimulus in the absence of stability was 
never on the table. Darling was aware, of course, that he was embarking on a new 
trajectory: his Mais lecture made pointed use of the famous Keynes aphorism 
about changing one’s mind when the facts change. Yet even this change of 
direction had, it seems, to be couched in terms of the old rhetoric. This was a new 
causal story attempting to disguise itself as an old one. 
What both Brown and Darling displayed, at this point, was a vestigial concern 
to protect the internal validity of the old causal story, even as both the external 
circumstances and, indeed, their own policies, presented it with overt challenges. 
Brown did so by attempting to straddle continuity and change in his rhetoric, 
insisting that there had been a fundamental rupture in the economic conditions 
that meant the world was now at a rhetorical day zero, but then locating the 
rupture itself in his long-standing globalisation story. The past was another 
country; all that mattered now was the new global era. Darling, on the other hand, 
attempted to connect changing policy with past ideas, but he did so by rewriting 
the old causal story to suggest that the crisis response could be read as continuity 
(albeit in heightened circumstances) rather than change.  
One obvious reading of the confused rhetoric in September and October 2008 
is that Brown and Darling were simply experimenting with different kinds of 
blame-shifting. It is plausible that the events of the banking crisis had wrought 
some ideational change, and that the government now realised certain pre-crisis 
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ideas had failed, but could not admit it publicly for political reasons. The Brown 
approach was therefore simply to avoid the question of why the crisis had 
happened, to ignore the obvious return of boom and bust, and focus attention 
instead on a globalisation story that allowed the crisis to be seen as exogenous – 
to Britain, to his policy framework, and to the pre-crisis story. Radical policy could 
therefore be justified on the basis that the post-Lehman economy existed on an 
entirely different planet to pre-crisis Britain. Just as he had previously adjusted his 
estimate of the economic cycle to accommodate the narrative, Brown’s response 
to crisis was to reset the narrative to a new day zero, erasing external validity 
challenges by putting them outside the timeline for his new causal story.  
Darling, on the other hand, did not entirely ignore the past but sought to draw 
a veil over the failure of the old paradigm. In Darling’s account, the necessity of 
policy change did not prove that the old policy had been wrong; rather he insisted 
these new approaches were provided for, and permissible within, the old policy 
framework. In Darling’s rhetoric, therefore, some considerable effort was made to 
defend the New Labour record even as key parts of it were being abandoned. Was 
this simply a rhetorical fig-leaf for a government confronting its own mistakes? Or 
was it a more substantive kind of ideational hangover? In fact, the next section 
will show that into 2009, there is little evidence of Labour (and especially Gordon 
Brown) having come to terms with the failure of the old paradigm even privately; 
instead they remained profoundly blocked from being able to understand the 
nature of the problem. The resilient ideas of New Labour’s great moderation had 
some distance yet to run. 
 
2009-10: Narrative fragmentation 
Early 2008 had seen the continuation of narrative retrenchment, with the promise 
of Britain’s “resilience” through tough times as a variation on familiar themes. 
September and October had been a period of narrative disruption, as both Brown 
and Darling reacted to the banking crisis with an uneasy combination of continuity 
and change that left both internal and external validity in disarray. As 2009 
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approached, it was becoming clear that the old lines were not going to work. As 
one official recalled: 
“[It] became clear through early 2009 that no, it wasn't going to 
be the case that Britain was going to be resilient. The fact is, we 
had a bigger financial sector and we were going to suffer the 
consequences.” (Interview B) 
As such, from 2009 to the end of the Labour government in May 2010 both Brown 
and Darling adopted new stories that did move the narrative away from pre-crisis 
themes in certain respects. However they did so quite differently from one 
another. Brown’s account of the crisis was an extension of his existing narrative of 
globalisation. This meant confronting the great tension in his third way 
economics: the ultimate compatibility of social justice and market freedom. 
Brown’s determination to reconcile these things in his 2009 and 2010 rhetoric 
represents a last-ditch attempt to make the ideational challenge of the crisis fit a 
larger story that would leave New Labour’s political economy intact. By contrast, 
Alistair Darling’s crisis narrative was simpler and less intellectually tortured, 
advancing a narrower causal story about the value of government activism in 
response to economic cycles. Its simplicity was made possible by the 
abandonment of any pretence at consistency with pre-crash narratives, directly 
addressing the return of boom and bust and, in the process, letting the old story 
go.  
 Brown’s post-crash story, which he evolved shortly after Lehman and stuck 
to closely thereafter, was that this was the “first financial crisis of the global age” 
(CFR08), and that the difficulties it presented should not be allowed to undermine 
the long-term benefits of open, free trading economies. This logic was continually 
expounded in Brown’s post-crisis rhetoric, with his November 2008 speech to the 
Council of Foreign Relations in New York providing a particularly full example. In 
that address, Brown told his audience that he continued to be “positive about an 
open, free market, inclusive and sustainable globalisation”, and that the problems 
currently confronting the advanced economies were “problems that were going 
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to have to be solved anyway. But problems [that] if solved, can point to an 
opportunity-rich future”. All the events of the crisis, including governments’ 
proactive policy response could, and in Brown’s argument should, be folded into a 
larger story about the teleology of globalisation: 
“What I see us doing at the moment, and perhaps it is giving a 
longer term perspective to the present troubles we face, is that 
we have got the birth pangs of this new global order. We are 
having to deal with the problems of them. We are in the 
transition to what I believe is a more opportunity-rich economy 
for the future.” (ibid.) 
A near-identical argument had appeared in another speech in earlier that month, 
at the CBI annual conference: 
“Quite simply: we are making the transition from the old world 
of sheltered national economies to the new world of a fully 
open global economy.  
And the challenge is for each of us, in the spheres of influence 
we have, to surmount the risks and insecurities – and manage 
the teething troubles – of this new global age, while not losing 
sight of the vastly increased opportunities it brings.” (CBI08b) 
This is economic long-termism in the extreme; rather than confronting the near-
term reality of recession, Brown asks his audience to pan out so far that the entire 
sweep of economic history becomes visible, and the largest financial crisis in 
several generations is reduced to “teething troubles”.  
This ‘birth of an era’ framing is significant for our understanding of 
Labour’s ideas and narrative in two ways. First, it indicates Brown’s continued 
belief in the ultimate benefits of globalisation, even at a time when global 
markets were in utter turmoil, with private risk being underwritten or absorbed 
by governments around the world. The largest possible external validity challenge 
was once again prompting ideational defiance, at least within the globalisation 
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theme. In this new framing, the crisis was not a repudiation of Labour’s previous 
thinking about globalisation, but an acceleration of the very processes that had 
made them the right ideas in the first place; all that had changed was their 
urgency. The stability theme, meanwhile, was largely dropped, with Brown 
attempting to compartmentalise pre-crisis stability and post-crisis instability as 
having nothing to do with each other.  
Secondly, by making this a crisis of globalisation rather than of banking, or 
of the British growth model, Brown was choosing a very particular way of 
rationalising the policy moves necessary to deal with the implosion of global 
markets. For Brown, simple mitigation of economic pain, or the cleanup of an 
economic disaster, was not a sufficiently satisfying or purposeful reason for 
government to act. Instead, radical policy had to be understood as serving the 
long-term purposes of globalisation, laying the foundations for a more functional 
– and a more generally accepted – global era in the future. Just as the great 
moderation narrative on globalisation had called for political ‘evangelists’ who 
could persuade the public that short-term pain would be to their long-term gain, 
Brown’s “crisis of globalisation” narrative was mostly about explaining to the 
public that all would be well in the long run. Even, or especially, during 
globalisation’s great crisis, the job of political leaders was to emphasise that 
government intervention was never just for its own (or even for the people’s) 
sake, but for the sake of a broader vision of fully integrated global markets. As he 
told the Council for Foreign Relations: 
“We have now; instead of just muddling through dealing with 
this crisis – as people think we are doing at the moment – we 
have got to show people that we are actually making the 
adjustments in the proper way to this global age.” (CFR08) 
If the people could only be brought to understand the long-term vision, their 
short-term pain would apparently become bearable. Just as in the pre-crash 
globalisation story, aggregate gains in the long run had been emphasised; after 
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the crisis short-term pain, and its distribution, were very little discussed. The 
global economy may have imploded, but the ideas had not moved.  
 Interview evidence on this period again suggests that this was not a 
question of institutional drag on the narrative, but a direct reflection of the Prime 
Minister’s thinking: 
“you can talk about officials doing things, this was a case where 
there was some work but they really picked up on it very 
quickly.” (Interview F) 
Brown had made concerted efforts, beginning during the summer of 2008, to 
reflect on and intellectualise the problem. Ultimately though, the ideas he had 
ultimately drawn on to make sense of the crisis were the same ones that had 
guided his economic philosophy all along: the evils of protectionism and the 
importance of leadership as a bulwark against populist backlash. The same official 
described his thinking as historically grounded: 
“he recognised… that the history of the past was that you go 
into a crisis like this, recessions, and the first thing you get is 
protectionism. And in this case we had a very very unusual 
variant of protectionism, which was every domestic banking 
system was drawing back into itself... that was individual 
decisions proving to be a collective disaster.” (ibid) 
There is no doubt that the 2008 liquidity crisis was global, and that the collapse of 
market confidence was prompting a flight of capital to assets perceived as safe or 
familiar. But to call this protectionism is somewhat perverse; this was after all the 
operation of markets rather than policy. For Brown, or the Treasury as an 
institution, to see a systemic banking crisis as problematic mainly because it might 
lead to protectionism speaks volumes about their underlying ideas: even when 
markets were at their most dysfunctional, the ultimate threat was perceived as 
coming from policymakers’ capacity for overreaction. 
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 This is not to say that the crisis had changed nothing for Brown. In fact he 
became increasingly willing to say that “economic orthodoxy” had been upended 
by the disaster, and that ideas once taken for granted had been overturned 
(Brown, 2010a: xix). This ideational challenge was addressed most directly in his 
speech at St Paul’s Cathedral in 2009, on the theme of markets and morality, in 
which he explicitly referenced the seismic impact of the crisis on international 
thinking about markets and their management: 
 “I say to you plainly: this old world of the old Washington 
consensus is over, and what comes in its place is up to us. 
Instead of a global free market threatening to descend into a 
global free-for-all, we must reshape our global economic system 
so that it reflects and respects the values that we celebrate in 
everyday life. For I believe that the unsupervised globalisation of 
our financial markets did not only cross national boundaries; it 
crossed moral boundaries too.” (STPAULS09) 
This was an important moment for Brown’s narrative, since it acknowledged the 
gap between what he had always believed to be the promise of globalisation and 
what, in 2009, it was actually delivering. Was there a way to still believe in the 
positive-sum benefits of open markets in that context? Brown wrestled with this 
question at length: 
“Let me put markets in context. They can create unrivalled 
widening of choices and chances, harnessing self-interest to 
produce results transcending self-interest. When they work, 
they will fulfil the promise of Adam Smith that individual gain 
leads to collective gain, that even when people are pursuing 
private interests and private wishes they can nevertheless 
deliver public good. 
But as we are discovering to our considerable cost, the problem 
is that, without transparent rules to guide them, free markets 
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can reduce all relationships to transactions, all motivations to 
self-interest… 
And we can now see also that markets cannot self-regulate, but 
they can self-destruct and, again, if untrammelled and unbridled, 
they can become not just the enemy of the good society; they 
can become the enemy of the good economy. Markets are in 
the public interest but they are not synonymous with it.”  
The St Paul’s speech is almost a case study in cognitive dissonance; markets are 
vehicles for turning self-interest into common benefit; yet markets mistakenly 
promote self-interest above all else. Individual gains should, in principle, sum up 
to a still greater collective gain, yet in practice markets malfunction and inflict 
common detriment. How are these things to be reconciled? Brown’s answer was 
that “markets need morals” – that the challenge of the coming years would be to 
design an international regulatory framework that mandated and oversaw honest 
trade. There was little in Brown’s speech to suggest how this might be done, but 
the implication was that markets must somehow be both entirely open and 
effectively governed. The profit motive was no longer trusted to be a sufficient 
safeguard against malfeasance and irrationality; only some kind of global 
oversight would finally harness the positive potential of markets. In which case, 
what kind of market is left? 
In the end, this new causal story could only collapse under the weight of 
its own contradictions. In policy terms, Brown was left more or less where he 
began: though international cooperation remained incomplete at best, it was still 
necessary to “avoid the mistakes of the 1930s and not descend into protectionism” 
(ibid). Since the world was still just beginning its transition to the opportunity-rich 
future, policy to protect citizens from globalisation should still be subordinated to 
the long-term protection of globalisation from the polity. It seems that Brown was 
able to embrace the idea of intellectual change: even in 2008 he was arguing that 
“If we have learnt anything in these last tumultuous and unprecedented months, 
it is that this is not the time to become prisoners of the old dogmas of the past” 
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(CBI08b), and in his 2010 book he would argue that “if [the crisis] is to end with a 
full recovery, we need to learn quickly the lessons of what went so wrong that the 
global financial system froze, and we need to come to a firm and shared view 
regarding what we can do to make things right.” (Brown, 2010a: vii). But talking 
about change is not the same as making it, and the evidence of Brown’s post-crisis 
narrative is that the lessons he drew were, in the end, fundamentally bounded by 
the intellectual parameters of his pre-crisis narrative.  
As we have seen, Gordon Brown’s narration of the crisis was relentlessly 
global in scope and as such it played particularly well to an international audience. 
Domestically, the Prime Minister continued to struggle to communicate with 
either public or press, for whom his ambitious globalism was failing to resonate. 
Darling, by contrast, moved on from his poorly-received 2008 budget by 
developing a more domestically-oriented narrative, within fairly modest 
boundaries. Darling’s alternative story was simply that Britain was in recession, 
but would recover, provided government policy was supportive. Specifically, this 
meant keeping the fiscal taps turned on through the downturn, in the interests of 
counter-cyclical stimulus (or at least the avoidance of pro-cyclical austerity), 
ensuring that monetary loosening was backed up by fiscal flexibility.  
 The vocabulary of this narrative was quite distinct to Darling. Within the 
speeches in the crisis corpus, there are 99 references to recovery, of which 78 are 
from speeches by Darling, and 21 from speeches by Brown. Of the 104 references 
to recovery, 90 are by Darling. And the story emerging from those coded 
segments was a simple one: that government could and should be a proactive 
agent of the recovery: 
 “I want to set out the additional help we will give to people and 
businesses to get through the recession – and build towards 
recovery.” (BUD09) 
“As long as we continue to support the economy, recovery will 
be underway in the UK by the turn of the year.” (CONF09a)  
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“Governments have the ability to act – and I believe the 
responsibility – to reduce the length and severity of the 
recession.” (BUD10) 
Later in 2009, as the battle lines for the 2010 election became clear, Darling 
adjusted his language slightly to signal that deficit reduction would become a 
priority in the medium term, but continued to argue forcefully against premature 
fiscal tightening: 
“Just as we’ve had a clear plan for dealing with the recession, 
we are now putting in place a clear plan for the recovery.” 
(MH09) 
“The choices we make over the next year will be crucial in 
deciding whether we can foster the recovery and benefit from 
the global upturn.” (REUT09) 
Compared with Brown’s “crisis of globalisation” this is a far simpler 
framing, based on the rhetorical juxtaposition of recession and recovery. But 
more importantly, this framing represented a decisive break with the old stability 
narrative, since by focusing on preparing for the next upturn it essentially 
resurrected the notion of the boom-bust cycle, acknowledging the bust in order to 
hold out the promise of the next boom. This framing also abandoned great 
moderation axioms about the importance of constrained government. Whereas 
the old stability narrative had claimed that if government were prevented from 
behaving irresponsibly the business cycle would be eliminated, this new story had 
activist government seeking to mitigate the reality of the business cycle, devising 
policy to capture the benefits of the eventual boom. The boom-bust cycle was not 
only back, it was understood to be the central fact around which economic policy 
must revolve. Content analysis earlier in the chapter showed that the rhetoric of 
stability had peaked in Darling’s speeches in 2008, before dropping away in 2009. 
This qualitative account shows that he did not just stop talking about stability, but 
had substantively dropped some of the key ideas behind that part of Labour’s 
causal story. There had been both rhetorical change and an ideational one, 
 234 
because where Brown’s post-crisis rhetoric had de-emphasised the stability story 
in favour of globalisation, Darling’s actively contradicted it. 
The other area of change indicated by frequency counts from content 
analysis was on regulation, where there was a noticeable change of emphasis 
from competitiveness to financial stability (Fig. 6.10). Darling’s speeches are 
relatively open about pointing the finger at the banking industry, arguing that 
“the central lesson of the past two years is that too many people simply failed to 
understand the impact of globalisation and innovation in financial markets” 
(MH09). An official put it more bluntly:  
“we hadn’t been monitoring, at all, or regulating well, what the 
banks were doing. And we all just assumed the banks knew 
what they were doing. And we were completely wrong.” 
(Interview F) 
Darling’s speeches could not go that far, but by 2009 they did come fairly close to 
an admission of regulatory failure: 
“just as the banks need to learn the lessons, governments and 
regulators do too. No one model of regulation has been 
successful in insulating a country from the current crisis – and 
we are not alone in strengthening regulation.” (MH09) 
This willingness to strengthen regulatory frameworks was a substantive change 
from Brown’s position in 2007-08 that Britain already had a world-leading 
regulatory framework, and would resist all European attempts to move it beyond 
its ‘light touch’ approach. In 2007 Darling had repeated Brownian lines to take by 
pledging to “argue against restrictions and unnecessary regulation which damage 
our competitiveness and which are holding back growth in the European 
economy”. By 2010 he had not only become convinced of the need for stronger 
financial regulation but had incorporated that new thinking into his wider causal 
story about the merits of proactive government, arguing that “the role of 
government is now equally critical in regulating the global financial system” 
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(BUD10). By diverging from the underlying assumptions in the stability theme 
Darling also found himself able to justify broader policy changes with little cost to 
the overarching story. Policy and rhetoric were thus much better aligned in 
Darling’s revised narrative than in Brown’s selective reliance on the old one. 
 The distinction between internal and external validity is once again helpful 
in distinguishing how, and why, Brown and Darling’s narration of the crisis 
diverged as it did. Brown’s convoluted attempts to take third-way lessons from 
the ‘first crisis of globalisation’ were, in the end, another attempt to salvage the 
internal validity of his longstanding narrative. While full consistency with the old 
story was impossible, particularly in respect of boom and bust or financial 
regulation, Brown was determined to show that New Labour’s pro-globalisation 
political economy had always been based on the right fundamentals, and that the 
crisis had, if anything, shown them to be ahead of their time. The failure of 
financial markets had come about not because global markets were inherently 
unstable, but because Britain had not yet persuaded the rest of the world to join 
them in regulatory cooperation on a Bretton Woods scale of ambition. But this 
failure should not invalidate the goal of a fully open, globalised economic system. 
Viewed in this way New Labour’s globalist political economy was not broken, only 
unrealised. 
 Darling, on the other hand, had made a clear choice in favour of repairing 
the perceived external validity of his narrative by choosing a rhetorical strategy 
much more closely fitted to the external conditions, and largely giving up the 
attempt to defend Labour’s past record. His arguments for active, interventionist 
fiscal policy, and his overt nods to Keynes, were a conscious step away from the 
great moderation narrative in which government succeeded mostly by tying its 
own hands. Darling’s horizon was nearer than Brown’s; his language was mostly 
geared to the 2010 general election, not to the verdict of history. But more 
importantly, his validity trade-off was the opposite of Brown’s: external fit over 
internal consistency. The concluding section of this chapter asks why, in these 
latter phases, Brown and Darling’s validity trade-offs looked so different. 
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Explaining narrative fragmentation: ideas over institutions and interests 
Brown’s high-minded globalism was an attempt at reestablishing an 
internally-logical account of the crisis that could, if viewed through a sufficiently 
long lens, also be seen as consistent with the essentials of his pre-crisis narrative. 
If his story about opportunity-rich globalisation did not yet seem to fit the 
external conditions, that could itself be worked into the causal story – it was in 
the nature of the transition to full globalisation that things would have to get 
worse before they got better. The sunlit uplands of global prosperity would 
eventually be attained, at which point external validity would be proven again; in 
the meantime, the internal logic of the story was enough to get by on. Darling, by 
contrast, abandoned any attempt to preserve the old narrative, returning to a 
more conventional theory of government’s role in the management of boom and 
bust. That is, he prioritised external over internal validity, advancing a new story 
about recession and recovery that addressed itself to the external context in the 
immediate term. This last phase can be characterised as narrative fragmentation, 
with different actors making different trade-offs between internal and external 
validity. Hoever that very fragmentation ensured that neither kind of validity 
could be convincingly asserted. 
In Chapter 6 it was suggested that New Labour’s political economy was, 
ultimately, a denialist kind of neoliberalism; one which adopted broadly neoliberal 
assumptions, mobilised mostly neoliberal policy, and yet insisted on its own good 
faith as something other than neoliberal. This last dimension is often missed in 
accounts that seek to separate the substantive truth of Labour’s political economy 
from their rhetoric. My account of Labour’s crisis shows that, in fact, Labour’s 
attachment to a particular third-way account of themselves is the critical 
dimension to understanding the limits of their ability to change, even when faced 
with disaster. Let us return for a moment to Craig Berry’s verdict that Labour had 
operated neoliberal policy agendas without fully embracing a neoliberal ontology. 
I agree that there is something unsatisfactory in proclaiming New Labour to have 
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been out-and-out neoliberals – there was plenty in their policy mix, and especially 
in their account of their political purpose, to suggest they were not comfortable 
with, and did not see themselves as being, pure free-marketeers. The whole point 
of the third way was that it rejected both laissez-faire and old-fashioned 
command and control in economic policy. It was supposed to have found a viable 
middle way, taking the best of both worlds and escaping the worst. However the 
account of Labour’s crisis laid out in this chapter reveals that in fact Labour were 
far more wedded to a neoliberal ontology than Gordon Brown was prepared to 
admit, publicly or indeed privately.  
Far from being neoliberal in policy but social democratic in ontology, 
Labour, and especially Brown, proved capable of altering the policy mix but deeply 
resistant to ontological reversals. They could get comfortable with the necessity 
of some drastically leftwing policy moves, from nationalisation of banks to short-
selling bans to quantitative easing and neo-Keynesian demand stimulus. But they 
continued to try to fit those policies into an explanatory framework that made 
globalisation an opportunity not a threat, that regulated for the good of global 
markets rather than for the good of citizens, and that continued to equate growth 
with stability over the (very) long run. Sacrifices could be made on policy, but the 
overarching project of globalisation had to go on. In the post-crisis period this was 
prefixed as “inclusive” or “sustainable” globalisation, to signal some distinction 
between good globalisation and pure unfettered capitalism. But in practice this 
inclusivity was still aimed mainly at developing economies, not at the domestic 
inequality that had burgeoned in New Labour’s global era. The thrust of the 
argument remained defiantly pro-globalisation while more challenging questions 
about the social distribution of market output and risk, let alone the possibility of 
inherent instability in capitalist systems, were not addressed. 
 Why this ontological stubbornness? The evidence of the chapter is not that 
interests or institutions blocked the way; if they had, surely policy would have 
been likewise constrained. Powerful interest groups are generally more 
concerned with what governments do, than with what they think and say. The rise 
of populism in the last several years shows clearly that powerful lobby seek above 
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all to influence policy, and are generally content to leave politicians to deploy 
whatever rhetoric might please the public in the meantime, however provocative. 
Pandering to the anti-globalisation masses in rhetoric is fine, so long as you 
remain favourable to business in the actual implementation of policy. New Labour 
did the opposite, implementing relatively leftwing economic policies in the public 
interest, while using language that sought to downplay their radicalism, soothe 
business, and continue selling globalisation to the public.  
Institutional continuity is a somewhat more plausible explanation of 
Labour’s ontological non-change, since institutions are important repositories of 
intellectual frameworks. But institutions are not just academic observers; they are 
active participants in policymaking, and repositories not just of ideas but of 
practice. In this period the practice changed rapidly; key institutions of British 
economic policymaking including the Treasury and Bank of England were placed 
on a war footing, conceiving and implementing rapid and significant change. 
These institutions proved remarkably willing to seize the opportunity to lead a 
period of policy innovation, even at the cost of supposed orthodoxies like the 
fabled “Treasury view”. Officials interviewed for this research mostly presented 
this as a matter of pragmatism, suggesting that they had simply grasped the scale 
of the problem and therefore embraced radical solutions, sometimes before their 
political masters had got there. This may be a somewhat self-serving account, 
conveniently downplaying the reputational advantage to be gained from being a 
first-mover in a period of international policy change. The same institutional 
interests that are served by continuity in normal times may be served by 
embracing change to build new empires during periods of crisis. In any case, 
conventional assumptions about institutional conservatism do not fit the 
empirical reality of what Britain’s institutions were doing between 2007 and 2010, 
and as such they are insufficient to explain Labour’s ontological non-change. 
Ideas, on the other hand, go to the part of New Labour’s crisis that 
remained change-resistant to the end. The ontology of the third way was the last 
thing to go, if indeed it went at all. I suggest that the ultimate stickiness of 
Labour’s core political economy was driven by one of the most important ideas of 
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all: New Labour’s idea of itself. Policy could be changed in the name of changing 
circumstances, and indeed it was. But to explicitly reject a neoliberal ideology as 
disproven by the crisis would, by definition, have meant admitting that ideology 
was there in the first place. Labour’s neoliberalism was always in denial about 
itself; to confront its failure would have been to acknowledge its existence, and to 
admit to the vacuity of third way positioning. This would have implied a deep 
rethinking of not just policy – which can be done at an intellectual remove – but 
of self. It would have upended Labour’s causal story in the most fundamental way, 
by revealing that what they had been doing all along was something different 
than had been claimed. Their ontological non-change in the wake of crisis offers 
powerful evidence that ideas and narrative come, over time, to exert a cognitive 
grip on political narrators that goes well beyond rational calculus or institutional 
defaults. Gordon Brown, who had been more deeply attached to the construction 
and maintenance of the great moderation narrative than Darling, was 
consequently more trapped by it after crisis. The concluding chapter will unpack 
this social psychological dimension in more detail. 
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8.  Conclusions 
Ideas, confirmation bias and the resilience of fragile 
narratives16  
 
This concluding chapter pulls together the theoretical and empirical dimensions 
of this research, asserting a new understanding of economic policy narratives 
and their relationship to change and continuity. First, it recapitulates the findings 
of the case study, setting out a typology of the life-cycle of an economic policy 
narrative, structured around the distinction between internal and external 
validity. This suggests that over most of the life cycle, internal validity is 
prioritised over external validity, to the extent that the internal logics of the 
narrative itself become barriers to both policy change and ideational renewal. 
Second, some reflections are offered on possible boundary conditions for these 
findings and their claims to generalisability. Third, the chapter discusses possible 
future research directions building on this work, on two fronts. The first is a 
discussion of the inherent fragility of economic policy narratives, based on an 
analogy with quantitative modeling in financial markets. It is argued that we 
need to develop a constructivist understanding of how this fragility interacts with 
the life cycle of narrative to create the surprising resilience of economic policy 
paradigms. Second, the chapter discusses the scope for a new social psychology 
of political narrative, which would explore the cognitive mechanisms at work in 
the life-cycle of economic constructions. This implies rethinking the rationality of 
policymakers, who are just as prone to well-known cognitive biases as either 
voters or economists, but whose thinking is still too often (and inadequately) 
explained in rational materialist terms Finally, the thesis concludes with some 
reflections on the ultimate value of a constructivist, narrative-oriented political 
economy. 
 
                                                        
16 Parts of this chapter were first developed in Alexander Shaw, 2017a 
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Key findings: the life-cycle of an economic policy narrative 
The empirical study undertaken in this project has served two purposes. First, it 
renders a more forensic account of New Labour’s path from stability to crisis 
than has generally been available, systematically tracing key themes over the 
entire thirteen year period of government. Second, the case study develops and 
demonstrates a new conceptual toolkit based on internal and external validity as 
distinguishable properties, separating the two key imperatives driving political 
narratives and analysing them in context and in sequence. The twin categories of 
internal and external validity highlight different, and often conflicting, 
dimensions of economic policymaking: on one hand, the desire to be consistent 
and, on the other hand, the attempt to be (perceived as) objectively right, all 
under conditions of uncertainty. This new analytical framework therefore 
permits the researcher to undertake a narrative analysis that transcends the 
epistemological limitations that often afflict such work, because it is no longer 
necessary to choose between approaching narratives as either free-standing 
discursive artefacts or as epiphenomena that sit in contrast to material reality. 
Both the internal logic of the discourse and its external fit with the observable 
world are acknowledged to matter, but differently and in ways that shift over 
time.   
Identifying the moments in an economic narrative when internal and 
external validity must be traded off against one another is ultimately about 
finding the politics in political economy. Such moments are not just about 
exogenous shock or strategic rhetorical manoeuvres, but the maintenance of 
political constructions whose self-certainty is both the key to their effectiveness 
and their fatal flaw. The findings show that “rhetoric versus reality” is an 
inadequate basis for understanding what economic policy narratives do, because 
the rhetoric and the reality are always politically entwined. It is intuitively 
obvious that politicians would like to be seen as both coherent and factually 
correct. But in a world of uncertainty, such a position is likely to be fleeting; the 
very narratives that create the coherence tend to diverge from events over time. 
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The politics of economic policy rest on what happens at moments of tension, 
when the internal and external validity of a narrative seem to be pulling in 
opposite directions.  
The empirical work in chapters 4 to 7 identified four distinct phases in the 
evolution of New Labour’s economic narrative, each characterised by a different 
conjunction of internal and external validity (figure 8.1). Understanding these 
phases separately, but in sequence, enables us to build a more complex picture 
of the path dependencies involved in economic policy narratives, and the extent 
to which they do or do not appear responsive to external events. It is 
immediately apparent that internal validity was the more constant condition, 
breaking down only in the very final stages of the life cycle and well after the first 
signs of crisis. When the crisis arrived, the government’s concern with internal 
validity was not overridden by external challenges; instead of discursive change 
we see a period of uncertainty and contradictory rhetoric, followed by divergent 
sub-narratives attempting different degrees of continuity with the pre-crisis 
story.   
The picture on external validity is more complicated because it was 
simultaneously harder to prove and harder to falsify. With the exception of the 
initial construction phase, every part of the narrative life cycle included moments 
of external validity challenge – that is, moments at which events did not appear 
to be fully congruent with the causal story even measured against its own 
favourite indicators. The impact of such moments on the narrative varied 
considerably in different phases. The external validity of Labour’s narrative 
evolved from being believed plausible, to believed proven, to a period of 
unarguable crisis and confusion. At the very end of the life-cycle we see the 
government finally attempt to repair external validity by making significant policy 
reversals geared to the new conditions, but stopping short of a third-order 
paradigm shift.  At all times, external validity was contestable and had to be 
constructed in rhetoric. Internal validity was far more amenable to control. This 
was the economic uncertainty dilemma in action, and the Labour government’s 
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Figure 8.1: The narrative life cycle of New Labour’s economic policy  
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solution across most of the life cycle was to pursue internal validity as a 
substitute for certainty on the external side.    
i. Construction 
The first phase was narrative construction: very simply the period in 
which the new government first set out its economic narrative. Internal validity 
was necessarily strong at this point, because the narrative had been crafted in 
opposition to set out a political vision with its own internal logics. It could 
therefore be launched fully formed as soon as the new government assumed 
office, and there would be no reason for the narrative to be less than fully 
coherent at this point. In Heclo’s terms, the ‘puzzling’ had been done in 
preparation for government and the ‘powering’ could now begin (Heclo, 1974, 
cited in Hall, 1993: 275). The new narrative duly set itself up against both the 
outgoing Conservative government and against ‘old’ Labour leaderships, 
asserting a vision of the political economy in which macroeconomic stability, 
fiscal prudence and openness to global markets would deliver a prosperous new 
era in which investments in social policy need not frighten the markets. As 
shown in Chapter 4, the underpinning ideas in this narrative were mistrust of 
governments’ tendency to destabilising short-termism, and faith in the capacity 
of unimpeded markets to generate stable returns, which could then be 
distributed in the interests of fairness. By making credible commitments to 
constrain its own discretion, it was argued that government could stimulate 
market confidence over a longer time-horizon and so create a virtuous circle of 
stability and growth.  
The external validity of these ideas was, at this stage, more a matter of 
assertion than proof, based on forward-looking claims that if certain policies 
were pursued, favourable outcomes would follow. As long as nothing happened 
to immediately upset the plausibility of these claims the narrative could be 
assumed to fit the external conditions, even in advance of any tangible results. 
The benign market reaction to early policy changes such as Bank of England 
independence seemed to indicate that things were going to plan, so the external 
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validity of the new government’s narrative could be given the benefit of the 
doubt. In the construction phase, as afterwards, what counted was not definitive 
evidence of external validity, but the absence of serious challenges to the 
perceived external validity of the narrative. 
ii. Reinforcement 
The second phase of the life cycle was characterised by processes of 
reinforcement. This period can be distinguished from the construction phase 
because the nature of the government’s claim to external validity had undergone 
a shift; where before the validity of the story had been simply plausible, in the 
reinforcement phase it was believed proven. New Labour’s reinforcement phase 
began around 2000-01, when better-than-expected growth in 1999 was 
interpreted as vindication of the government’s monetary and fiscal conservatism 
in the first two years in government. Low headline inflation also fit the causal 
story, and contributed to a perception that the policy framework was a success, 
with internal and external narrative validity both strong. From that point on, 
incoming data were consistently interpreted with a view to underwriting the 
correctness of the narrative and with it, the correctness of the policies it had 
launched. For example, Britain’s relative strength compared with G7 
counterparts after the 2001 terrorist attacks was also credited to policies 
promoting domestic stability and global openness, while the booming financial 
sector was perceived as an example of the benefits deregulated global capitalism 
could offer. 
Over the course of this second phase, as well as repeating the original 
ideas, the government narrowed and simplified its account of them, allowing for 
less favourable signals to be either excluded or bent to fit the story. In the 
stability and prudence themes, what had been a relatively sophisticated analysis 
of the cyclical weaknesses of the British economy became a far narrower focus 
on price inflation and headline GDP growth. In the mid-2000s, challenging signals 
from an overheating housing market were simultaneously excluded from the 
narrative by a change in the inflation measure, and absorbed within it, by the 
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repeated assertion that historically low mortgage interest rates were proof of 
economic stability. In the globalisation part of the narrative, early rhetoric had 
made clear that while protectionism was to be rejected, this stance must be 
accompanied by investment in skills to support people in coping with free 
markets. Over time, however, openness to globalisation was increasingly 
presented as a freestanding good, and evidence to the contrary received less and 
less attention. By the late-2000s, external data were less and less relevant to the 
continued projection of the pro-globalisation narrative; positive signals could be 
taken as indicating the success of current policy, while challenging developments 
were interpreted as requiring a redoubled commitment to the government’s 
stated policies. This narrative entrenchment was further reinforced by Labour’s 
efforts to persuade international counterparts, in Europe and in the developing 
world, that they should emulate Britain’s policy frameworks, since the more that 
the government evangelised for its approach abroad, the more convinced it 
became of the rightness of that approach at home. In this way, internal validity 
was consistently prioritised over external. 
Strikingly, the government’s rhetorical assertiveness in this second phase 
of the life-cycle was particularly marked when the data presented an external 
challenge, as when the UK’s growth ranking in the G7 dipped before recovering. 
The standard response to external validity challenges was first to double down 
on the story and, after the challenge had passed, to frame the blip as an 
important test passed; proof that the government had been on the right track in 
the first place. The cycle of encountering and surviving EV challenges appears to 
have done more to strengthen the perception of external validity than a trouble-
free context would have done, because seeing off challenges provided a stronger 
sense of validation than simply avoiding them. And this cycle would become self-
perpetuating; preserving internal validity was the government’s answer to 
everything because it also served to maintain their faith in the narrative’s 
external validity. Favourable economic data was of course held up as proof of 
external validity, but unfavourable data was also interpreted as showing the 
importance of staying the course, giving Labour a “heads we win, tails we don’t 
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lose” approach to the economic context. As long as external challenges could be 
absorbed into the story, the reinforcement phase continued, which in New 
Labour’s case was as late as mid-2008.  
Rhetoric in the reinforcement phase was characterised by repetition of 
key themes and simplified interpretations of external data. The consequence of 
these processes was that the narrative was becoming institutionalised as 
something free-standing of its narrators, with the power to direct their decision-
making.  By the end of this period the instinct to maintain internal validity was 
not only dictating what the government could say, but what it could do. The 
delays in agreeing nationalisation for Northern Rock reflected the extent to 
which a narrative based on the superiority of private over public ownership was 
constraining policy in an emergency. There has been a tendency, in post-hoc 
accounts of the period (Brown, 2010a, 2017; Darling, 2011) to suggest that in 
late-2007 and early-2008 the government had accepted that a crisis was 
unfolding, but was choosing to speak the language of stability for fear of 
provoking panic. The content analysis and interview evidence reported here, 
however, points more strongly to their having been in denial about the 
seriousness of the problem up to and including the summer of 2008. The 
reinforcement phase of the narrative had a surprisingly long tail, for two reasons: 
Labour still believed in the great moderation as a sound basis for policy, and they 
had evolved a rhetorical playbook in which all challenges and moments of 
uncertainty could be dealt with by shoring up the existing story. A dawning 
awareness of problems “in the American housing market” was not the same as 
recognizing the flaws in Britain’s own globalised, financialised political economy, 
and indeed Labour’s insistence on framing the turbulence as a global or an 
American problem was an exercise in holding the problem at arm’s length from 
their core ideas and established story. 
 The evidence of chapters 6 and 7 is that this reinforcement phase, and its 
pattern of prioritising internal validity in response to external uncertainty, went 
on for a surprisingly long time. Though Labour’s reinforcement phase began 
during the long expansion of the 1990s and early 2000s, it did not end until that 
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expansion was categorically over. Though the signs of trouble were there from at 
least mid-2007, the dynamics of the reinforcement phase saw the government 
continuing to interpret the evidence in ways that were supportive, rather than 
disruptive, of their casual story and its policy prescriptions. As such the narrative 
acted as a brake on policy change in 2007 and into 2008. Only with the ultimate 
meltdown of financial markets in September and October 2008 did the external 
validity challenge finally become too much for the old narrative to digest. 
iii. Crisis 
Taking the tension between external and internal validity as our guide, 
we can say that a third phase in the narrative life-cycle began in mid-2008, when 
both internal and external validity came under pressure. The internal integrity of 
the narrative was first damaged in August 2008 when the two key narrators, 
Brown and Darling, publicly disagreed on the scale of the expected downturn. At 
this point there was still enough uncertainty around the nature of the problem to 
give the government the option of applying its usual tactic of shoring up internal 
validity. However, this option was rejected by one of the two key narrators 
(Darling), ensuring that internal validity was compromised anyway. The larger 
breakdown, occurred in September 2008 when the banking sector meltdown 
finally provided a problem too far from the predictions of the causal story to be 
rationalised using familiar tropes. The external challenge posed by the banking 
crisis was undeniable; the old story simply could not accommodate it. But a new 
story had yet to be adapted, with Brown and Darling each making speeches that 
uneasily straddled the line between continuity and change. While policy was 
evolving rapidly, the government struggled to adapt a narrative in which those 
policy reversals could make sense without invalidating the arguments of the 
previous ten years. 
Rhetoric in the crisis phase was highly confused, attempting to 
simultaneously frame the external conditions as totally new and unforeseeable, 
while also making partial attempts to rationalise them in terms of familiar ideas. 
For example, Gordon Brown seems to have struggled to determine whether the 
 250 
financial crisis should be understood as a wholly unprecedented exogenous 
shock, or as an acceleration in the very processes of globalisation he had long 
been talking about. Alistair Darling’s rhetoric also oscillated between defending 
Labour’s record and setting up potential policy change. The result was that the 
banking crisis did not only put holes in the external validity of Labour’s economic 
programme, but finally broke the internal coherence of the story. Headline 
agreement about what vocabulary could be used to name the crisis masked 
underlying confusion about how that crisis should be substantively understood. 
Internal validity was therefore absent in the rhetoric of each narrator individually, 
and further undermined by the disagreements between them. The crisis phase 
was fairly short, lasting around three months in mid-2008. Its primary 
consequence was to make the tension between internal and external validity 
unsustainable, with both ultimately breaking down together.  
iv. Fragmentation 
The final phase of the narrative life cycle began in late-2008, when the 
government attempted to regroup and find a way to narrate the financial crisis. 
The breakdown of internal validity in the crisis phase had removed the narrative 
constraints on policymaking, and significant policy reversals did now take place. 
To a significant extent, the attempt to maintain internal validity had now been 
dropped, particularly by Alistair Darling whose adoption of recession/recovery 
framings was in direct contradiction with the old stability theme. Whereas earlier 
policy changes (like Northern Rock) had been couched in the language of 
continuity, there was now open acknowledgment of the importance of radical 
solutions to avoid a depression.  However, even radical first- and second-order 
policy change was not accompanied by a third-order paradigm shift, particularly 
in the rhetoric of Gordon Brown who remained more deeply attached to the old 
ideas than his successor.  
By 2009 Gordon Brown’s speeches had finally begun to acknowledge the 
paradigm-shaking nature of what had occurred. The price of this 
acknowledgement was a further sacrifice of internal validity, as the trade-off 
 251 
between the two imperatives was finally reversed, and the story was allowed to 
change. For the first time the rhetoric included explicit admissions of error, 
particularly on financial regulation but also to some extent at the level of 
principle, as in Brown’s admission that “the market seemed intent not on self-
correction, but on self-destruction” (2010a: xix). Even then, however, it was 
impossible for Brown to completely move away from the old narrative, and his 
rhetoric swung between suggesting that the old ideas had been overturned and 
renewing his commitment to certain among them, particularly in respect of 
globalisation’s benefits. The old narrative had been compromised but it still 
could not be entirely abandoned. This final phase therefore represents a period 
of narrative fragmentation: between narrators, between themes, and between 
first- and second-order policy and third-order goals. The economic crisis had 
forced a new balance between the two validities, with external problems finally 
taking precedence over internal ones. The downside of this tradeoff is that it 
permitted new policies to come through, but left those policies without a 
coherent narrative of their own. Even after all, the influence of the pre-crisis 
story could not be entirely shaken off.  
Several findings emerge from this analysis of the narrative life cycle. First, 
that internal validity is generally much more clear-cut – and much easier to 
control – than external validity, and it is the primary anchor of the narrative 
throughout most of the life cycle.  Second, that the reinforcement phase is 
particularly important, setting up the resilience of the story and obscuring its 
vulnerability to shocks as the focus on internal validity makes the narrative more 
and more impervious to new evidence. Third (and in contrast to Widmaier, 
2016a) there is not a single ‘crisis’ phase in which events finally and clearly 
overcome ideas. Instead we observe a surprisingly long reinforcement phase, 
followed by a two-stage breakdown. In the initial crisis period, mounting external 
validity challenges begin to break down internal narrative coherence but do not 
provoke doubt or recalibration so much as confusion, and a partial attempt at 
continuity, with the result that both kinds of validity fall apart. In the later 
fragmentation period, the narrative finally breaks down and external validity is to 
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some extent reprioritised. Yet even this period displays a surprising amount of 
ideational resilience even after radical policy change, resulting in a disjunction 
between policy and ideas.  
 
Boundary conditions and generalisability 
The next question is whether the dynamics identified as crucial in the New 
Labour case have broader significance and, if so, what boundary conditions 
might be applied to their relevance. This research treats the New Labour 
government as a critical case, capable of generating new insights about the 
operation of ideas and narrative more broadly. This is not simply the story of 
Gordon Brown and his personal limitations (a much overused trope in 
commentary on New Labour, especially its later years). Rather it is an account of 
what happens to economic narratives over time, under conditions of both 
stability and crisis. In keeping with the constructivist epistemology underpinning 
the project, context and meaning are assigned central importance, but even so 
the case study points up certain structural properties of economic narratives that 
clearly have significance beyond the single case. 
I suggest that the ideational rigidity displayed by New Labour’s leaders was 
not a personal foible of those individuals but a by-product of the inherent 
tensions involved in managing economic policy under conditions of uncertainty. 
Narratives are indispensable tools for the creation of political (and economic) 
confidence; they create a foundation for policy programmes by advancing a 
causal story that models, and to some extent creates, the economy. Such 
narratives become increasingly vulnerable to shocks over time, yet the business 
of being a political narrator lends itself to continuity more than change, making 
narratives highly resilient even (or especially) when events seem to go against 
them. This chapter will suggest that the uncertainty in economics then combines 
with the psychology of confirmation bias to produce narrative structures that, 
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over the years, turn from being expressions of their narrators’ agency to 
structures that constrain and confound their creators. 
Certain boundary conditions should, however, be considered. The narrative 
dynamics identified here rely on the presence of sincerely held ideas to which 
deepening cognitive attachments may accrue. For narrators to endure the 
discomfort of sticking to positions that are unpopular, or increasingly discredited, 
requires a level of ideational commitment that is not present in every political 
project. For every Gordon Brown attempting to intellectualise his way through a 
paradigm failure, there will be a Boris Johnson prepared to jump ship for any 
expedient alternative. The narrative life cycle bites on those politicians that 
genuinely invest in a set of ideas about the economy. Even so, I suggest this 
condition is fulfilled more often than not, and that there is no reason to suppose 
the ideationally committed politician is the exception rather than the rule.  
It is plausible that the case for ideas and narrative as the source of political 
continuity, rather than interests or institutions, may be particularly strong in the 
British context. The combination of majoritarian government and a highly 
insulated executive branch concentrates decision-making power with a few 
individuals at the top of government, while the absence of a Washington-style 
lobbying industry around legislative veto points reduces (though does not 
remove) the scope for interest capture (Hopkin & Alexander Shaw 2016). This 
gives the British government unusually broad scope to construct and implement 
a singular narrative, putting internal validity well within the control of a 
reasonably organised leadership and perhaps making it more likely that internal 
validity is protected. It is likely that in the UK context, ideas will be particularly 
powerful because one need only capture a few minds within the policy elite in 
order to institute and the defend a policy paradigm. Government narratives are 
well-insulated against change because the same few minds would have to be 
changed for a shift to happen, and access to the key players once they are in 
government tends to be limited. Short of a personnel change at the top, there 
are few entry points into the British system for new ideas, or even for heterodox 
interpretations of the economic data. Mark Blyth has made a similar suggestion 
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in regards to Swedish social democracy, arguing that “one may hypothesize… 
that more hierarchic state structures that concentrate decision-making power 
essentially institutionalize ideas very quickly, and because of this such states are 
more likely to exhibit cognitive locking” (Blyth 2001: 24). The narrative life-cycle, 
and especially the reinforcement phase, might be expected to be shorter and 
less pronounced in political systems where it is more difficult for a single causal 
story to predominate. This is, however, only a hypothesis; for example German 
governments’ attachment to certain ordoliberal ideas does not seem to be much 
weakened by that country’s more pluralist politics. Further research would be 
needed to assess the differential power of narrative to constrain narrators in less 
centralised political systems. 
Finally, it might be argued that the problems encountered by New Labour 
were generated less by inherent tensions in narrating the economy than by the 
tensions inherent in social democracy under late capitalism – that is, by the 
incommensurability of the substantive ideas in New Labour’s political economy. 
Put another way: the stubbornness of the government’s rhetoric might have 
been driven by their unwillingness to confront the specific dysfunctions of this 
narrative, rather than implying similar tensions in all narratives. Certainly New 
Labour had set themselves an ambitious task, claiming to have effected an 
historic reconciliation between state and market. Could it be that the rise and fall 
of their causal story reflected a problem unique to left parties who find 
themselves unable to pursue conventionally leftwing policies in the global era, 
but who cannot admit as much to the electorate?  
It is certainly true that with the arrival of crisis, Labour ran up against 
some fundamental problems in their account of how the economy was supposed 
to work. The financial crisis of 2008-09 and the broader economic crisis it 
triggered, emerged through fault lines in the great moderation that had been 
there all along. Within the dominant, broadly-neoliberal paradigm that 
dominated policy thinking in the period before the crisis, it was barely 
conceivable that there could be a problem of market-wide mispricing of risk, 
leading to systemic instability and bank failure, followed by contagion into the 
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real economy and a slump in aggregate demand. According to the ideas of the 
day, neither the mispricing, nor the systemic risk, nor the aggregate demand 
problem should have been possible. The narrative was, as it turned out, deeply 
fragile and yet, as discussed above, the apparent failure of the old paradigm did 
not lead a decisive ideational shift in post-crisis politics, in Britain or elsewhere.  
The simple answer, however, is that New Labour are far from the only 
government to find that their political economy runs up against difficulties in its 
fit with the world, and yet be reluctant to change course. Certainly it is not 
difficult to think of further examples of politicians cleaving to favourite narratives 
despite highly debatable evidence of their external validity. George Osborne’s 
insistence that austerity would be the key to Britain’s recovery persisted even as 
the projected pickup in growth failed to materialise year after year. The 
rhetorical battles now raging around Brexit, and its likely impact on the economy, 
display all the narrative resilience one might wish for, with highly uncertain 
evidence being interpreted to support favoured positions that show less and less 
openness to doubt. The next two sections expand on two properties of narrative 
that combine to create the structural dynamics of the narrative life cycle: on the 
one hand, the essential fragility of narratives designed to combat uncertainty 
and, on the other hand, the social psychological processes at work in narration. If 
we accept that the narrative traps New Labour encountered were a function of 
the structural tension between these two dimensions, then the theory of the 
narrative life cycle ought to travel well beyond this critical case. 
 
The fragility of economic narratives  
The New Labour case study exposes a paradox in economic policymaking: 
that economic ideas, and the narratives in which they are mobilised, are 
simultaneously vulnerable to shocks and highly resistant to change. That is, they 
are both fragile and resilient at the same time. Politically speaking, this is a 
terrible outcome: stubborn wrongness is not a condition to which most 
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politicians aspire. It also runs counter to the presumptions of most mainstream 
political science, which credits politicians with a fair grasp of their own best 
interest. Even where voters are believed to be irrational, politicians are usually 
presumed to be strategic about noting and adapting to voter’s irrational 
preferences. For a government to adopt a political economy that was, from the 
start, not obviously in the interests of their core voters, and for them to continue 
pursuing and defending it after its dramatic failure in practice, was astonishing. 
The evidence is that in the New Labour case, the stubbornness of the narrative 
was ideational rather than driven by interests or institutions. But this is 
theoretically troubling: bringing ideas back in, via a case in which the ideas 
proved extremely flawed, risks lending weight to the kind of rationalist 
arguments that treat ideas as the negative space in between rational interests, 
proving only that governments may be as irrational as voters. As set out in at the 
beginning of this thesis, the risk for constructivist political economy is that 
Labour’s apparently illogical crisis response sends us straight back to rational-
materialist explanatory frameworks, in which Labour can be dismissed as simply 
having paid the price of believing in a failed construction, when they should have 
been addressing material realities. 
 Instead, I want to suggest that New Labour’s problem was not that they 
chose flawed ideas and a dubious narrative over solid facts and rational interests. 
Rather, the rise and fall of their narrative reveals an unavoidable tension in 
economic policymaking, between the need for economic certainty and the 
exposure to risk this creates. The fragility of the New Labour narrative was not 
just about one set of misguided ideas; it is a property of all economic narratives 
to some extent. Nassim Taleb (2012) has suggested that there are three classes 
of object in the world: the fragile, which is vulnerable to shocks; the resilient, 
which can withstand shocks for a while but still ultimately experiences them as 
negative; and the ‘antifragile’, which can actually profit by shocks and disorder. 
Taleb explicitly criticises the fragility of “narrative knowledge” which he sees as 
afraid of uncertainty, prone to over-rationalisation of things that should properly 
be seen as random, and “psychologically comfortable” (2012: 214). Antifragility, 
 257 
on the other hand, requires a hedged position and a high level of conceptual 
flexibility – that is, the opposite of a narrative. 
Drawing on Taleb’s concepts, I suggest the inherent fragility of economic 
policy narratives can be usefully explored through an analogy with the models 
used by traders in financial markets. Trading models, and the academic economic 
models on which they draw, are simplifications of the world that provide actors 
with a basis on which to act. They are necessarily reductive and selective, making 
assumptions about the nature of risk, the likely shape of future returns, and the 
opportunities for investment that those things imply. The problem is that in 
reducing and simplifying the world, models exclude some things that may turn 
out to be important, and treat as fixed things that may turn out to be contingent 
or variable (Derman, 2011). At some point those simplifications, which give the 
model its internal coherence and integrity, run up against the messiness and 
unpredictability of the world at large, as when the financial crisis exposed 
systemic risks that were simply outside the scope of the dominant models at that 
time (Derman, 2011; Patterson, 2010).  
Economic policy narratives operate as qualitative models of the economy 
and are prone to many of the same weaknesses as their quantitative 
counterparts. The value of an economic narrative is that it boils down the vast 
range of possible understandings of the economic conditions into a single story. 
It reduces complexity, rendering the abstract or technical understandable for 
both expert and general audiences. But more importantly it provides a working 
measure of certainty, asserting that (subject to certain assumptions being 
correct) we can operate on the basis of a particular account of what the 
economy is doing, what role policy played in getting it there, what policy should 
be in the future and how things should therefore turn out. Narratives, like formal 
models, are reductive and selective; they simplify the economic world in order to 
make policy action possible. Like models therefore, they are vulnerable to shocks 
that are outside the scope of their core assumptions. 
Chapter One argued that economic policy narratives respond to an 
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uncertainty dilemma, in which policymakers face inherently uncertain conditions 
but must project political certitude, for the sake of economic confidence and as a 
basis for policy action. Narratives reduce uncertainty by advancing a persuasive 
casual story. But both the value and the fragility of an economic narrative are 
products of its singularity; there is only one version of the economy that will 
fulfill the terms of the narrative, and many other possible versions that would 
contravene them. This is of course itself something of a simplification; as Schmidt 
and Thatcher note, some narratives are broader than others, and may be able to 
accommodate a range of outcomes within their scope (2013). The underlying 
tension, however, is unavoidable; in order to be specific enough to provide 
political stability, an economic narrative must put its eggs in one basket and 
explicitly or implicitly disavow the alternatives.  Once again, analogies with 
finance are instructive; whereas investors are taught to deal with risk by 
diversifying the portfolio and so reduce their exposure to any one source of 
trouble (Markowitz, 1952) politics demands not a portfolio but a single bet. In 
order to provide certainty, narratives must eschew diversification. So while 
economic risks may be distributed in the world, they become correlated in the 
politics of the economy, because the assertion of a particular causal story puts all 
shocks into a single category tagged “outside the narrative”. It is the discourse, 
not the economics, that correlates a government’s risk, and because of this 
narratives, though essential for policy, are an ever-present source of political 
fragility. 
The fragility problem, unfortunately, doesn’t end there. The risk that a 
singular narrative can be challenged is amplified when the temporal dimension is 
taken into account. Derman notes that time is a problem for modelling, because 
“theories and models are attempts to eliminate time and its consequences, to 
make the world invariant” (2011: 7). A brief thought experiment shows that such 
attempts should eventually be doomed to failure. Let us assume, for the time 
being, that economic narratives attempt to provide a correspondence theory of 
the world – that is, they attempt to be true. (Politicians are not, for the most part, 
conscious constructivists.) We can further assume that at year zero, they appear 
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to have succeeded in being so. However, as time moves on and the narrative 
stands still, the chances of nothing having changed in the world become smaller 
and smaller. If economic changes are normally distributed, then the probability 
of events landing on the spot predicted by the narrative become less likely – the 
trajectory of the economy becomes a fan chart in which the narrative is the 
central estimate, as commonly seen in forecasts of economic indicators like GDP 
growth. Time makes the uncertainty larger, so the likelihood of the narrative 
being wrong, and the scale of the potential wrongness, will increase with each 
passing year. Alternatively, we might assume that economic events are not 
normally distributed, and that risk lies mainly in big events in the tails (Taleb, 
2008). Even then it is likely we will end up somewhere very different than the 
trajectory the narrative projects; the fact that economic shocks are random, 
rather than probabilistic, simply makes it harder to predict when the gap 
between the narrative and the events will open up. Either way, it is likely that at 
some point economic events and narratives will be seen to have diverged; 
because “the longer a theory stays in circulation, the greater the likelihood of 
underlying conditions shifting to the point where the original model’s empirical 
claims do not hold up” (Drezner & McNamara, 2013: 160). Economic stories that 
do not change are, therefore, doomed to blow up. Narrative fragility thus arises 
out of two things: the inherent tendency of narratives to prioritise certainty over 
flexibility, and the likelihood that the passage of time will bring changes that 
render inflexible narratives increasingly likely to be wrong. 
Framing the thought experiment in this way might appear to contradict 
the constructivist stance taken so far in this thesis.  The idea that narratives’ 
biggest problem is poor or decreasing fit with the real economy cuts across a 
constructivist view of the world in which the economic conditions are primarily a 
construction, not a material fact. Two points are worth clarifying here. First, the 
argument is not necessarily that there is an objective, unarguable material 
context against which narratives are eventually found lacking. The notion of a 
perfect correspondence theory of the economy is deeply problematic, and the 
idea that the politics of the economy comes down to a measurable gap between 
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rhetoric and reality is a largely unsatisfactory way of understanding economic 
policy. However, it is possible for political narrators to be confronted with events 
– or with others’ constructions of the same events – that are outside the terms of 
the existing narrative. Things do happen, and while some economic changes can 
be incorporated within the terms of an existing political story, others will be 
more overtly contradictory to it. There is no inconsistency in arguing that while 
all economic events gain their political meaning via processes of construction, 
certain events may be incompatible with the constructions we already have in 
place. Second, the purpose of this discussion is not to show that narratives are 
always objectively flawed and will therefore always fail; it is to illustrate the 
paradox that despite their apparent fragilities, political narratives of the 
economy often turn out to be extremely resilient in practice.  
 
The social psychology of narrating the economy 
We have established that narratives are inherently vulnerable to shocks 
but, as New Labour amply demonstrated, they are nonetheless resilient to all but 
the most incontrovertible evidence of crisis. The evidence of the New Labour 
case is that this resilience is ideational rather than institutional, or interest-led, in 
which case the mechanisms by which ideas gain and lose ground with 
policymakers are of central importance. I suggest that further research could 
usefully pursue the development of a social psychology of narrative, in order to 
theorise the effect that narrating the economy has on economic policymakers. 
This section begins to outline such a research agenda, suggesting that 
policymakers should not be seen as simply poor rationalists, but as social actors 
that are prone to familiar cognitive biases that give rise to the surprising 
resilience of ostensibly fragile narratives.   
The most pivotal moment in the narrative life cycle is arguably the 
transition out of the construction phase, when narrators’ confidence in their 
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causal stories is first cemented. The subsequent reinforcement phase, 
characterised by repetition of key messages, simplified interpretive processes 
and the constant revalidation of the policy status quo, is what creates, and 
constrains, the space in which future crises will be confronted. In 2008, the 
politics of the banking crisis had to play out on a field already crowded with 
narrative constructions of how the economy was supposed to work, and for 
policy change to take place, those constructions had to give way. As we have 
seen, this process was slow, messy and ultimately incomplete. The resilience of 
the old narrative can be seen to derive, above all, from the effects of the 
reinforcement phase, in which years of rhetorical groundwork took the original 
ideas from creative new politics to institutionalised received wisdom; from being 
the tools of political agency to structures that bounded agents’ choices and 
cognition. Even in the final, fragmented stages of the narrative life cycle, the old 
ideas retained considerable power to constrain their narrators’ ability to make 
sense of new conditions. 
The empirical case study clearly shows the importance of the 
reinforcement phase in a narrative’s life cycle. We might take this insight further, 
however, by exploring the specific processes that were at work in the 
reinforcement phase, and during its aftermath.  Social psychologists have long 
been aware of human agents’ tendency to confirmation bias, which ensures that 
new information is not dispassionately added to our calculations but must fight a 
losing battle with what we already think we know (see Nickerson, 1998 for a tour 
of this literature). There are several dimensions to the theory of confirmation 
bias that are relevant here. First is the simple tendency to interpret evidence in 
ways that are supportive rather than contradictory of existing beliefs, and to 
respond to ambiguity by sticking with cherished positions. This tendency is not a 
personality flaw afflicting only those who are bad at weighing new evidence, but 
a common and recognised outcome of having committed to a position in the first 
place, as Nickerson explains: 
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“Once one has taken a position on an issue, one’s primary 
purpose becomes that of defending or justifying that position…. 
Regardless of whether one’s treatment of evidence was 
evenhanded before the stand was taken, it can become highly 
biased afterward.” (1998: 177) 
That is, there is a temporal dimension to confirmation bias: after an initial 
window of opportunity in which alternative ideas may be given a fair hearing, 
most actors settle on one particular position and will thereafter be inclined to 
defend it. This looks a lot like the construction/reinforcement cusp in the 
narrative life cycle. Nickerson further notes that “bias is especially prevalent in 
situations that are inherently complex and ambiguous” (ibid: 192-3) in which 
case economic policymakers must be considered particularly vulnerable to it.  
Second, confirmation bias is known to exist not just when the evidence 
for a position is ambiguous, but even when it is shown to be wrong. Actors show 
a tendency to “belief perseverance”, wherein a person may be shown that the 
information on which they based a belief is incorrect, and continue to hold it 
anyway (Anderson et al, 1980). So strong is this effect that in some 
circumstances, attempts to invalidate a belief by presenting someone with 
evidence of its falsity may backfire and actually strengthen the believer’s 
attachment to it (Nyhan & Reifler 2010). Strikingly, when presented with disproof 
of their positions, people will try to explain away that new evidence through “the 
generation of causal explanations or scenarios that continue to imply the 
correctness of one’s initial beliefs” (Anderson et al, 1980: 1045); that is, by the 
construction of plausible, if unevidenced, causal stories. The tendency of 
economic policymakers to resort to internal validity as a cure for external validity 
problems seems a prime example of belief perseverance in action, as does 
Labour’s observed tendency to derive increased narrative confidence from 
external validity challenges. 
Third, the social psychological literature shows that confirmation bias and 
belief perseverance are further strengthened when ideas have been mobilised as 
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rhetoric, because the very act of articulating a belief may deepen a person’s 
attachment to it. Being asked to suggest an explanation for something (i.e. to 
come up with a causal story) immediately introduces cognitive boundaries such 
that those who are asked to expound an argument for a given position are found 
to be more wedded to it later, even when that position has been invalidated by 
new information (see Nickerson 1998: 203). The initial causal story, even if it was 
no more than a hypothesis, becomes a “conditional reference frame”, which is to 
say that it has a kind of first-mover advantage over the narrator’s thinking, 
becoming the story to beat from that point forward. This effect comes about 
because it is extremely difficult to stand outside one’s own social constructions, 
as Moscovici argues: 
“Once they have become fixed, these intellectual constellations 
make us forget that they are our creations, that they have a 
beginning and will have an end… Individual or social 
representations make the world what we think it is or what we 
think it must be.” (2008: 16) 
To put it another way, confirmation bias is not only a function of the individual 
cognitive processes of the agent; it is deepest where that agent has publicly 
committed to the ideas in language, giving them social as well as cognitive power. 
The business of constructing, and articulating, economic narratives can 
therefore be seen as a double bind for policymakers. Narrative constructions 
solidify ideas into something like an institutional structure, giving them external 
power over the narrator. And narrating the ideas in rhetoric deepens the 
narrator’s own belief that their ideas must be correct, giving them internal power 
over the narrator’s subsequent thinking. To borrow Vivien Schmidt’s (2002) 
useful distinction and extend it slightly: narratives are both coordinative and 
communicative discourses, and are prone to confirmation bias on both 
dimensions. Grube (2016) identified that political rhetoric can be “sticky” when it 
binds politicians to previously articulated positions, but assumed that it was the 
public’s antenna for hypocrisy that made past rhetoric a constraint. The social 
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psychology of narrative indicates an alternative explanation: words are sticky 
because of the psychological impact on the speaker of having publicly committed 
to a set of ideas. Over time, and through many rhetorical repetitions, the 
tendency to confirmation bias is likely to increase, making the oldest narratives 
simultaneously the most fragile in terms of their external fit with events, and the 
most tenacious in their prioritisation of internal validity.  
Political scientists, however, have been slow to apply these concepts to 
political economy. There are exceptions: for example, Hindmoor and McConnell 
have suggested in relation to the financial crisis that politicians were blind to the 
impending crash because “dominant ideational pathways created biases 
whereby ambiguous and fragmented warning signs tended to be marginalised” 
(2013: 14). That is, in the absence of certainty politicians tended toward 
interpretations of the economy that reassured rather than challenged, and that 
promoted continuity over change. Mark Blyth suggested in 2001 that one of the 
mechanisms by which ideas shape politics is by the imposition of “cognitive 
locks”, in which an idea fitted to one context becomes “an ideological mantra… 
applied regardless of actual conditions”, to the extent that “any other policy 
outcome [is] impossible” (2001: 22-3). Path-dependency in policymaking is then, 
according to Blyth, “fundamentally a cognitive phenomenon” (2013b: 208).  
Such social-psychological insights are, however, still relatively unusual in 
political economy, not least because of the continued dominance of rational 
choice models that take as their starting point the maximising agent of 
neoclassical economic theory. Daniel Kahneman has noted the gulf between 
economics and psychology in their basic conceptualisations of human agents: 
“My economist colleagues worked in the building next door, but 
I had not appreciated the profound difference between our 
intellectual worlds. To a psychologist, it is self-evident that 
people are neither fully rational nor completely selfish, and that 
their tastes are anything but stable. Our two disciplines seemed 
to be studying different species…” (2012: 269) 
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To the extent that political science has problematised the rational agent 
assumption by considering the prevalence of bias, attention has been chiefly 
focused on the irrationality of voters and not their political leaders. For example, 
recent work on voter preferences has lamented the difficulty of correcting 
misinformation in voters’ minds, noting that it is generally easier to mobilise a 
misinformed voter who agrees with you than to convert an active voter who 
does not. Electoral strategies are commonly built around moving voters’ feet 
rather than changing their minds, working with the grain of people’s favourite 
narratives rather than seeking to overturn them (Hochschild & Levine Einstein 
2016). Political campaigns that validate voters’ existing positions and do not 
require them to absorb new information are more likely to succeed than those 
that challenge voters’ rationalisations of their views (Achen & Bartels 2006). 
Such accounts not only ignore the potential for politicians to be irrational 
too, but actively exclude it by presuming that politicians are always triangulating 
around voters’ irrationalities. Political science generally assumes politicians to be 
capable of assessing voter preferences and exploiting their misinformed beliefs; 
elected officials are the manipulators of voter irrationality, in which case they 
must be coolly rational themselves. Normative accounts in this vein may deride 
political actors as weathervanes, capable of selling out any cherished idea in the 
pursuit of political gain, but they still assume politicians are rational maximisers, 
if only of electoral gains. The possibility that politicians might cleave to their own 
cherished beliefs past the point of all reason or utility is outside the scope of 
such theories. 
Social psychology has begun to enter the debate around post-crisis 
economics, where the failure of the great moderation paradigm opened up a 
new conversation about the biases of academic experts. For example, a 
newspaper article by economist Paul DeGrauwe (2009) openly addressed the 
problem of confirmation bias, noting that “an economic theory can work as a 
framing device conditioning us to interpret the facts in a way that is consistent 
with the theory”. Kahneman has taken a social-psychological view of economists’ 
attachment to empirically dubious assumptions, putting it down to “theory-
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induced blindness: once you have accepted a theory and used it as a tool in your 
thinking, it is extraordinarily difficult to notice its flaws” (2012: 277).  Akerlof and 
Shiller’s Animal Spirits suggested that economists’ preference for rationalist 
assumptions was social as much as intellectual, because “focusing exclusively on 
the rational… leads to an elegant presentation” whereas introducing alternative 
motivations to the model would “violate the etiquette of textbooks”, offending 
by its inelegance as much as by any perceived flaws of substance (2009: 21).  
While such commentary has had relatively little impact on the dominant 
paradigm in the discipline, there is now some recognition that economists, as 
well as voters, may be prone to cognitive fallacies and subject to social pressures 
that can constrain or corrupt their thinking.  
The case for extending such critiques to economic policymakers is surely 
self-evident. But once again, it is important to beware a slide back into rational 
materialism that concludes only that politicians can be as wrong as anyone else. 
Theories of confirmation bias are themselves often built on rational materialist 
foundations, because they derive from experiments that construct scenarios in 
which participants are simply, evidentially, wrong about something. The very 
notion of a bias or a fallacy implies a departure from fact, implying an ideal state 
in which all such cognitive error has been overcome. As argued at the outset, the 
ever-present condition of economic uncertainty makes such a state wholly 
unrealistic. The ideal-type rationalist has probably never existed, and models 
which insist on taking such an individual as their microfoundation are inevitably 
problematic. Applied to politics, there is a risk that a focus on psychological 
biases contributes only to the denigration of politics, and political narrative, as a 
domain of misinformation and error. 
What, then, can a constructivist do with the theory of confirmation bias? 
The approach taken by this research is to be interested in, but reasonably 
forgiving of, the ways in which policymakers’ psychology affects their decision-
making across the narrative life-cycle. Theories of confirmation bias fit very well 
with the empirical evidence of New Labour’s narrative, but that is not to say we 
should import a set of assumptions that say Labour were straightforwardly 
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wrong where they could, and should, have been straightforwardly right.  I do not 
suggest that narrative = bias = error, and that narratives should therefore be 
done away with. Nor is it helpful to conclude that the tendency to confirmation 
bias is a failure to live up to an ideal-type rational policymaker. Rather, both 
narratives and biases are inescapable features of how human beings behave 
when confronted with uncertainty and complexity. Becoming conscious of this 
fact in relation to economic policy is useful not least because it offers politicians 
a prompt to periodically scrutinise their assumptions without waiting for a crisis 
to force the issue. 
 
The indispensability of narrative in economic policy 
This thesis began with the conviction that narrative is central to economic policy, 
but that it has been generally under-theorised by political economists. The 
evidence presented here shows not only that narrative matters, but that it does 
so in often surprising ways. Government narratives, being a form of discursive 
action, embody the constructive potential of ideas at the beginning of a political 
project, but after that all the evidence points to narrative being the servant of 
continuity, not change. This continuity-bias increases the longer a government is 
in office, because the narrative becomes both a hill to be defended against all 
incursions, and the filter through which external signals are perceived in the first 
place. A narrative of the economy is a political construction that then repels 
further constructivism. We already know that interests (or at least perceived 
interests) can exert causal power in the political economy, and that institutions 
of many sorts introduce a status-quo preference into policymaking that is not 
easily disrupted. Deepening attachment to a particular set of ideas – and to the 
idea that those ideas are right – imposes the ultimate barrier to a government’s 
changing course once a political project has passed from the construction phase 
to the reinforcement phase of its life-cycle. Crisis and fragmentation must 
eventually follow, but even they are shaped and constrained by the narrative 
that went before. 
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During his time as Prime Minister, Tony Blair would sometimes be 
challenged by members of his own party about whether his third way narrative 
had outlived its usefulness. Having won gigantic parliamentary majorities, and 
facing an extremely weak Conservative opposition, surely Labour could now 
afford to be braver about asserting recognisably leftwing positions? Surely the 
rhetoric of the third way had been a means to an end, and could now be safely 
discarded to give voice to a more full-blooded socialism? Blair’s favourite 
response on such occasions was “it’s worse than you think: I really do believe it” 
(CONF01b).17 The centrist politics of New Labour was not only a means of 
beating the electoral arithmetic of 1990s Britain by capturing swing voters in 
Basildon or Hove, nor was the rhetoric of the third way a smokescreen for their 
true positions. Rather this was a narrative in which a set of ideational 
commitments, including a distinctive political economy, were being devised and 
deployed. Explaining the evolution of that political economy need not mean 
uncovering hidden interests and assigning them causal primacy; instead, we 
must confront the fact that the language of “no more boom and bust” was far 
more than ‘mere’ rhetoric. It’s worse than we thought; they really did believe it. 
 This research therefore supports a conclusion that has, in one sense, 
been available all along: that New Labour’s economic narrative, both in its pre-
crisis certainty and its post-crisis resilience, was exactly what it claimed to be. 
The rhetoric of the third way, and its embrace of great moderation economics, 
were not sustained for 13 years in government and through a global financial 
crisis by the machinations of interest groups or the tendency of institutions to 
blindly preserve the status quo. They were sustained by the sense of purpose in 
New Labour’s political story, and by the ideational rigidity this story generated in 
its narrators. The rhetoric was, for the most part, seriously connected to ideas; 
the ideas themselves were sincerely held and increasingly inflexible. This is not to 
say that political strategy was absent – far from it – but over the years that 
strategy came to operate within an Overton window of Labour’s own creation, 
                                                        
17 Blair would later repeat the same line in relation to foreign policy on Iraq 
(see Bower, 2016; Vickers, 2011) where again he was in the position of 
defending intransigence. 
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based less on electoral strategy or the economic conditions than on the internal 
logic of the narrative itself.  
The financial crisis, when it arrived, was not only a material challenge to 
the economics of the great moderation, but a natural test of the sincerity of New 
Labour’s stated beliefs, since it provided the perfect opportunity for a narrative 
change had the government wanted to make one. The fact that the opportunity 
was not seized, and indeed was actively resisted, is strongly indicative of the 
power of ideas.  The crisis generated a tension between maintaining external 
validity and internal coherence in Labour’s economic narrative, but this tension 
was not the catalyst for ideational change: instead it resulted in an uneasy 
combination of policy change at the first- and second-order and dogged 
continuity in the government’s third-order goals and account of itself. This 
continuity was particularly pronounced in the rhetoric of Gordon Brown, whose 
attachment to the pre-crisis narrative was strongest.  
 There is a tendency in much of the commentary on New Labour to 
suggest that Gordon Brown’s intransigence was simply a personality flaw, and to 
some extent that may have been true. But this is a shallow read of complex 
politics. Brown is hardly the first politician to display stubbornness in his 
convictions, or a tin ear for criticism. The fact that Brown’s narrative problems 
were in keeping with his perceived personal shortcomings should not be 
interpreted a reason to dismiss the case as particular to Brown, but as a prompt 
to ask what other common human foibles might be worth theorising in politics. I 
suggest it is time to finally throw out the shopworn caricature of the hyper-
rational homo-economicus, and replace it with something closer real-world 
political agents who, even when seeking to further a particular set of interests, or 
to succeed in a given institutional context, still feel compelled to come up with a 
narrative account that makes sense of their political choices, for the public and 
for themselves. Politicians, for the most part, do not just want to be seen to be in 
the right – they also need to believe they are doing the right thing. Narratives 
address uncertainty in the world, but also in in the individual. And because 
policymakers are human, there is only a brief window of opportunity in which a 
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new causal story can be moulded, before it succumbs to the psychology of 
confirmation bias and belief perseverance.  
Ignoring these social psychological dimensions in favour of a blunt 
conception of rationality/irrationality has left political science poorly equipped to 
interpret real-world cases in which the politics of economic policy deviates from 
the apparently rational. In a world of post-truth politics and populist movements, 
this will no longer do; the need to understand narrative not just as politics 
malfunctioning, but as essential to the political process, is more pressing than 
ever. We need a theory of economic policymaking that places actors in their 
proper context, recognising that they must confront an unenviable set of 
problems: perpetual uncertainty, the pressure to support economic confidence 
and the march of political time. Ideas are the only available signposts through 
this maze, but the narratives they generate quickly solidify into new obstacles. 
This dilemma cannot be resolved by simply getting a better narrative that fits 
more straightforwardly with the facts, because even deciding which facts matter 
is an interpretive process in which narrative constructions must be deployed. 
Following Colin Hay and Mark Blyth in particular, I have suggested that while 
there is such a thing as the material economy, we can only get at it via the 
processes of social construction that give economic phenomena their political 
meaning. Narratives are therefore indispensable and yet irretrievably 
problematic.  
JK Galbraith argued that “The rule of ideas is only powerful in a world that 
does not change. Ideas are inherently conservative. They yield not to the attack 
of other ideas but… to the massive onslaught of circumstance with which they 
cannot contend” (1999: 17). I take a slightly different view. Governments’ ideas 
are indeed conservative, but they become so over time, by their 
institutionalisation as narratives. They yield to circumstance that they cannot 
narrate, which is a function of their internal logics as much as the scale of the 
external problem. The world inevitably changes, but ideas retain their power 
because they retain the ability to constrain their narrators and to set the 
boundaries of the politically possible. Given that background, theories of ideas in 
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economic policy should not only ask how new paradigms emerge, but how old 
ideas decay – or do not – in the face of events. The narrative life-cycle militates 
against an ideal-type process of paradigm change in which new thinking wins the 
battle of ideas; instead, change is forced to happen gradually, messily and 
partially as the keepers of old narrative cling to the last evidence of its validity. In 
the end, while interests and institutions can be disrupted by an exogenous crisis, 
the life-cycle of New Labour’s political economy shows that there is nothing so 
politically intractable as a sincerely-held idea.  
 
 
* * * 
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Part IV: Methodology 
 273 
M1:  Content analysis and interview methodologies 
 
This supplementary chapter provides a full accounting of the methodological 
choices made in the process of compiling the primary data for this thesis. Two 
primary research methods were used: content analysis of speeches by New 
Labour actors, and interviews with individuals who were involved with the 
New Labour government at some point. For each of these methods the 
following commentary sets out details of: research objectives; methodology 
design processes including pilot studies (in particular, the choice of a content 
analysis software and an interview approach); data collection and sampling; 
operational methodology, and some reflections on the limitations of each 
method, including ethical considerations. 
Some methodological detail has already been explained in chapters 4-7, 
which reported and analysed the results of the primary research within a 
broader qualitative-historical account of New Labour’s economic narrative. 
However, the methodological elements in those chapters are far from being a 
full account, providing only the information necessary to enable the reader to 
understand the selection of data being presented. The empirical chapters are 
necessarily long and detailed, to the extent that elaborating more fully on 
methodology within the main thesis would have made them unwieldy.  Long 
sections on methods might also have been distracting if read alongside the 
analytical content. Dealing with methodology in a dedicated chapter in this 
way avoids crowding out the analysis in the main thesis; moreover it allows 
proper space for reflection on the methodological decisions made in the 
course of the research. As such the reporting of methodology in a dedicated 
chapter, rather than in the body of the thesis, should not be taken to imply its 
relegation to a second-order issue. Rather, the chapter is written with the 
intention that academic transparency is better served by giving 
methodological questions their due attention in a separate discussion. 
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Content analysis  
Research objectives  
A major challenge of the New Labour case study, which spanned a 13-year 
period in government, was how to tackle “the narrative” at a suitably forensic 
level without being buried under an avalanche of often very repetitive political 
verbiage. As noted in chapter 3, a great advantage of taking political language 
seriously is that there is no shortage of data; words are the medium in which 
politics and policy are conducted, and in the digital age most of those words 
survive on the record. The challenge, for the researcher, is to sift that mass of 
evidence in a systematic way, without simply imposing one’s own categories 
and finding only what one set out to find in the first place. There was 
particular reason to fear confirmation bias in the empirical part of this study, 
because I would be commencing the research with – indeed motivated by – 
the pre-existing impression that certain things had been said by New Labour 
over the years, and that they were significant in certain ways. There was 
therefore a need to stress-test my preconceptions about New Labour rhetoric 
by introducing an element of automation to the analysis that might throw up 
negative findings if rhetorics I had thought were common or important turned 
out, in fact, not to be so. 
Content analysis (CA) offered a means of processing large volumes of data 
toward a particular research question, and hopefully of augmenting the 
possibilities offered by a purely qualitative-historical approach to primary 
sources. In particular, CA raised the prospect of being able to say more about 
rhetorical patterns over time than would be possible in a purely qualitative-
historical treatment of the sources, if only because the sheer number of 
speeches that could be ‘read’ by content analysis software would be greater 
than what a single researcher could mentally process, or even realistically read, 
in the time available. The temporal dimension was critical to the research, 
which was centrally interested in observing and explaining narrative continuity 
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and change over time. Yet it was precisely this temporal dimension that would 
be most difficult to address using purely qualitative methods. An early pilot 
using Budget Statements to look at “stability” as a theme (Alexander, 2012) 
involved weeks of reading and notation, and it was quickly evident that 
keeping straight the subtle differences between different years’ statements 
would be very difficult; this with a population only 14 speeches. Resulting 
conclusions about the evolution of rhetoric over time would be vulnerable 
both on a small-n basis (only one speech per year places a heavy burden of 
representativeness on that speech) and because of the sheer difficulty of 
retaining a mental overview of what rhetorical changes had been made, and 
when. Content analysis, if properly specified, would in theory enable me to 
expand the population of rhetoric under analysis and to extract more robust 
findings from it.  
Of course content analysis software is not an analyst but a tool, and it can 
only produce the results it is tasked for; processing power is no substitute for 
research design. In particular, CA software cannot draw conclusions about 
meaning: it may take observations about what is said and when, but it remains 
for the researcher to interpret those observations and determine their 
significance, if any. There was therefore a degree of caution attached to my 
use of CA, which did not aspire to push at some of the more cutting-edge 
applications of the technology (e.g. Hopkins & King, 2010; Schonhardt-Bailey 
2014) or to load too much analytical weight on the outputs of the analysis, 
particularly in regards to causation. This was partly pragmatic – there were 
only so many degrees of freedom available within this single-case study – but 
also reflected epistemological reservations about the quantification of 
rhetorical data. Content analysis in political science has sometimes been used 
to analyse political texts “not as discourses to be understood and interpreted 
but as data in the form of words” (Laver et al, 2003: 311). However, to adopt 
such methodologies would be fundamentally at odds with the constructivist, 
narrative-oriented research framework pursued here. Words are not numbers; 
they are carriers of meaning, and while recording their incidence can point up 
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patterns for further investigation, it can also mislead if the importance of 
those linguistic patterns is mis-specified from the start. In this I concur with 
Krippendorff’s judgment that “ultimately, all reading of texts is qualitative, 
even when certain characteristics of a text are later converted into numbers” 
(2013: 22). I wanted content analysis to take me through the rhetorical data in 
a relatively systematic way; I did not seek to achieve statistical detachment 
from the data in a way that relieved me of the problem of meaning or the 
complexity of context. The identification of rhetorical patterns would be a spur 
to qualitative reading, albeit selective reading; it could not be a substitute for 
it. 
The objectives of the content analysis exercise were therefore deliberately 
descriptive rather than inferential. The aim was not to generate free-standing 
statistical inferences about positive causal relationships between language 
and key variables in a way that would satisfy the precepts of King, Keohane & 
Verba’s (1994) model of qualitative inquiry. It was simply to identify patterns 
that could then be qualitatively interrogated. Specifically, the aims of the 
content analysis exercises conducted for this project were: 
1. to observe the incidence of language in key thematic categories over 
time, as a means of: 
a. testing preconceptions about the existence and centrality of 
certain themes in the New Labour narrative (e.g. “no more 
boom and bust”), and 
b. ascertaining whether, and when, the frequency of this language 
of interest changed over time; and 
 
2. to facilitate qualitative analysis of speeches by: 
a. extracting sub-categories of language from within the larger 
population (e.g. all names for the financial crisis), and 
b. providing an easy reference framework for extracting language 
on relevant themes while retaining the ability to view thematic 
keywords in context. 
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This second objective draws on Kelle (1997) who suggests that concerns about 
the erasure of meaning by computerised content analysis should not detract 
from its potential as a tool for organising textual data.  
 
Software selection and pilot studies 
The choice of software for the content analysis work was shaped by these 
research objectives. Two main alternatives were considered: Alceste and QDA 
Miner/Wordstat. In each case, an exploratory pilot exercise was conducted 
using only budget statements, as a means of exploring what the software 
could do, and its fit with the research objectives of the project. 
  Alceste is an exploratory content analysis programme based on the co-
occurrence of units within a body of text. As such it is a particularly powerful 
tool of inductive analysis, when it is simply provided with textual material and 
asked to perform context-blind correspondence analysis on the words therein. 
It is capable of distilling themes and categories in a population of texts, and for 
mapping the relatedness of those categories, with relatively little input from 
the researcher. Set against descriptive variables (e.g. political partisanship, 
gender) this can be a means of generating compelling evidence of the 
relationship between characteristics of a text and the use of language therein. 
For example, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (2008) has used Alceste to analyse 
partisan differences in Congressional speech around abortion, where the 
programme’s ability to categorise language patterns was particulary valuable 
in creating a structured picture of the different rhetorical styles at work. 
However, this inductive approach to content analysis is less useful – at least 
initially – as a means of narrowing down a body of text to its most relevant 
components, which requires the deductive imposition of categories that direct 
the analysis. While this could certainly be attempted as a second-round of 
analysis in Alceste, perhaps based on the categories generated by the 
inductive first round, this is a roundabout way of arriving at the population of 
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language of most interest, and has the potential to fragment rather than 
focusing the researcher’s understanding of texts.  
 The pilot exercise for this research involved preparing and processing 
the fourteen Budget statements from the New Labour period, out of which 
Alceste generated a “rapport detaille” with the results of its correspondence 
analysis. This process identified six categories of language within the budget 
speeches, grouping keywords together based on their likelihood of appearing 
in proximity in the texts. These did not, however, prove particularly revealing 
for the purposes of a narrative analysis. The categories revealed a certain 
predictability in the language of budget statements:  one group, for example, 
was dominated by the language of tax policy (tax, duty, reliev*, rate, exempt) 
and another by the language of public sector financial projections (debt, 
deficit, cautious, project*). The existence of such themes in budget statements 
is, however, neither surprising nor very enlightening. In a more comparative 
framework (comparing the budgets of different parties, or across very 
different time periods, for example) Alceste’s categorisations would have 
more potential to surprise, but since this research is interested in within-case 
variance of a more subtle kind, the categorisation process proved a blunt tool. 
Alceste was therefore ruled out as a method for this project. 
 QDA Miner (and its quantitative sister programme, Wordstat) is a text 
analysis tool. It is relatively theory-neutral, facilitating a variety of options for 
text processing without committing the researcher to a particular school of 
content analysis. Compared with Alceste it operates mostly deductively, and is 
most powerful as a means of implementing coding frameworks designed by 
the researcher. Codes can be applied automatically (via keyword and text 
retrieval functions) or manually according to the researcher’s judgment. 
Likewise, the results can be analysed quantitatively, in relation to researcher-
specified variables, or qualitatively, via the keywords-in-context function.  
Once again a pilot exercise was conducted based on budget speeches, 
coded for key vocabulary such as stability. This was a mostly exploratory pilot 
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to establish how to create a project in the software and to identify which of its 
functions would be most useful. The deductive structure of QDA miner 
appeared well suited to producing the frequency counts and keyword-in-
context tables that would fulfil the two main objectives of the research; it was 
therefore selected as the software for the full content analysis. 
 
Sampling and data gathering: Main corpus 
The main content analysis exercise was a longitudinal analysis of four 
rhetorical themes over time. It was therefore necessary to construct a corpus 
of speeches that would facilitate comparisons across years. For this reason the 
corpus focused on set-piece economic policy speeches by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, rather than including speeches that represented an irregular or 
one-off intervention on economic policy matters. For balance, the aim was to 
include speeches that had been made to a variety of audiences, making it less 
likely that the presence of coded language in the four themes might reflect the 
nature of a statement, rather than the broader narrative of the government. 
Comparisons across audience types might also be revealing of the thinking 
behind the narrative. 
The original intention was to include six speeches per year, across 
three audience types: Budget and Pre-Budget statements addressing a general 
and Parliamentary audience; Mansion House and CBI conference speeches for 
a business and finance audience, and the Labour Party Conference and Trades 
Union Congress speeches addressing a leftwing constituency. In practice, it 
was not possible to compile a full set of TUC speeches: those for 1997-1999 
could not be located, and the 2001 speech had been cancelled because of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. As a result the TUC speech was dropped. A 
good alternative set-piece speech to leftwing audiences could not be 
identified, leaving five speeches per year in the main corpus, with comparisons 
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on the audience variable weighted to take this discrepancy into account. Table 
M1.3 itemises the speeches included in the main corpus. 
Speeches in the main corpus were mostly sourced from HM Treasury’s 
archived website, held by the National Archives at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010813/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/home.htm 
The exceptions were: the 1997 Budget statement which was found on the 
PRnewswire website; the 2008 Mansion House speech, found as an 
embargoed press copy via Google; and Gordon Brown’s speeches to the 2008 
and 2009 CBI Conferences, which were included in an edited volume of his 
speeches (Brown, 2010b) and on the UKpol.co.uk website, which is a privately 
curated collection of British political speeches. Brown’s speech to the 2009 CBI 
Dinner was transcribed from a youtube video, making it the only one in the 
corpus to be analysed as-spoken rather than as-written; however the 
unlikelihood of Gordon Brown ad-libbing during speeches meant that this 
discrepancy was not believed to be significant enough to disrupt the content 
analysis. Finally, the government web archive’s link to Brown’s 2000 speech to 
the CBI Conference was misdirecting to the 1999 speech; the correct 
statement was found reproduced in full on the website of the Local 
Government Chronicle. While the official Treasury web archive is obviously the 
most definitive source for speech materials, the alternatives were deemed to 
be sufficiently reliable as to justify inclusion. As such the main corpus is 
believed to be a full and faithful record of Labour’s rhetoric in the set-piece 
speeches selected for analysis. 
 
Sampling and data gathering: Crisis corpus 
As set out in Chapter 6, a second corpus of speeches was constructed to 
facilitate closer analysis of the evolution of the narrative after the crisis. A key 
 281 
element of this phase of the research was the comparison between Gordon 
Brown, as Prime Minister, and Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, 
being the two post-crisis narrators of Labour’s economic policy after the crash. 
This necessitated a move away from set piece speeches only, because the 
Prime Minister’s speeches on the economy were fewer and more ad-hoc than 
those of the Chancellor. As such, one-off and keynote speeches had to be 
considered for inclusion. This introduced the possibility of some bias in the 
sample because it was harder to control for the nature of the audience; 
however this risk was considered acceptable because the Prime Minister’s 
words are, of themselves, likely to address a broader audience than the 
Chancellor’s. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that non-set piece Prime 
Ministerial speeches are nonetheless representative of his overall message, as 
opposed to being tailored to a niche audience. Corpus selection here focused 
primarily on achieving balance between the two speakers, as well as a good 
spread of material across the time period. In practice it was possible to 
achieve good coverage not only of general-audience speeches, but of 
speeches to business audiences by both speakers, since the job of speaking to 
the CBI, which had been done entirely by Brown in the pre-crisis period, was 
split between Brown and Darling after 2007. Both also addressed the annual 
Labour Party conference, and with speeches in the crisis period being 
necessarily focused on the economy, their inclusion ensured good coverage of 
the economic policy language used by both speakers in front of a leftwing 
audience. The crisis corpus was therefore well balanced on the audience 
variable as well as the speaker variable. 
Table M1.4 itemises the speeches in the crisis corpus. Some Prime 
Ministerial speeches were available on the archived No.10 website, though 
this was a less complete record than the HM Treasury archive. Others were 
sourced via the Labour Party website, ukpol.co.uk and through 
britishpoliticalspeech.org, which contains an archive of British political rhetoric 
curated by Dr Alan Finlayson of UEA and Dr Judy Atkins of Swansea University. 
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As in the main corpus, these sources were deemed reliable and the texts 
analysed are assumed to be an accurate record of the government’s rhetoric. 
Text preparation and variables 
Text preparation of the corpus speeches was deliberately minimal, reflecting a 
desire to leave the material as close to its original state as possible. There was 
no attempt to standardise spellings (e.g. across UK and US English verb 
endings) nor to clean up the way numbers are presented (billion/billions, 
£/pounds). Had the aim been to run a more inductive, quantitative coding 
process, this might have been necessary: for example, combining 
“globalisation” and “globalization” as a single word would produce more 
meaningful frequency counts than leaving them as two apparently separate 
text units. But since the aim was to deductively code for categories containing 
groups of pre-specified keywords, this could be dealt with via the coding 
framework, which could simply group both spellings under the same code. I 
therefore judged it best to leave the original texts alone as far as possible, to 
avoid interfering in ways that could themselves produce inconsistencies. 
Text preparation was therefore limited to: 
- the removal of special characters as required by QDA Miner, specifically 
brackets [ ] { }  
- Removal of hyphens, which QDA Miner cannot process. These were 
replaced with spaces, so “long-term” became “long term” etc. 
- Replacing the % symbol with “per cent” throughout 
- Removal of extraneous text that is not part of the body of the speech 
(e.g. where the speaker begins with a  “thank you very much” to the 
person introducing him). 
Subheadings in the speeches were also removed. These were mostly a feature 
of budget and PBR statements in the late 1990s, and were removed because 
their usage was inconsistent over time. While the subheadings could be 
qualitatively interesting (for example, they often pointed up stability as a key 
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theme in speeches), their inclusion would have skewed frequency counts for 
key words towards the earlier speeches, simply because the later ones 
dropped the subheadings as part of their format. Removing these allowed for 
a straight comparison of the content, rather than the structure, of speeches. 
The speeches were not proof-read before being uploaded to QDA 
Miner, creating the possibility that frequency counts for keywords could be 
affected by typing errors in the original texts. However for reasons of 
efficiency, proof-reading every speech in detail would simply not have been 
possible. Given the nature of the raw material, which will have been subject to 
proof-reading before its clearance for publication by the relevant government 
departments, the risk of errors was presumed to be low enough to be 
acceptable. 
The structure of QDA Miner is such that each document under analysis 
must be assigned to a ‘case’ unit within the programme. In this instance, each 
document was treated as a separate case in its own right. Analysis can then be 
conducted on a case-only basis, or according to programmed variables, which 
are constructed by tagging each case with relevant properties. This facilitates 
both descriptive analysis in the form of crosstabs for frequency by variable. 
The following variables were constructed for the purposes of the analysis: 
speaker, year, speechdate, audience type (parliament/business/party) and 
speech type (Budget; PBR; Mansion House; CBI; Conference).  
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the speech materials were coded for 
the presence of four rhetorical themes, each of which was known to be 
important to Labour’s economic policy framework. These were: 
macroeconomic stability (mainly monetary policy), fiscal prudence, 
globalisation and financial sector regulation. The first three were important 
because they encompassed the ideational core of New Labour’s political 
economy; the fourth mattered because it captured the application of those 
ideas to the sector that would prove most central to the 2008 crisis. This was, 
therefore, a deductive exercise in extracting relevant text against pre-
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determined thematic categories, combined with a longitudinal exercise in 
observing change or continuity within those categories. In order for this to be 
successful it was vital that the categories be consistently applied. This could 
have been achieved in one of two ways: manual coding, in which a coder reads 
the text and assigns codes to segments that meet pre-specified criteria, or 
automated coding based on pre-determined keywords. The latter approach 
was selected as more efficient and as offering a high degree of transparency 
while removing the problem of inter-coder reliability. While it risked missing 
language that could be considered relevant to the themes, but which did not 
contain the right keywords, it had the great advantage of simplicity whilst 
retaining the potential to capture themes effectively, provided the keywords 
were well enough specified to make the codes a good proxy for the concepts 
of interest.  
The coding framework (Figure M1.1) arranged the four themes as 
‘categories’ in QDA miner. Beneath each category was a set of codes built on 
groups of related keywords. By coding on two levels in this way, keywords in 
each category could be either combined or held separate to allow more 
granular analysis of the coded rhetoric – for example by distinguishing 
between references to stability, and references to boom and bust. In most 
cases lemmatisation (i.e. asterisked word stems) was necessary to capture 
variations on a common root: for example “globalis*” captured globalisation, 
globalised etc. A separate stem for “globaliz* captured any instances where 
the American spelling had been used. The programme was asked to retrieve 
full sentences containing each keyword; these were briefly reviewed before 
being coded automatically using the “code all segments” function. If a 
keyword tended to bring up irrelevant segments, the code would be 
redesigned: for example, the lemmatized stem *stab* did not only capture  
 285 
Figure M1.1: Four themes coding framework 
CATEGORIES  CODES KEYWORDS 
MACROSTABILITY 
 
Stability 
Boom and bust 
 
STAB*, INSTAB*, DESTAB*, RESTAB*, UNSTAB* 
BOOM_AND_BUST, BOOM_BUST, STOP_GO 
PRUDENCE 
 
Prudence 
Fiscal rules 
 
PRUD*, IMPRUD* 
FISCAL_RULE*, GOLDEN_RULE*, SUSTAINABLE_INVESTMENT_RULE* 
GLOBALISATION 
 
Globalisation 
Global Economy 
 
GLOBALIS*, GLOBALIZ* 
GLOBAL_ECONOM*, WORLD_ECONOM* 
 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
 
Regulation 
Financial Services 
City of London 
REGULAT*, DEREGULAT* 
FINANCIAL_SERVICE* 
CITY_OF_LONDON 
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different prefixes and verb endings for ‘stability’ and ‘stabilise’, but also 
returned hits for irrelevant words such as ‘establish’. The code was therefore 
redesigned to look for different stability prefixes separately. This avoided the 
need to manually sift retrieved segments for relevance, which would have 
undermined the goal of applying codes automatically in order to avoid coder 
judgment calls that could have become a source of inconsistency. 
The unit of analysis was specified as sentences rather than paragraphs, 
for manageability. Coded segments were highlighted in QDA Miner, allowing 
for analysis against variables and keyword-in-context searches. They were also 
extracted and saved in Excel files, thereby generating a complete archive of 
relevant language on each theme, with the project variables attached. These 
tables would prove an invaluable resource for the compilation of the 
qualitative historical account in chapters 4-7. For example, every reference to 
prudence in the corpus could be viewed in a list, with information on the 
speeches in which they had appeared, facilitating conclusions about when 
themed language was being used, whether individual speeches were 
particularly driving frequency counts for particular keywords, and so on. 
 
Coding for sub-themes 
In certain areas it was desirable to break down the language within a thematic 
code, to achieve a more granular picture of the rhetoric being used. This could 
be done in two ways. The first was to report the keywords in each code 
separately, for example by distinguishing between “stability” and “boom and 
bust” in the macrostability theme. This was a simple question of deciding how 
to present the outputs of the automatic coding process. A second method, 
however, was to apply a second round of manual coding to thematically coded 
segments, effectively treating language in a theme as a new population of 
words to be re-coded. This was done for two of the four themes, prudence 
and financial regulation, where it was deemed that headline frequencies could 
not of themselves fully illuminate the ideas at work in those areas. 
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 Figure M1.2 explains the coding frameworks devised for these manual 
exercises. For prudence, the purpose of the exercise was to determine 
whether the meaning of this language had altered over time, and especially 
when the juxtaposition of prudence with “purpose” had evolved. For financial 
regulation, I wanted to distinguish between different justifications of 
regulatory policy, particularly city competitiveness versus financial stability. 
These research objectives derived from a qualitative reading of the coded 
segments, which had generated an impression that the language had shifted in 
certain ways over time. The subcodes exercise was intended to test that 
qualitative conclusion and help establish its validity. 
Figure M1.2: Coding framework for prudence and financial regulation 
subcodes 
 
Prudence segments coded into one of four mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories: 
 PURPOSE – uses word ‘purpose’ or puts emphasis on positive 
impacts of public spending  
 RESPONSIBILITY – emphasises fiscal restraint and/or  
observing/meeting the fiscal rules 
 
 BOTH – displays both logics 
 NEITHER – all remaining segments 
 
Financial regulation segments coded into one of four mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive categories: 
 FINANCIAL STABILITY – emphasises stability case for regulation 
 COMPETITIVENESS – emphasises competitiveness in context of 
regulatory policy 
 BOTH – displays both logics 
 NEITHER – all remaining segments 
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It should be acknowledged that manual coding of this kind, even based 
on a prescribed coding framework, requires a degree of judgment on the part 
of the coder. In a large-n study with more overtly quantitative aspirations, it 
would be necessary to validate the coding by the use of multiple coders. 
However for this project, the application of qualitatively-assessed subcodes 
was done only by me, assigning segments to one of several categories 
(including, in each case, a residual category to achieve exhaustiveness). Since 
the aim was to test the robustness of a qualitative reading of the raw texts, I 
judged that this approach was valid. While my application of the coding 
framework by a single coder could be subject to challenge, it is no more so 
than any qualitative interpretation, and had the advantage of being 
transparent in its parameters and relatively systematic. As such I judged it 
would generally strengthen the qualitative historical account emerging from 
the thematic case study. 
 
Coding for crisis names 
As set out in Chapter 6, a final content analysis exercise was designed to focus 
specifically on the language the government used to name the financial crisis 
over the period 2007-10. The coding was thus directed to a specific question: 
when had the government acknowledged the economic crisis problem, and in 
what language? Placed in its broader context, this piece of CA spoke to the 
question of how external validity challenges arise and are acknowledged, by 
asking when and how the crisis, as an EV challenge, was conceptualised and 
communicated in rhetoric. This required the identification of a specific sub-set 
of rhetorical material that dealt directly with the crisis as an object.  
Automatic coding based on keywords would not have been suitable 
here, since the research question is inductive and descriptive: simply, what 
language was used and when? Specifying keywords deductively would have 
pre-judged the results. Instead, as with the thematic subcodes, the approach 
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was to manually code for relevant language based on a set of pre-determined 
parameters. The coding framework (Figure M1.3) specified that only segments 
containing a noun-form descriptor would be coded, excluding more broadly 
descriptive passages. For example, “these difficult times” would be coded, but 
a general discussion of productivity challenges would not. As with the 
thematic subcoding exercises, this manual approach to coding introduces a 
degree of researcher judgment and is therefore less automatically reliable 
than a keyword-based coding frame. However, seen as a structured form of 
qualitative analysis, it can be considered perfectly valid for the purposes of 
extracting relevant language, and allows for more systematic treatment of a 
medium-sized body of material than might be achieved through purely 
qualitative methods.  
Figure M1.3: Crisis names coding framework 
 
Looking for descriptors of the economic conditions - names for crisis - 
not just general discussion of economic problems. 
  
In relation to the contemporary conditions in the UK: 
  
- All sentences containing the word crisis  
  
- Any references to economic difficulties, problems, turbulence or 
similar 
  
- Any references to recession, depression, downturn, bust, slump, 
crash or the downswing of the present economic cycle 
 
Do not code: 
 
- Text units referring to past conditions or future recovery, unless 
they also meet one of the other coding criteria 
 
- References to the downturn in other countries, unless they also 
refer, directly or indirectly, to conditions in the UK 
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Limitations and ethical considerations 
There are few if any ethical dilemmas pertaining to content analysis of political 
speeches. The material under examination is already in the public domain, and 
can be treated as an official record of the positions of the government at the 
time. Content analysis of this material is simply a technique for mining the 
historical archive; the challenges attending this kind of work are more 
methodological than ethical. 
There are some important limitations of the corpus as constructed for 
this project. The most significant is the fact that the source material was 
generated by just two narrators, Brown and Darling, limiting the number of 
degrees of freedom in the analysis and placing a high burden of significance on 
the language used by those two people. This limitation is compounded by the 
fact that the time periods of most comparative interest – pre- and post-crisis – 
coincided almost exactly with the transition from Brown to Darling as 
Chancellor. Separating what was a rhetorical or ideational difference between 
the two speakers, and what was a response to the changed economic context, 
was therefore challenging. A pre-crisis comparison between different speakers 
could not meaningfully be achieved, because in the period 1997-2007 Gordon 
Brown was effectively the sole voice of New Labour’s economic policy. As 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s interventions on economic questions were 
notoriously few. The pre-crisis corpus is therefore entirely composed of 
speeches by Gordon Brown. The only alternative spokespeople in that period 
would have been junior Treasury ministers, who would have been operating at 
all times under Brown’s authority and therefore could not be considered a 
serious alternative to the Brown narrative.  The Brown-Darling comparison, on 
the other hand, is meaningful because both were at the forefront of 
conceiving, and narrating, Labour’s crisis response.  
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Given these empirical realities, I judged it best to work with the best, 
most relevant, material rather than to construct larger corpuses out of weaker 
material in the name of balance. The coincidental timing of the crisis and the 
change of leadership was dealt with through the dual design of the content 
analysis exercises, one focused on the time dimension (main corpus), and the 
other on comparing post-crisis narratives between sepakers (crisis corpus). 
Had the purpose of the content analysis been to generate evidence of strong 
statistical relationships between causal variables, the skew to Brown’s rhetoric 
might have been a fundamental barrier to meaningful inference. However, the 
research objectives did not specify this kind of hard inference, looking instead 
for patterns and co-occurrences that could serve as a prompt to semi-
structured qualitative investigation. The question was therefore how to work 
sensibly around the peculiarities of the case, rather than to control for them in 
the statistical sense. The presentation of the CA findings in Chapter 6, and 
their subsequent exploration in the historical account in Chapter 7, represent 
a pragmatic approach to the material that treats the QDA outputs as 
preliminary indications to be picked up through qualitative methods including 
interviews and historical interpretation. This methodological pluralism, it is 
suggested, achieves a more meaningfully balanced set of outputs than would 
have come from an attempt to construct a more statistically perfect (but less 
empirically meaningful) corpus of speeches. 
 
Semi-structured elite interviews 
Research objectives and scope 
From the beginning of the project, it was envisaged that interviews would, if 
possible, be used as a secondary research method to supplement the main 
case study, adding “depth and richness” (Stroh, 2000: 202) to the account 
generated through historical and content analysis of primary sources. Since 
the object of analysis was the government’s narrative, as embodied in public-
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domain speeches, the first avenue of inquiry was to interpret that speech 
material directly, including via content analysis. However, interview evidence 
had the potential to provide a valuable second layer of interpretation, 
supplementing, or perhaps challenging, my initial conclusions by providing 
post-hoc accounts of the development of that narrative, as recalled by 
individuals who were involved with the New Labour government at the time. 
David Richards’ useful article on elite interviewing particularly recommends 
incorporating interviews as a secondary method in this way, because “if the 
political scientist can combine the information gained from elite interviews 
with other sources of data, such a combination produces a powerful research 
package” (1996: 204).  
The objectives for the interviews were: 
1. to explore key actors’ general perceptions of the role of 
narrative in New Labour’s economic policymaking; 
2. to stress-test emerging conclusions about the development of 
New Labour’s narrative, and its relationship to policy; and 
3. to explore certain key episodes in depth, particularly relating to 
the events of the crisis period.  
 
I was particularly mindful of Richards’ advice that “by their very nature, 
elite interviewees provide a subjective account of an event or issue [and] 
should not be conducted with a view to establishing ‘the truth’, in a crude, 
positivist manner” (ibid: 200). The purpose of the interviews was not to get 
the final word on what was ‘really’ happening behind the rhetoric, but to take 
further observations that could be set alongside the content analysis and 
qualitative readings of the material to build a fuller picture. Interviews were 
not expected to provide a proverbial smoking gun – indeed to expect this 
would be to reinstate the “rhetoric versus reality” framings that this research 
has explicitly disavowed. Rather, the interviews were intended to create 
opportunities to road-test my impressions of the case, to give alternative 
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explanations a fair hearing, and perhaps to point up new directions I had not 
yet considered. 
Given these objectives, and in line with Richards’ advice that 
interviewing is “probably most productive in the latter stages” of a project 
(ibid: 201), it was intended that the interviews should mostly take place after 
the content analysis had been conducted. However, this ideal sequencing had 
to be balanced against the fact that approaches to potential interviewees 
would sometimes have to be made opportunistically, and that the passage of 
time would tend to erode interviewees’ recall of the events in question, such 
that any long delay might lead to weaker data. There was therefore a balance 
to be struck between waiting until interviews could be leveraged for maximum 
explanatory insight, and seizing opportunities for interviews in a timely 
manner.  
 
Sample selection and limitations 
The target population for interviewees was the set of individuals who had 
been directly involved, at a high level, with both the coordination and the 
communication of New Labour’s key economic messages in government. In an 
ideal world this would include politicians themselves, plus senior advisers and 
civil servants who had worked closely with the main narrators of New Labour 
economics. For interviewees’ accounts to meaningfully contribute to the 
research, they would need to be able to speak with authority about the 
decision-making processes behind the public narrative; that is, they would 
need to have been high-ranking officials and advisers. Interview quality would 
need to be prioritised over quantity in the sample, because a few well-
connected interviewees would add greater value than a large population of 
more junior people who had observed the key narrators at a greater remove. 
An effective sample would, however, need to facilitate differentiated insights 
across certain key variables, namely time (i.e. the pre- and post-crisis periods); 
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and narrator (i.e. the teams around both Brown and Darling). Even a small 
sample would need to strive for balance on these dimensions in order to fulfill 
the research objectives. 
 Securing interviews was expected to be challenging, given the seniority 
of the people involved, the fact that we would be discussing relatively recent 
events that might still be politically sensitive, and the fact that some of those 
targeted were still actively involved in politics or policy. Even those who had 
left the policy world for the private or third sectors could be expected to be 
cautious about speaking about their previous jobs, either because they might 
wish to reenter the political sphere at some point, or out of concern to 
maintain a reputation for professional discretion and perhaps to preserve 
relationships with other key players. Former and serving civil servants could be 
expected to be particularly sensitive about the appearance of discretion, while 
politicians might be both inaccessible and cautious. Political advisers would, it 
was hoped, be more naturally comfortable with discussing sensitive or 
controversial matters. 
 Against these challenges I had certain advantages: in particular, the 
fact that I had previously been a civil servant, including at HM Treasury in the 
period 2003-07. This background helped to establish my credentials as a 
‘sensible’ person who understood how policymaking worked, and who would 
be mindful of the sensitivities attending officials’ participation in academic 
research. My background also offered a practical advantage in that I already 
knew who many of the key players had been, and could quite easily draw up 
an initial wish-list of interviewees. I planned to make initial approaches under 
my own initiative to the most-likely candidates, and then rely on snowball 
sampling to develop the interview programme. The strategy would involve 
asking respondents to suggest further contacts and, with their permission, 
name-dropping those who had already spoken to me as a means of 
establishing the respectability of the research.  
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 The first two interviews were conducted in 2012, towards the 
beginning of the project and somewhat earlier than would ideally have been 
the case. However both were classic example of the value of an opportunistic 
approach to securing interviewees. In the first case, the subject was speaking 
at a public event at which I was able to approach them in person. I introduced 
myself as a former official, briefly explained the research and asked if they 
would be willing to be interviewed, to which they agreed. Because the subject 
was both very senior and very candid, this encounter yielded a high-quality 
interview and a good set of suggestions for potential contacts. The subject 
kindly agreed that I could use their name in future approaches to interviewees, 
which was enormously helpful in reassuring others that I could be trusted (and 
indeed in getting their attention in the first place). In the second instance, a 
journalist who was a guest at an LSE event took an interest in the research, 
and offered to put me in touch with a former political adviser who might be 
willing to be interviewed. Once again, this person agreed to speak and was 
happy for their name to be used in future approaches, which was useful both 
in establishing that senior people were cooperating with the project and, 
perhaps, in provoking others to contribute, in the interests of balancing what 
might have been a somewhat partisan account from that adviser. Not all 
approaches were successful; some people agreed in principle but could not be 
pinned down in practice; others did not respond to requests. However, the 
interviews that went ahead were all extremely valuable, generating a 
significant amount of new data even allowing for the limitations of the sample. 
In the end, interviews were conducted with seven people, all very senior 
officials or advisers to the New Labour government. Though small, this sample 
did achieve the desired coverage across time and narrators. It captured the 
full period of government 1997-2010, and included people who had worked 
for both Brown and Darling.  
Approaches to politicians were, unfortunately, unsuccessful, despite 
attempts to pursue interview requests through channels including senior 
academics and policy contacts. However this did at least enable the interview 
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strategy to concentrate specifically on gleaning insights from civil servants and 
advisers who might have a greater degree of detachment from the narrative 
itself. While an opportunity to interview Brown or Darling would obviously 
have been valuable in many ways, their answers would by definition have 
represented a continuation of the narrative rather than a commentary on it. 
Politicians’ reflections on the narrative were also available by other means, 
since both Brown and Darling had published memoirs of their time in 
government with dedicated reflections on the economic crisis. Officials, on the 
other hand, could be asked to reflect on Labour’s economic story as third 
parties and to offer observations about the processes at work behind the 
narrative, rather than restating or developing the rhetoric that had been the 
outcome of those processes. As such their interviews represented genuinely 
new contributions to the evidence base on the topic, and added value to the 
research in a way that political interviews would not. 
 
Interview methodology 
Interviews were conducted between 2012 and early 2014. Initial approaches 
to potential subjects were usually made by email, which would give a brief 
outline of the planned research and my credentials, and make the request for 
an interview. These emails were kept as short as possible, since I knew that 
the working culture of policymakers favoured brevity and directness over the 
more expansive style characteristic of academics. The essential elements of 
those initial emails were: one or two lines on the research topic; a reference to 
my background as a Treasury official; my affiliation to the LSE; the names of 
any former interviewees or other contacts who had recommended I approach 
this person, or whose involvement might reassure them; and a nod to the fact 
that the interviews would be attributable only by agreement. Each of these 
matters was dealt with as succinctly as possible. For example, I would make 
clear that I was conscious of the importance of anonymity and that I would be 
happy to discuss suitable terms, but would not generally propose those terms 
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in detail in the first email. If the initial email approach was successful in getting 
agreement-in-principle to an interview, I could go into more detail in 
subsequent communications.  
After initial agreement was secured, interviewees would be provided 
with an information pack setting out the purpose of the research, a short 
researcher biography, and some outline information on matters we might 
expect to discuss. Interviewees were not given prior sight of precise questions, 
but some advance notice of the topics I wanted to cover was requested by 
some of the interviewees, and this was generally perceived as helpful. I would 
also make clear, by email, that with their permission I would like to tape-
record interviews for the purposes of accurate transcription, giving the 
interviewee the opportunity to object in advance of the interview if they 
wished, and creating a written record of the fact that this had been drawn to 
their attention. Consent for tape recording was also verbally confirmed at the 
beginning of each interview, before the dictaphone was switched on.  
Interviews generally lasted between 30-45 minutes. Regarding the 
content of interviews, I followed Richards’ guidance on elite interview 
technique, in which “the norm is not to use a questionnaire… but to adopt a 
semi-structured approach, using an aide memoir that can be referred to as the 
interview develops” (1996: 201). I would generally begin with a general 
discussion of the person’s role during the New Labour years, both to break the 
ice and to mentally take them back to the period of interest. After that, the 
topics covered were somewhat tailored to the knowledge and specific role of 
each interviewee, but would include a general discussion of the role of 
narrative in economic policymaking, some reflections on Labour’s key 
messages, and then targeted questions around events or policies of particular 
interest. Follow-up questions would sometimes have to be improvised to 
delve deeper into interesting answers; less important questions sometimes 
had to be dropped in the interests of time. The flexibility inherent in semi-
structured interviewing proved generally very effective at gleaning wide-
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ranging insights from each subject. After each interview a follow-up email 
would be sent to thank the person for their participation. 
  
Ethical considerations 
The single most important issue for securing, and successfully conducting, 
these interviews was the question of anonymity for interviewees. It was clear 
from the outset that without the promise of anonymity, either people would 
be unwilling to speak to me or they would feel unable to be frank during the 
interviews. Since the research objective was explicitly to get behind the scenes 
of the policymaking process, and to critically examine the public narrative, 
interviews that could not go further than public lines-to-take would be of very 
little value. There might have been some scope to agree attributable quotes 
with individual interviewees, some of whom were more relaxed about 
speaking publicly than others. However this would have left an even smaller 
pool of unnamed interviewees, possibly making it easier to infer their 
identities. As a result I decided to take a consistent approach to the 
presentation of interview material that would guarantee maximum anonymity 
and, hopefully, maximum frankness in the subjects. 
 My approach is therefore as follows: 
o Quoted interview material attributed only in generic terms to 
“senior official/adviser”, with in-text references to (Interview A) 
etc.  
o Interview tapes to be held confidential and used only for 
transcription purposes. 
o Interview transcripts to be anonymised and held confidential. 
Transcripts will not be placed in the public domain or circulated 
further. 
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o The list of interviewees may be discussed with my academic 
supervisor and with the examiners of this thesis but will not be 
placed on the record. 
The anonymisation of elite interviews is not an uncommon strategy in the 
social sciences, but it does require careful justification from an ethical point of 
view, since it goes against the general movement towards open data. In an 
ideal world, interview transcripts would become part of the general stock of 
knowledge, enabling others to replicate or challenge the findings of this 
project, or to draw on the primary data in their own research. In practice, 
however, this is simply not possible when dealing with policy elites on matters 
of contemporary interest. If the interview material could only be gathered on 
an open-data basis, it would not have been gathered at all; cooperation and 
anonymity went hand in hand. As such my withholding of the primary data, 
and the unattributed use of interview quotes in this thesis and related 
publications, is a valid and necessary compromise. 
 Another ethically sensitive dimension of elite interviewing – at least in 
respect of British policymakers – is judging the appropriate balance of 
formality and informality in the way the interview programme is conducted. In 
many research contexts, the correct approach would be to standardise the 
terms on which subjects agree to be interviewed, and to secure clear written 
consents as far as possible. For example, best practice might be to ask all 
interviewees to sign a pro-forma agreement on tape recording, attribution and 
the expected uses of the interview material. However, in the context of this 
project, such formality would have been off-putting and would have 
compromised my ability to secure access to the people I wanted to talk to. The 
senior civil servants I interviewed were, in some respects, only too happy to 
speak. They found the topic interesting, and seemed to actively enjoy 
discussing the politics of New Labour and the interaction between narrative 
and policymaking. Provided they could be persuaded to speak in the first place, 
they made for well-informed, candid and thoughtful interviewees. However, 
they were also highly sensitive to anything that looked like a formal process 
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rather than a discussion between individuals. Perhaps ironically for 
professional bureaucrats, most were more reassured by an informal 
arrangement that allowed them to participate as individuals, rather than as 
representatives of an institution. Formal processes would have meant putting 
their professional ‘hats’ back on, and applying greater caution than was 
otherwise the case. AS such, the tone needed to be professional but 
somewhat informal and tailored to each interviewee’s particular 
circumstances (e.g. whether they were still serving officials).  
Given that context, I decided against written consent forms and used a 
combination of email communications and verbal confirmation to agree our 
terms of engagement.  This was by no means an attempt to fudge the issue: it 
was essential that the terms were understood on both sides, that consent was 
genuinely present with no attempt at constructive ambiguity. But the manner 
in which these points were agreed was part and parcel of establishing rapport 
and trust. If I felt that an interviewee was unhappy with the situation I gave 
them the chance to decline the interview on the day. One subject did initially 
baulk at tape recording, which nearly caused the interview to be aborted. 
Thankfully they were persuaded to change their mind, based on the fact that 
other colleagues had agreed to be recorded and that I was able to assure them 
the tapes would be treated confidentially. Requiring a signature on a consent 
form would likely have pushed that person to a hard ‘no’. In the end, a clear 
but non-legalistic process for agreeing terms with interviewees struck the 
appropriate balance between professionalism and pragmatism. 
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Table M1.4: Speeches included in the Main corpus 
Year Speech Date Speaker Speech reference 
1997 
  
  
  
  
Mansion House speech 12 June 1997 Gordon Brown MH97 
Budget statement 2 July 1997 Gordon Brown BUD97 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 29 September 1997 Gordon Brown CONF97 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
10 November 1997 Gordon Brown 
CBI97 
Pre-Budget Report statement 25 November 1997 Gordon Brown PBR97 
1998 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 17 March 1998 Gordon Brown BUD98 
Mansion House speech 11 June 1998 Gordon Brown MH98 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 28 September 1998 Gordon Brown CONF98 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
2 November 1998 Gordon Brown 
CBI98 
Pre-Budget Report statement 3 November 1998 Gordon Brown PBR98 
1999 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 9 March 1999 Gordon Brown BUD99 
Mansion House speech 10 June 1999 Gordon Brown MH99 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 27 September 1999 Gordon Brown CONF99 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
1 November 1999 Gordon Brown 
CBI99 
Pre-Budget Report statement 9 November 1999 Gordon Brown PBR99 
2000 
  
Budget statement 21 March 2000 Gordon Brown BUD00 
Mansion House speech 15 June 2000 Gordon Brown MH00 
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Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 25 September 2000 Gordon Brown CONF00 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
6 November 2000 Gordon Brown 
CBI00 
Pre-Budget Report statement 8 November 2000 Gordon Brown PBR00 
2001 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 7 March 2001 Gordon Brown BUD01 
Mansion House speech 20 June 2001 Gordon Brown MH01 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 1 October 2001 Gordon Brown CONF01 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
5 November 2001 Gordon Brown 
CBI01 
Pre-Budget Report statement 27 November 2001 Gordon Brown PBR01 
2002 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 17 April 2002 Gordon Brown BUD02 
Mansion House speech 26 June 2002 Gordon Brown MH02 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 30 September 2002 Gordon Brown CONF02 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
25 November 2002 Gordon Brown 
CBI02 
Pre-Budget Report statement 27 November 2002 Gordon Brown PBR02 
2003 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 9 April 2003 Gordon Brown BUD03 
Mansion House speech 18 June 2003 Gordon Brown MH03 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 29 September 2003 Gordon Brown CONF03 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
18 November 2003 Gordon Brown 
CBI03 
Pre-Budget Report statement 10 December 2003 Gordon Brown PBR03 
2004 Budget statement 17 March 2004 Gordon Brown BUD04 
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Mansion House speech 16 June 2004 Gordon Brown MH04 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 27 September 2004 Gordon Brown CONF04 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
9 November 2004 Gordon Brown 
CBI04 
Pre-Budget Report statement 4 December 2004 Gordon Brown PBR04 
2005 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 16 March 2005 Gordon Brown BUD05 
Mansion House speech 22 June 2005 Gordon Brown MH05 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 26 September 2006 Gordon Brown CONF05 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
28 November 2005 Gordon Brown 
CBI05 
Pre-Budget Report statement 5 December 2005 Gordon Brown PBR05 
2006 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 22 March 2006 Gordon Brown BUD06 
Mansion House speech 21 June 2006 Gordon Brown MH06 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 25 September 2006 Gordon Brown CONF06 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
28 November 2006 Gordon Brown 
CBI06b 
Pre-Budget Report statement 6 December 2006 Gordon Brown PBR06 
2007 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 21 March 2007 Gordon Brown BUD07 
Mansion House speech 20 June 2007 Gordon Brown MH07 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 23 September 2007 Alistair Darling CONF07a 
Pre-Budget Report statement 9 October 2007 Alistair Darling PBR07 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
27 November 2007 Alistair Darling 
CBI07b 
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2008 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 12 March 2008 Alistair Darling BUD08 
Mansion House speech 18 June 2008 Alistair Darling MH08 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 22 September 2008 Alistair Darling CONF08a 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
24 November 2008 Gordon Brown 
CBI08b 
Pre-Budget Report statement 24 November 2008 Alistair Darling PBR08 
2009 
  
  
  
  
Budget statement 22 April 2009 Alistair Darling BUD09 
Mansion House speech 17 June 2009 Alistair Darling MH09 
Chancellor’s speech to the Labour Party conference 28 September 2009 Alistair Darling CONF09a 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry annual 
conference 
23 November 2009 Gordon Brown 
CBI09b 
Pre-Budget Report statement 9 December 2009 Alistair Darling PBR09 
2010 Budget statement 24 March 2010 Alistair Darling BUD10 
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Table M1.5: Speeches included in the Crisis corpus 
Year Speech Date Speaker name Speech reference 
2007 
  
  
  
  
  
Chancellor's speech to Labour Party Conference 23 September 2007 Alistair Darling CONF07a 
Leader's speech to Labour Party Conference 24 September 2007 Gordon Brown CONF07b 
Speech at Reuters 1 October 2007 Gordon Brown REUT07 
Pre-Budget Report statement 9 October 2007 Alistair Darling PBR07 
Chancellor’s speech to the Confederation of British 
Industry annual conference 27 November 2007 Alistair Darling CBI07b 
Prime Minister’s speech to the Confederation of 
British Industry annual conference 29 November 2007 Gordon Brown CBI07c 
2008 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Speech on business priorities for a 'Global Europe' 14 January 2008 Gordon Brown GE08 
Budget statement 12 March 2008 Alistair Darling BUD08 
Speech to the Confederation of British Industry 
annual dinner 20 May 2008 Alistair Darling CBI08a 
Mansion House speech 18 June 2008 Alistair Darling MH08 
Chancellor's speech to Labour Party Conference 22 September 2008 Alistair Darling CONF08a 
Leader's speech to Labour Party Conference 23 September 2008 Gordon Brown CONF08b 
Speech on the global economy at Reuters 14 October 2008 Gordon Brown REUT08 
Speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New 
York 14 November 2008 Gordon Brown CFR08 
Pre-Budget Report statement 24 November 2008 Alistair Darling PBR08 
Speech to CBI Annual Conference 24 November 2008 Gordon Brown CBI08b 
2009 Speech at the Foreign Press Association in London 26 January 2009 Gordon Brown FPA09 
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Speech at St Paul's Cathedral 31 March 2009 Gordon Brown STPAULS09 
Budget statement 22 April 2009 Alistair Darling BUD09 
Speech to CBI Annual Dinner 20 May 2009 Gordon Brown CBI09a 
Mansion House speech 17 June 2009 Alistair Darling MH09 
Chancellor's speech to Labour Party Conference 28 September 2009 Alistair Darling CONF09a 
Leader's speech to Labour Party Conference 29 September 2009 Brown CONF09b 
Speech at Reuters 21 October 2009 Darling REUTERS09 
Speech to CBI Annual Conference 23 November 2009 Brown CBI09b 
Pre-Budget Report statement 9 December 2009 Darling PBR09 
2010 
  
Speech to the Progressive Governance Conference 19 February 2010 Brown PG10 
Budget statement 24 March 2010 Darling BUD10 
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